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Oregon’s nursery and greenhouse industry has ranked the first in the State’s 
agricultural for 18 years.  The majority of nursery sales from the Pacific Northwest come 
from Oregon.  Due to data limitations, empirical study of the Oregon nursery industry is 
rare.  The present dissertation consists of three essays that analyze the demand and supply 
of inputs and outputs and the relationship between producers and retailers in the Oregon 
nursery industry. 
Chapter 2 identifies the major factors affecting farm labor supply and demand and 
evaluates their relative importance in the Oregon nursery industry from 1991 to 2008.  
Empirical results show that border control effort doesn’t have an influential role in labor 
supply, while the Oregon and Mexican minimum wage do.  It is because of the 
substantial gap between the U.S. and Mexican economies, reflected for an example in the 
minimum wage gap, which attracts a continual flow of immigrants.  Risk of border 
apprehension is not great enough to prevent the flow.  Increases in Oregon minimum 
wage is more effective than border apprehension policies in boosting the average wage 
and in reducing the number of hours that illegal immigrants work in the nursery sector. Chapter 3 investigates producers’ and retailers’ choices of, and reactions to, 
various contract types in the Oregon nursery industry from 2005 to 2010.  As new and 
fast-growing retailers in the industry, big-box stores are less likely than independent 
retailers to make pre-order contracts with the producer.  However, once a pre-order 
contract is chosen, big-box stores demand more days of pre-order interval than 
independent retailers do.  Transactions with independent retailers exhibit – on average 
over the sample range – scale economies and scope diseconomies.  Boosting per-
transaction revenue scale and the number of species sold to big-box stores enhances 
transaction efficiency. 
Chapter 4 examines the interaction between supply and demand in Oregon 
nursery products.  The result indicates that the production and transaction costs are major 
drivers on the supply side, while transportation costs and consumer demand for nursery 
products play important roles on the demand side.  At the genus level, the supply 
elasticities of coniferous plants are larger than those of deciduous plants, which in turn 
are higher than those of flowering plants.  The demand elasticities are the lowest in 
coniferous trees followed by deciduous plants, then flowering plants.  Price discounts on 
plants with high demand elasticities would significantly boost sales and enlarge the 
market, while those on plants with low demand elasticities would have less sales impact.  
Empirically, patenting seems to bring no direct signs of greater profitability.  The 
wholesale nursery may wish to reconsider the pricing and marketing policies of its 
patented plants to differentiate them more effectively from its non-patented plants. 
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Foreign-born labor, sales contracts, and price discovery are three important areas 
of agricultural economics.  The Oregon nursery provides an interesting background from 
which to study these topics.  I address each of them in the following three chapters.  
Labor’s importance to agriculture is well known, as is the large proportion of 
foreign-born workers in the agricultural workforce.  Rapid expansion of foreign-born 
workers in the low-skilled sectors of the agricultural labor market has impelled both legal 
and illegal U.S. immigration to the front rank of policy debate.  In particular, the 
interaction between potential immigrants' relocation decisions, growers' production 
decisions, and government policy choices has become crucial to the formulation and 
implementation of immigration policy reform.  However, immigration policy impacts on 
labor supply, demand, and local wage rate remain inconclusive.  In chapter 2, I focus on 
the nursery industry—one of the more labor-intensive in agriculture—as a case in point.  
The objective has been to answer three questions:  (1) What are the major factors in 
agricultural labor supply?  (2) What are the major drivers of agricultural labor demand?  
(3) What are these factors’ relative contributions to labor supply and demand?  A new 
and carefully constructed quarterly dataset of 93 Oregon nurseries during the 1991-2008 
period is used in the empirical study. 
The nursery industry consists of wholesale nurseries – which I will call the 
producers – and their customers, namely retail nurseries, landscapers, garden centers, and 
big-box stores.  Marketing practices of nursery growers include sales to repeat customers, 
negotiated sales, brokerage sales, contract sales, and export sales.  Pre-order contracting 
is an important marketing practice as a risk management tool (Hodges, A., M. Palma, and 
C. Hall, 2009).  Compared with a spot market transaction, pre-order contracts reduce the 
producer’s inventory and market risk, while providing retailers with purchase discounts.  
Based on retailer and payment type, nursery contracts are divided into four groups in 
chapter 3: single-order contracts using pay-by-order, single-order contracts using pay-by-
scan, annual contracts using pay-by-order, and annual contracts using pay-by-scan.  The 
goal is to analyze producers’ and retailers’ choices of, and reactions to, various contract 3 
 
types in the Oregon nursery industry.  Data on contract and retailer characteristics were 
provided by a large Oregon wholesale nursery during the 2005 – 2010 period. 
A critical characteristic distinguishing nursery products from many other 
agricultural crops is the high degree of product differentiation.  Enormous product 
diversity arises from combinations of variety, plant material, and plant size.  A 
representative nursery wholesaler may produce as many as 500 varieties of coniferous 
trees, deciduous trees, broadleaf evergreens, shrubs, Japanese Maples, ornamental, 
perennial, and annual plants.  Chapter 3 is the first research to systematically examine the 
interaction between supply and demand among highly differentiated nursery products.  
Data were collected from a variety of sources, including the Oregon Association of 
Nurseries, the invoices of a representative nursery company, and the Oregon 
Employment Department.  The objectives are to:  (a) study the interaction among the 
major drivers of nursery supply and demand in an industry of high product differentiation; 
and (b) draw management implications on the basis of the estimated supply and demand 
elasticities.4 
 
 
Chapter 2 : Immigration and Agricultural Labor Market in Oregon 
Nursery Industry 
 
 
 
Cheng Li5 
 
 
Introduction 
The U.S. agricultural labor market has experienced structural changes in the last 
fifty years, from family farmworkers to hired farmworkers and from domestic 
farmworkers to foreign-born farmworkers.  Immigrants play an increasingly important 
role in this transition since, based on the report The National Agricultural Workers 
Survey
1, 78 percent of all crop workers were foreign-born in fiscal years 2001-2002 and 
53 percent of all respondents lacked legal status to work in the U.S.  There is a long-
standing immigration policy debate regarding the laws surrounding immigrant 
farmworkers, including the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), 
agricultural guest-worker program, non-immigrant agricultural worker program (H-2A), 
Agricultural Job Opportunity Benefits and Security Act of 1998 (AgJOBS), and 
Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006 (CIRA).  However, the effectiveness 
and enforcement of immigration policy are doubtful because of the rapidly expanding 
numbers of illegal foreign-born workers.  Relationships among farmworkers, producers, 
and government are reciprocal and partly contradictory.  For example, strict border 
control will limit immigration across the border and reduce the availability of agricultural 
workers, while loose border control will expand illegal immigration, boosting the social 
cost of education and health care. 
The Oregon nursery provides an interesting background from which to study the 
effect of immigrants on the agricultural labor market because Oregon’s nursery and 
greenhouse industry has ranked the first in the State’s agriculture for 18 years, and a large 
proportion of Oregon nursery workers are from Mexico (Oregon Nursery and 
Greenhouse Survey 2007).  Compared to beef, hogs, and poultry industries, many jobs in 
the nursery sector are labor-intensive and physically demanding.  In Oregon nursery, 
greenhouse, and floriculture production, the share of labor among all production expenses 
was 49.2% in 2007 (Britsch 2010).  However, these low-paid, high mobility, exacting, 
and tedious agricultural jobs are less attractive for domestic workers than non-agricultural 6 
 
 
jobs are.  Therefore immigrants, even lacking documents, fill the gap between high 
demand from growers and low supply from domestic workers. 
The objectives are to: (1) specify the factors affecting the farm labor supply, such 
as immigration policies, minimum wage policy, and labor demand from other industries 
employing low-skilled workers; (2) identify the factors affecting the farm labor demand, 
such as important input and plant prices; and (3) evaluate the relative importance of labor 
supply and demand drivers.  To this end, a theoretical model is conducted to analyze the 
interaction between the relocation decisions of immigrants, production decisions of 
growers, and policy choices of government.  I compile a unique dataset covering 
quarterly working hours and wages of 93 nurseries from 1991 to 2008.  Based on the 
theoretical analysis, a simultaneous equation system is estimated to evaluate the effects 
on labor working hours and wages of immigration policies, the minimum wage gap, and 
labor demand in other low-skilled industries. 
 
Literature Review 
 
Analysis of agricultural labor supply and demand combines labor economics, 
migration theory, and immigration policy.  Regarding labor supply, because most 
agricultural workers are foreign-born and seasonal employed, they make choices not only 
between leisure and labor but also between moving and staying.  Evers et al. (2005) 
observe that 239 estimates of labor supply elasticities ranged from -0.24 to 2.79, with the 
mean of 0.24.  They show that the large variation in the estimates stems from variations 
in gender, participation rates, and country fixed effects.  Some researchers assess 
migration reasons on the basis of individual characteristics, such as gender, education, 
age, marriage status, and legal status, to determine which person finds it worthwhile to 
migrate to a new location (Perloff et al., 1998).  Surprisingly, Perloff et al. find that 
unauthorized workers are more likely to migrate within the U.S. than authorized workers 
are because unauthorized workers gain more from migrating than do citizens and green-
card holders.  They also conclude that if the earnings of seasonal agricultural workers rise 7 
 
 
by 10% in a new U.S. location, the probability of migrating rises by slightly more than 
1%.  Migration probability is inelastic to income increases because of high moving costs.  
Other researchers, for example Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999), emphasize the 
importance of social and economic factors in workers’ migration decisions.  They 
analyze the effects of macroeconomic conditions such as real wage, unemployment rate, 
and minimum wage, on illegal immigration.  In accounting for macroeconomic 
conditions and immigration policy, they find that border apprehension rate, implying 
illegal immigration effort, is strongly positively correlated with border patrol 
enforcement and that shrinking the U.S. – Mexico wage gap would reduce illegal 
Mexican immigration.  Kochhar (1992) and Card (2001) argue the impacts of labor 
immigration on domestic wage rates and labor supply depend on the patterns of labor 
migration generated by substitution and income effects.  The former effect boosts the 
migration because wages and thus wealth utility rise, while the latter effect reduces 
migration since marginal utility of wealth falls as workers increase their consumption 
flows.  If the substitution effect dominates, the domestic labor supply falls in response to 
migrant inflow.  Otherwise, immigration would increase the domestic labor supply.  
Empirical analysis supports the argument that immigrant inflows reduce employment 
among low-skilled natives by one to three percentage points because the substitution 
effect dominates the income effect (Card 2001). 
On the demand side, producers’ employment decisions have also been widely 
discussed in the economic literature.  The labor demand function is derived from a 
production function that describes how growers use technology to produce goods and 
services (Borjas, 2010).  Growers then decide how to allocate labor, capital, and material 
to maximize profit.  Espey and Thilmany (2000) summarize 84 estimated farm labor 
demand elasticities, ranging from 0.22 to -4.42.  The mean elasticity is -0.74, and over 85% 
range from 0 to -1.5.  The average long run elasticity is -1.11 and the average short run 
elasticity is -0.60, indicating that in the long run, farm labor demand is more elastic than 
in the short run.   8 
 
 
Borjas (2003), Ottaviano and Peri (2006), and Bodvarsson et al. (2008) estimate 
the effects of immigration on wages.  Overall immigration reduces wages by 3 to 4 
percent, but the impact differs by the worker’s education, work experience, and ethnicity.  
Immigration impact on U.S.-born workers with at least a high school degree is actually 
positive because immigrants are imperfect substitutes for this group.  Jaeger (2008) 
employs a regional input-output model of Oregon to evaluate the effect of “No Match” 
immigration rules
2 on the Oregon economy.  These rules include fines or criminal 
prosecution of firms hiring illegal workers, which might affect firms’ incentives to hire 
illegal workers.  Jaeger estimates that the rule will result in a loss of 7.7% of Oregon’s 
workforce in the short term and 6.5% in the long term.  The departure of Oregon’s 
undocumented workers will not reduce the unemployment rate because there is a 
mismatch in skills, education, location, and willingness-to-work between undocumented 
workers and Oregon’s unemployed. 
Kannan (1988), Wilkinson (1970), and Katz et al. (1992) have analyzed labor 
supply and demand simultaneously.  However, it is not common to assess international 
agricultural immigration issues in a labor supply and demand framework.  With a rich 
data set, I am able in the present chapter to examine such issues that have been 
inadequately treated in the earlier literature.  First, I establish general equilibrium in the 
labor market by specifying supply and demand factors simultaneously.  Because supply 
and demand quantities depend on each other, estimates of supply and demand elasticities 
would be biased if either supply or demand were ignored.  Second, I combine migration 
theory into a labor supply and demand framework to examine the effect of immigration 
on the agricultural labor market.  Third, I assess the effects of social and economic 
factors on migration, with consequent important policy implications.  
 
The Theoretical Model 
 
Roback (1982) develops a general equilibrium model in which both labor and 
capital are assumed completely mobile across cities.  Wages and rents are determined by 9 
 
 
the interaction between the equilibrium conditions of workers and firms.  I modify this 
model by assuming that the costs of changing locations are not zero and that workers are 
identical in skill and different in immigration costs and accessible amenities.  Wage rates 
and working hours are determined by the interaction between the equilibrium conditions 
of labor supply and demand.  Work locations are assumed to differ by socio-economic 
characteristics, industry characteristics, and local amenities. 
Quantity Determination on the Supply Side 
 
We can distinguish three types of farmworkers according to immigration costs 
and local amenities:  native workers, authorized immigrants, and undocumented 
immigrants.  In the present paper, immigration costs are expressed in terms of 
apprehension risk, smuggler fees, and transportation expenses.  Local amenities refer to 
education conditions, medical accessibility, environmental conditions, and social welfare.  
Immigration costs and local amenities influence workers’ decisions on whether to move 
from Mexico to the U.S. and therefore the labor supply quantity in the host country.  
Assume that   is immigration cost,  is local amenity, h is working hour, w is wage rate, 
x is agricultural product consumption, p is the vector of prices of agricultural product, z is 
a numeraire non-agricultural good, and y is non-labor income.  Utility functions of the 
three worker types,  ( , ; , ) u h x , are assumed identical with the usual properties.  The 
problem of the representative worker is to choose labor quantities h to satisfy a budget 
constraint: 
(1) 
         
max ( , , ; , )
h u h x z 
 
subject to  px z wh y     
The budget constraint says expenses for the agricultural and non-agricultural good 
are less than or equal to the sum of labor and non-labor income.   0
u



  
because   is a 
proxy for the immigration cost and  0
u




because  is a proxy for the local amenity.  
Forming the Lagrangian gives 10 
 
 
 (       )    (     )    (               ) 
Taking first derivatives and solving for first-order conditions in h and x, I get 
  
  
 
  
  
     
  
  
 
  
  
     
Setting them equal to zero, I obtain 
0
u w u
h p x


  
or  /
/
x
uh
wp
ux



 
where  0
u
h



 and  0
u
x



 because of utility function convexity.  Maximizing u with 
respect to h yields the labor supply function 
(2)        
*( , ; , , )
ss h h w p y    
The labor supply can also be written in its inverse form, reflecting the wage rate that 
workers demand. 
(3)                      ( , ; , , )
ss w w h p y    
The labor supply curve can be backward bending.  When a worker initially 
substitutes leisure for work, the curve is positively sloped.  But when the worker is 
willing to substitute work for leisure, the curve is negatively sloped.  I assume 
farmworkers are in the former situation because they engage in the low-skilled and low-
paid jobs with low wages.  The farmworker market equilibrium condition is given by 
(4)        ( , ; , , ) V w p y V    
where   ̅ is a reservation utility determined endogenously in general equilibrium.  Wages 
must adjust so that utility is at least as great as reference point   ̅ established by 
farmworkers in other locations.  Otherwise some workers would have an incentive to 
migrate (Roback, 1982). 
 11 
 
 
Price Determination on the Demand Side 
 
Assume a representative grower produces output q using labor quantity h and 
material quantity m.  The grower is indifferent among the types of farmworker it hires.  
Only two production inputs, labor and materials, are considered.  I assume a twice 
differentiable aggregate production function that describes the nursery industry’s 
production technology in the form 
(5)            ( , ; ) q Q h m t   
where t is a time variable which serves as a proxy for technology.  The production set is 
convex, so that  '( ) 0 Qh ,  '( ) 0 Qm ,  ''( ) 0 Qh , and  ''( ) 0 Qm  .  Labor and material 
inputs drive up output, but their marginal substitution rate decreases following the law of 
diminishing marginal utility.  The problem for the representative grower is, given the 
wage rate w, input price r, and output price p, to choose input labor quantity h and 
material quantity m to maximize profit conditional on technology: 
(6)    
, max ( , , ; )
hm w r p t pq wh rm    
 
subject to  ( , ; ) Q h m t q     
where q is the output determined by the production function  ( , ; ) Q h m t .  By Hotelling’s 
lemma, optimal labor demand is obtained as the wage rate’s marginal profit: 
(7)        
* ( , , ; )
( , , ; )
dd w r p t
h h w r p t
w
 
  

 
Since the profit function is convex and continuous in w, the demand curve is 
downward sloping: 
2
2
( / )
0
d hw
w w w
     
   
  
.  Cross-price effects are symmetric 
because 
22 dd hm
r w r r w w
    
    
     
.  If  0
d h
r



, the labor and material input are 
substitutable; otherwise, if  0
d h
r



, the labor and material input are complementary.  The 
grower’s market equilibrium condition is given by 12 
 
 
(8)           (       )     ̅ 
where   ̅ is a reservation profit determined endogenously in general equilibrium.  Wages 
must adjust so that profit is at least as great as reference point   ̅ determined by competing 
growers’ optimizations.  Otherwise, the modeled grower will go bankrupt. 
 
Equilibrium 
 
The interaction of equilibrium conditions (4) and (8) for farmworkers and growers 
together determine wage rates and working hours.  Farm workers enjoy higher wages and 
better amenities at the price of immigration costs, and growers trade lower labor costs for 
higher material costs.  This framework can be used to reveal the effect of immigration 
costs and local amenities on wage rates and working hours. 
In equilibrium, wage rates are higher in periods with higher immigration costs.  
For example, when border apprehension risk rises on account of tightened immigration 
policy, the labor supply function would move to the left, boosting wage rates.  On the 
other hand, wage rates are lower in locations with better amenities.  For example, if 
expectations of a stable earning rate rise, the labor supply function moves to the right, 
decreasing the equilibrium wage rate.  These results can be obtained by differentiating (4) 
and (8) with respect to immigration cost  and amenity and solving for 
  
   and 
  
  : 
        
0
p
w p p w
V dw
d V V

  
  
  
        
0
p
w p p w
V dw
d V V

  
  
  
where  0 V  ,  0 V  ,  0 p   ,  0 w p p w VV   , and  0 w p p w VV   .  The derivations 
are presented in Appendix A.  On the demand side, because the demand curve is 
downward sloping, higher wage rates reduce the grower’s labor demand, 
  
      .  13 
 
 
Multiplying  
  
       and 
  
       by 
  
   gives the respective effect of immigration costs 
and local amenities on working hours: 
0
dh dh dw
d dw d 

 
0
dh dh dw
d dw d 
  
For example, higher immigration costs reduce the number of immigrants and 
better amenities attract more workers to cross the border.  Although immigration costs 
and local amenities are assumed not to affect agricultural production directly, both of 
them influence wage rate and working hours indirectly via the profit function. 
However, the effects of minimum wage legislation on the agricultural labor 
market are mixed.  In the short run, minimum wage legislation serves as a price floor on 
labor.  Increasing the minimum wage drives up the wage rates and decreases the 
employment of minimum-wage workers, but the labor supply and demand curves 
themselves do not change.  In the long run, minimum wage legislation serves as a proxy 
for the amenity of a stable earnings rate.  Thus, the minimum wage shifts the labor supply 
curve to the right, decreasing the equilibrium wage rate and increasing the number of 
hours employed.  In next section I use Oregon nursery labor data to conduct an empirical 
analysis of minimum-wage impacts. 
 
Empirical Model 
 
In the model derived above, equations (3) and (7), wage rates and working hours 
are determined simultaneously.  I approach the empirical analysis by employing log-
linear functional specifications in both the structural and reduced form.  Structural-form 
equations can be used to determine the relationship between wage rates and working 
hours on both the supply and demand side, and reduced-form equations to identify how 14 
 
 
wage rates and working hours are affected by immigration costs, local amenities, input 
prices, and output prices. 
 
Empirical Specification 
 
Consider first labor supply in the nursery industry.  Labor supply can be 
expressed either by the number of hours workers are willing to provide at a given wage, 
or by the wage rate they demand for certain working conditions and hours worked.  Total 
labor supply equals total working hours of those willing to take a job in a nursery, 
whether they are foreign-born or native workers, whether from Mexico or other states or 
industries.  A worker is willing to take a job in the Oregon nursery if and only if 
( , ; , , ) V h p y V   , which is the maximum utility he can achieve in Oregon facing 
immigration costs   and local amenities  .  Total labor supply in the Oregon nursery can 
be written as 
 
(9) Supply   
(, ; , , )
( , , , ) ( , , , )
Vhp y V
ss
ii w f h p w h p dhdpd d

     

    
 
where  ( , , , ) i f h p is the joint probability density function corresponding to( , , , ) hp , 
for a worker in nursery I, and  ( , , , )
s w h p  is agricultural labor wage demanded in 
equation (3).  Thus  ( , , , ) ( , , , )
s
i f h p w h p      reflects the portion of the mean wage that 
workers demand in nursery I under conditions( , , , ) hp .  In log-linear form, total labor 
supply of a worker in nursery I is estimated as 
 
(10) Supply    0 1 2 3 ln ln ln ln
ss w a h e            
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In particular, I suppose in (10) that the lagged number of border apprehensions B 
is a proxy for immigration cost  , considering the time an immigrant spends crossing the 
border to find a job in the United States.  In the long term, the minimum wage in Oregon 
min
OR w  and in Mexico  min
MEX w  can be used respectively as proxies for local amenities in 
those two countries.  Construction wage rates  con w  are proxies for the workers’ 
alternative labor opportunities in Oregon.  
Next consider the demand side of the labor market.  Generally speaking, nursery 
production includes costs of labor, land, machinery, and management; expenses for 
materials such as seeds and plants, fertilizers, chemicals, and fuel; and irrigation and 
marketing costs
3.  I am interested in the labor and material inputs because they occupy 
the top two shares of total production expenses.  Capital is held fixed because it is not as 
important as labor and materials in nursery production.  Growers choose the combination 
of labor and materials to maximize profit.  A nursery is willing to hire workers if the 
profit obtained satisfies  ( , , ; ) w r p     .  Total labor demand in nursery I then is 
 
(11) Demand          
( , , ;)
( , , , ) ( , , , )
dd
ii
w r p t
h g w r p t h w r p t dwdrdpdt
  
    
where  ( , , , ) i g w r p t  is the joint distribution function under conditions ( , , , ) w r p t  in 
nursery I, and  ( , , , )
d h w r p t  is the labor demand function in equation (7).  Thus
( , , , ) ( , , , )
d
i g w r p t h w r p t  measures the portion of the mean working hours a nursery 
demands under conditions ( , , , ) w r p t .  Total labor demand in nursery I is estimated by 
log-linear function 
 
(12) Demand          0 1 2 3 4 ln ln ln ln
dd h w r p t e             
 16 
 
 
Based on the data available, I use the PPI of nitrogen r to proxy for the prices of 
fertilizer materials, packaging prices, and pottery prices.  Housing starts H are proxies for 
nursery product prices because rising housing starts expand nursery product demand, 
driving up nursery product prices.   
The last step is to include dummy variables in the supply and demand models.  
Our theory indicates local amenities affect migration decisions, and nursery 
characteristics affect employment decisions.  Given that such information is not included 
in our data, I use a fixed effect model to capture the omitted amenities and nursery 
characteristics.  Here, vector  nursery D captures unobserved and time-constant nursery 
individual effects.  Because nursery production shows a strong seasonal pattern and all 
data are quarterly, I include a dummy variable  q D  for each season.  Letting I index 
nurseries, I thus finally represent the structural form of my fixed-effect model as 
 
(13) Supply 
3 92
0 1 2 3 4 min 5 min 6 7
11
ln ln ln ln ln ln
s s OR MEX s
i i con q q n nursery i
qn
w a h B a w a w w D D e     
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(14) Demand 
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Wage rates and working hours in these structural equations are the critical 
endogenous variables.  One might equally have written wage rates on the right side of the 
supply function or working hours on the right side of the demand function because 
workers decide upon the working hours they are willing to provide based on the wage 
rates they are offered, and growers offer wage rates based on the working hours they hire.  
Different from the case in which either wage or working hours are exogenous, 
endogeneity induces a correlation between working hours and the error term in (13) as 
well as between wage rates and error term in (14), leading to a bias in the elasticity 
estimates from OLS regressions.   17 
 
 
For example, assuming X is a vector of all explainable variables including wage 
rates in supply equation (13), the expectation of the estimated supply flexibility by OLS 
is expressed as 
 (   ̂)         ((   )      
 ) 
The expectation of estimated supply flexibility is unbiased if and only if 
1 (( ' ) ' ) 0
s
i E X X X e
  .  That is, there is no correlation between working hours and error 
term.  However, 
1 (( ' ) ' ) 0
s
i E X X X e
  for  ( ) 0
ss
ii E h e  .  In the presence of an unobserved 
positive supply shift, moving the supply curve to the right, working hours would tend to 
rise given all other variables fixed, inducing a positive correlation between unobserved 
shock and working hours:  ( ) 0
ss
it it E h e  or 
1 (( ' ) ' ) 0
s
i E X X X e
  .  Then  
 (   ̂)         ((   )      
 
)     .  That is, the estimated supply flexibility would be 
biased positively.  Because supply elasticity is approximately equal to the reciprocal of 
supply flexibility, supply elasticity would be biased negatively.   
In a similar way, I prove that without adjusting for the endogeneity of wage rates 
in equation (14), the demand elasticity would be biased positively.  The reason is that, in 
the presence of an unobserved positive demand shift, moving the demand curve to the 
right, wage rates would tend to rise if all the other variables are constant, causing a 
positive correlation between unobserved shock and wage rates:  ( ) 0
dd
it it E w e  .   
The other variables are regarded here as exogenous.  On the supply side, workers’ 
immigration decisions don’t affect border enforcement, Oregon minimum wage policy, 
Mexican minimum wage policy, or construction wage rates.  On the demand side, 
growers’ production decisions don’t affect material input or production output prices.  
Another possible argument is that border enforcement may serve as an endogenous 
variable because the government may strengthen border patrol enforcement when illegal 
immigration efforts rise dramatically.  Such influence may be significant in the southwest 
states (Arizona, California, and Texas) but could be negligible in Oregon, which is not a 
major immigration destination in the United States.  Thus, equations (13) and (14) 
comprise the simultaneous equation system estimated in this chapter. 18 
 
 
Data 
 
Quarterly data containing 93 nurseries during the 1991-2008 period are used to 
estimate the simultaneous equation system.  Table 2.1 presents the statistics summary for 
all variables in the empirical study.  All data are collected, from a variety of sources, as a 
quarterly basis. 
Data on wage rates and working hours are provided by the Oregon Employment 
Department (OED).  Real wage rates are calculated by dividing a nursery’s total wages 
by total working hours and deflating all nominal wages to 2009 dollars with CPI.  The 
distribution of real wage rates is skewed to the right, showing that wage rates of most 
farmworkers are under $15 and the range $0-$26 covering almost all worker wage rates 
(in 2009 dollars).  If a worker’s reported average wage rate is higher than $26, three times 
the Oregon minimum wage, the worker most likely is a manager or owner, not of interest 
to the present analysis.  To clean the dataset, I remove the observations with a real wage 
higher than $26.  The final quarterly dataset includes 93 nurseries over 18 years, giving 
6388 observations in total because records were missing in some nurseries. 
Southwest border apprehensions are available from U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP).  They indicate the quarterly numbers of individuals the Southwest 
border patrol apprehends when attempting to cross U.S. borders illegally.  I select data on 
the Southwest border because the majority of the apprehensions of low-skilled workers 
are from the U.S.-Mexico border.  Linewatch hours are used as an alternative proxy for 
border patrol effort in some literature, but they are available only during the 1991 –2004 
period, inconsistent with the 1991 – 2008 period used in the present paper. 
Oregon minimum wage rates are obtained from the U.S. Department of Labor.  
Mexican minimum wage rates, measuring potential immigrants’ opportunity costs, are 
taken from the Bank of Mexico.  I use constant-dollar mandated minimum wage rates in 
Oregon and constant-peso mandated minimum wage rates in Mexico and express both in 
2009 dollars.  The peso to U.S. dollar exchange rate is taken from the Bank of Mexico.  
Expressing the Oregon and Mexican real mandated minimum wages in the same currency 
allows a comparison of the real wage gap between the nations. 19 
 
 
The wage rate in the construction industry reflects a nursery worker’s opportunity 
price because the construction industry competes with the nursery industry for low-
skilled labor.  Data on it are available from the Oregon Employment Department.  I 
calculate real average construction wage rates by dividing the quarterly construction 
payroll by total number of construction employees and deflating it to 2009 dollars. 
On the demand side, the Producer Price Index (PPI) of nitrogen, obtained from 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics, provides a proxy for nursery material prices.  It is also 
deflated to 2009 from 1984 dollars.  Data on housing starts, taken from the U.S. Census 
Bureau, are defined as the number of new privately owned housing units started in the 
Western Region of the United States. 
 
Econometric Issues 
 
Before discussing the estimation results, it is necessary to conduct a Hausman 
specification test of whether simultaneity is present in the system.  If the test shows that 
labor supply and demand are determined by each other simultaneously, instrumental 
variables are needed; otherwise, OLS is preferred.  Consider two estimators,  ols b obtained 
with OLS and  iv b obtained with instrumental variables.  The null hypothesis in a 
Hausman test is that both  ols b and  iv b  are consistent.  Alternate hypothesis is that only  iv b  
is consistent.  First, endogenous variables h and w are regressed on all exogenous factors 
respectively, as shown in equation (a) and (b) below, and estimated residuals  1 ˆ e  and  2 ˆ e  
are derived.  I take the logarithm of all variables in these equations: 
(a) Demand      1 min min 1 ( , , , , , , , , , )
OR MEX
con q nursery h f B w w w r H t e  DD  
(b)  Supply      1 min min 2 ( , , , , , , , , , )
OR MEX
con q nursery w g B w w w r H t e  DD  
Then, as shown in equation (c) below, w is regressed on residuals  1 ˆ e  along with 
endogenous variable h and the exogenous factors in equation (13).  Similarly, as shown in 20 
 
 
equation (d) below, h is regressed on residual  2 ˆ e  along with endogenous variable w and 
the exogenous factors in equation (14).  The estimating equations are 
(c) Supply                  1 2 min min ( , , , , , , , )
OR MEX
con q nursery w f h B w w w e  DD  
(d) Demand           2 2( , , , , , , ) q nursery h g w r H t e  DD  
I then perform a t-test on residuals  1 ˆ e  and  2 ˆ e .  As shown in table 2.2,  1 ˆ e  is 
significant in equation I but  2 ˆ e  is not significant in equation (d).  This means w in the 
supply function is correlated with error term  1 ˆ e  derived from the demand function.  
Simultaneity thus exists between labor supply and demand.  OLS is not applicable when 
dependent variable is correlated with the error term.  A Hausman test shows instrumental 
variables are required to validly estimate the structural model.   
To attain efficiency, a three-stage least squares estimator (3SLS) is employed to 
estimate the simultaneous equation system.  In 3SLS, all exogenous variables are used as 
instrumental variables to correct the endogeneity problem.  That is, in the first stage, the 
predicted values of wage rates and working hours are estimated by regressing wage rates 
and working hours on all exogenous variables.  In the second stage, equations (13) and 
(14) are estimated by substituting the predicted values of wage rates and working hours in 
place of observed ones.  I then use the residuals from the second stage to obtain a 
variance-covariance matrix and apply generalized least squares (GLS) in the final-stage 
estimation. 
Next step is to perform relevance and exogeneity tests and to determine the 
validity of instruments.  First, instrument relevance is examined by two regressions.  In 
the first-stage regression of wage rates on all exogenous variables, R-square is 0.593.  In 
the first-stage regression of hours-employed on all exogenous variables, R-square is 
0.850.  As shown by the F-test of joint significance, the exogenous variables are overall 
statistically significant and most of the variables are individually significant as well.  All 
exogenous variables should be used as instruments when estimating hours-employed and 
wage rates. 21 
 
 
An exogeneity test is necessary to determine whether the instruments are 
uncorrelated with the structural error and hence truly exogenous.  The Basmann test 
(1960) is one method of conducting an exogeneity test.  As reported in tables 2.6 and 2.7, 
p-values of the Basmann test of the 2SLS model are 0.015 and 0.077 in the supply and 
demand function, respectively, indicating both are insignificant at the 1% level.  The 
instruments pass the over-identifying test in both equations of this model.  The tests 
confirm that the instruments used in the first stage are valid and I keep all the exogenous 
variables as instruments. 
With pooled cross-nursery time-series data, autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity 
violate the minimum-variance assumption.  While they do not bias the coefficient 
estimates, standard errors and therefore inferences are suspect.  To test for autocorrelation, 
I first regress equations (13) and (14) by 3SLS to obtain 
s e  and 
d e .  I then use 3SLS to 
regress the current errors against the lagged residuals  1
s e  and  1
d e  and against the nursery 
dummy variables.  The coefficients of  1
s e  and  1
d e  are significant at the 1% level in those 
regressions (table 2.3).  The inference is that autocorrelation is present in the structural 
model. 
The Breusch-Pagan test is a common method for examining possible 
heteroscedasticity.  The null hypothesis is that the fixed-effects model without 
autocorrelated correction is homoscedastic.  Equation (e) and (f) below are estimated by 
3SLS to verify whether the independent variables are jointly significant in the demand 
and supply regressions, and whether the hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity is rejected. 
(e)  Supply               
2
3 min min ( ) ( , , , , , , )
s OR MEX
con q nursery e f h B w w w  DD  
(f)  Demand 
2
3 ( ) ( , , , , , )
d
q nursery e g w r H t  DD  
P-values of the F test in both equations are <0.0001.  The null hypothesis is 
rejected and the structural model appears to have a heteroscedasticity problem.  The 
supply equation’s error variance widens the greater are the working hours, while the 
demand equation’s error variance shrinks the higher are the wage rates. 22 
 
 
The last step is to check whether the estimators would be more efficient if 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity were corrected.  There are two alternative ways to 
correct autocorrelation.  One way is to assume error terms follow an AR(1) process.  
With the assumption, the estimated
s   is 0.255 on the supply side, and estimated 
d  is 
0.337 on the demand side, as shown in table 2.3.  The associated autocorrelation 
correction in a log-linear model is similar to that in a linear model.  That is, suppose the 
log-linear model is ln ln t t t yx   , where 1 t t t v     .  In the previous period, 
1 1 1 ln ln t t t yx      .  Solving the equations by eliminating , the following equation is 
1 1 1 1 ln ln ln ln (1 ) (ln ln ) t t t t t t t t t y y x x x x v                     . 
If the serial correlation process just above is indeed AR(1), error t v in the equation above 
is non-autocorrelated.   
Using this process, equations (13) and (14) can be transformed to equations (15) 
and (16): 
(15)   AR Transformed supply model  
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(16)  AR Transformation demand model 
, , 1 0 1 , , 1 2 1 3 1 4
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If the error process is AR(1), assuming the estimated value of is correct, the error terms 
in equations (15) and (16) are not autocorrelated.   
Another way to correct autocorrelation is to add the lagged dependent variable 
1
s
it w   and  ,1
d
it h   to the right-hand side of equations (13) and (14) to estimate a dynamic 
model, as in equations (17) and (18). 23 
 
 
(17)  Dynamic supply model  
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(18)  Dynamic demand model  
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Model (17) and (18) assume  1   .   
A heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix (HCCM) is then applied to 
correct the variance-covariance matrix because 
2
it   is unknown (White, 1980).  White 
(1980) computes the weighted least square (WLS) estimator using a HCCM and 
investigates modified HCCM estimators for OLS, 2SLS, and 3SLS respectively.  I used 
the HCCM estimator designed for 2SLS in order to obtain significant results.  Estimation 
results after correcting for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity are shown in tables 2.4 
and 2.5. 
Unfortunately, the above ways of correcting autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity generate other problems.  In the AR transform model, the coefficient of 
working hours is not significant.  In the dynamic and HCCME models, the coefficients of 
wage rates are positive, contrary to theory.  As a result, I employ full information 
maximum likelihood (FIML) estimation to approach the empirical analysis.  FIML 
estimators, as well as 2SLS and 3SLS estimators, of structural model (13) and (14) are 
reported in tables 2.6 and 2.7.  The 3SLS estimators of model (13) and (14) are consistent 
with the FIML estimators, including sign, magnitude, and statistical significance, 
indicating that autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in the structural model are 
negligible when using 3SLS or FIML. 
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Empirical Results 
 
The simultaneous equations illustrate the interactions between labor supply and 
demand as well as the effects of important exogenous supply and demand factors.  The 
FIML estimates of these supplies and demands are reported in the last columns of tables 
2.6 and 2.7.  Most coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% level and have signs 
consistent with economic theory.   
On the supply side, working hours has a statistically significant, positive effect on 
wage rates as expected.  Supply flexibility is 0.19, as shown in table 2.6.  Houck (1965) 
proves that the reciprocal of a direct price flexibility is the lower absolute limit of a direct 
price elasticity.  Thus, labor supply elasticity is larger than 5.15 which is the reciprocal of 
the supply flexibility.  A small wage-rate increase attracts large numbers of additional 
foreign workers.  This labor supply elasticity is much higher than the estimators in Evers 
et al. (2005), implying that undocumented labor migration is more sensitive than 
domestic labor migration is to changes in wage rates.  Surprisingly, border apprehensions 
show a significant negative effect on Oregon nursery wage rates.  Ten percent rise in 
border apprehensions reduces demanded wage rate by statistically significant but modest 
0.3%.  However, the construction wage, Oregon minimum wage rate, and Mexican 
minimum wage rate have a significantly positive effect on Oregon nursery wage rates.  
As an alternative labor opportunity in Oregon, the construction industry is a strong 
competitor to the nursery industry in this low-skilled labor market.  The results show that 
a one percent boost in the construction wage rate would lift nursery wage rates by 0.22 
percent.   
The Oregon minimum and Mexican minimum wage rate are each a proxy for 
social and economic conditions in their respective locations.  Oregon minimum wage 
rates have stronger effects on nursery wage rates than Mexican minimum wage rates do 
(0.39 vs 0.04 in table 2.6).  The fixed-effects model includes 92 nursery dummy variables.  
To simplify reporting, the dummy coefficients are omitted in table 2.5, although most are 
significantly different from zero.  Nursery dummies reflect the mean worker’s preference 25 
 
 
to a given nursery’s location, manager, or other attributes once the remaining supply 
factors, including working hours demanded, are accounted for. 
Wage rates have a significantly negative effect on the working hours that 
nurseries demand.  The demand elasticity is -0.64, as shown in table 2.7.  This labor 
demand elasticity estimate is consistent with Thilmany (2000), where the mean demand 
elasticity is -0.74.  In these proportionate terms, wage-rate rises have a moderate but not 
small effect on reducing labor demand quantities.  Nitrogen prices, used to proxy for 
fertilizer prices, do not have significant effect on working hours demanded.  Housing 
starts, a proxy for nursery output prices, have a significantly positive effect on working 
hours.  A one percent increase in housing starts drives demanded working hours upward 
by 0.17 percent, as shown in table 2.7.  Again, nursery dummies are omitted but most are 
significant.  These dummies reflect a given nursery owner’s own business strategies and 
technologies, for example the use of container, bar-boot, ball and burlap, or greenhouse 
technologies, once the remaining demand factors are accounted for. 
In summary, the structural model identifies the significant exogenous supply and 
demand factors and estimates the effects of these factors on supplied and demanded wage 
rates and labor usage.  In the next section, I use reduced-form equations, derived from the 
structural model, to evaluate the net or equilibrium effects on wage rates and hours 
employed.  By setting labor supply quantities equal to labor demand quantities, 
ln ln
sd
it it hh  , substituting the labor demand function into the supply function, and 
solving for wage rates, I derive the equilibrium wage rates as a function of border 
apprehension rates, construction wage rates, the Oregon minimum wage, Mexican 
minimum wage, nitrogen prices, housing starts, time, seasonal dummies, and nursery 
dummies as shown in the first column of table 2.8.  Using a similar way, by setting labor 
supply price equal to labor demand price and solving for labor quantities, I derive the 
equilibrium working hours as a function of border apprehension rates, construction wage 
rates, the Oregon and Mexican minimum wage rates, nitrogen prices, housing starts, time, 
seasonal dummies, and nursery dummies as shown in the second column of table 2.8.  In 26 
 
 
contrast to structural model (13) and (14), I have here only exogenous variables on the 
right side of the reduced-form model. 
 
Impacts of Immigration Policy 
 
Border apprehensions are commonly used in the literature to analyze 
immigration’s effect on the U.S. labor market (Hanson, 1999 and Borjas, 2001).  As 
shown in figure 2.1, there is a strong correlation between border apprehensions and the 
U.S. real GDP growth rate.  The number of border apprehensions increased dramatically 
during the period 1995-2000, when the U.S. experienced a high GDP growth rate.  After 
reaching a peak in 2000, border apprehensions fell gradually during the period of 2001-
2008, when the U.S. GDP growth was smaller.  Border apprehensions also show a 
seasonal pattern similar to GDP growth rate.   Usually both of them bottom out in the first 
quarter, peak out in the second quarter, then decline in the third quarter. 
As shown in figure 2.2, seasonally adjusted border apprehension variation closely 
follows linewatch hour variation.  After accounting for seasonal factors, linewatch hours 
explain 63 percent of variation in border apprehensions.  The regression of border 
apprehensions on linewatch hours and seasonal dummies shows that a ten-percent rise in 
linewatch hours lifts the border apprehension rate by 0.27 percent.  If linewatch hours 
proxy for border enforcement, this conclusion is in line with Hanson and Spilimbergo 
(1999), who state that apprehensions are strongly positive correlated with border 
enforcement. 
My results show that previous-period border apprehensions have a significant 
negative relationship with nursery wage rates (table 2.6).  When previous-period border 
apprehensions rise one percent, nursery labor wage rates fall 0.02 percent, consistent with 
Borjas (2003).  On the other hand, this implies border enforcement does not restrict 
illegal immigration very effectively.  The risk or consequences of apprehension are not 
high enough to prevent illegal immigrants from entering the U.S. via Mexico.  As Hanson 27 
 
 
(1999) and Borjas (2001) argue, migration flows from Mexico to the U.S. are more 
sensitive to economic differences between the two countries than to border enforcement. 
 
Impacts of Minimum Wage Legislation in Oregon and Mexico 
 
At $8.40 in 2010, the Oregon minimum wage is higher than the federal minimum 
($7.25 in 2010) and the second-highest in the U.S.  It therefore is a positive attractant to 
farmworkers.  Changes in minimum wage affect not only wage level but also wage 
structure, that is not only the worker who earns minimum wage but the worker who earns 
a higher wage.  If a grower had been paying less than the new minimum, he had to 
increase the wage and, perhaps, reduce the working hours employed.  If a grower had 
paid higher than the new minimum, he may reduce the wage rate because more farm 
workers have now become available.  Overall, a ten-percent minimum-wage boost lifts 
the mean wage workers demand by 3.5%.  Nursery demand for working hours falls by 
2.2% (table 2.8).   
The flexibility of labor wage demanded with respect to the Oregon minimum 
wage is seven times larger than with respect to the Mexican minimum wage.  As shown 
in the last column of table 2.6, a ten-percent rise in the Oregon minimum wage boosts the 
mean nursery wage by 4.3 percent, while a ten-percent rise in the Mexican minimum 
wage boosts it by only 0.6 percent.  This gap is partly a product of the minimum wage 
gap between Oregon and Mexico ($8.40 versus $0.57 in 2010).  At minimum wage levels 
in the two countries, Mexican workers earn in one day is what U.S. workers earn in an 
hour.  The large minimum wage disparity between Oregon and Mexico will continue to 
attract immigration flows from Mexico to the United States. 
On January 1, 2004, the Oregon minimum wage underwent a structural change in 
which the rate would be adjusted for inflation by a formula employing the U.S. city 
average consumer price index for all urban consumers and items.  To examine the effect 
of this structural change, I used FIML to re-regress equation (13) and (14) with the 
shorter 1991-2003 data set.  As shown in the last column of table 2.6, after Oregon 28 
 
 
indexed its minimum wage to inflation in 2004, the minimum wage’s nursery-wage effect 
fell by a slight 0.035.  The real minimum wage in Oregon has changed very little since 
the nominal rate began being adjusted for inflation.  Furthermore, the real minimum wage 
in Mexico has not undergone large variations.  Hence the wage gap between Oregon and 
Mexico has not varied much since 2004 (figure 2.3).  Thus, the effects of Oregon and 
Mexican minimum wage legislation on immigration flow fell slightly after 2004. 
 
Impacts of Labor Mobility 
 
The variability of agricultural labor demand stems partly from the seasonal 
pattern of agricultural production and from the competition with other low-skilled 
industries.  The nursery labor market shows the same seasonal pattern as does the nursery 
industry, achieving a different equilibrium each season, as shown in figure 2.4.  Labor 
supply is higher by 5% in the spring and summer than in the fall and winter.  Labor 
demand is largest in the fall, followed by the summer and spring, and lowest in the winter.  
The net effect is that fall exhibits the highest equilibrium wage rate and greatest 
equilibrium number of working hours, while spring exhibits the lowest wage rates and 
winter the fewest working hours.  Seasonal differences on the demand side are larger than 
on the supply side, implying labor demand is more sensitive to season than labor supply 
is. 
Workers can turn to other low-skilled jobs – such as in construction, tourism, and 
catering – during the off-peak nursery season, and then return during the peak.  For 
example, when wage rates in the construction industry rise, some low-skilled workers 
will be attracted to that industry, leaving their nursery jobs.  Hence, nursery managers 
must boost their wage rates to retain these workers or attract them back to the nursery.  
Oregon nurseries’ strongest labor competitor is the construction industry because it is 
large and pays higher wages than the nursery sector does.  As shown in the reduced-form 
equations (table 2.8), a ten-percent construction wage rise significantly lifts the nursery 
wage rate by 1.9% and reduces hours employed in the nursery by 1.2%. 29 
 
 
Relative Contributions of Supply and Demand Drivers 
 
Although the results in tables 2.6 and 2.7 identify supply and demand drivers in 
the nursery labor market and demonstrate their significant influences, they say little about 
the relative contributions of each driver to variations in wage rates and working hours.  
The answer to the third question – what are the relative importances of labor market 
factors – can be illustrated using reduced-form equations.  The derivation process is 
presented in Appendix B.  
Table 2.8 shows the relative importances of the exogenous variables, and their 
contributions to the variation in predicted wage rates and working hours, between 1991 
and 2008.  The Oregon minimum wage, the construction wage, and border apprehensions 
account for 15.5%, 14.3%, and 6.6% of the predicted time-wise changes in the average 
wage.  In contrast, the Mexican minimum wage, nitrogen prices, and housing starts make 
negative contributions to the average wage, accounting for -7.4%, -6.3%, and -2.9%, 
respectively.  The real Mexican minimum wage and housing starts largely fell during the 
1991 – 2008 period. 
Similarly, decreases in the real Mexican minimum wage account for 1.5% of the 
predicted working-hours changes.  In contrast, nitrogen prices, housing starts, the Oregon 
minimum wage, the construction wage, and border apprehensions account for -18.1%,     
-5.9%, -4.0%, -3.7%, and -2.7%, respectively.  Nitrogen prices, the Oregon minimum 
wage, and the construction wage make negative contribution because, as discussed in the 
previous section they have a negative relationship with working hours.  The negative 
contribution from housing starts and border apprehensions are caused by the secular 
declines in these two variables. 
The construction wage, the Oregon minimum wage, and the Mexican minimum 
wage make a larger contribution to average wage-rate changes than to working-hours 
changes.  The contribution of housing starts, nitrogen prices, and technology to variations 
in wage rates and working-hours-employed are similar to one another in direction and 
magnitude.  Border apprehension’s impacts on average wage and working hours are 
much smaller than are the other exogenous variables’ impacts.  Overall, the exogenous 30 
 
 
variables fit average wage better than working hours because they explain 72.7% of wage 
variation and 31.8% of working-hours variation. 
Table 2.9 reports the factual variation in average wage and working hours.  
Positive (negative) values indicate that the factor contributes to an increasing (decreasing) 
average wage or an increasing (decreasing) hours-worked.  Table 2.10 reports predicted 
wage and hours-worked in seven simulation scenarios, including no 1991- 2008 change 
in:  border apprehension rate, the construction wage, the Oregon minimum wage, the 
Mexican minimum wage, housing starts, nitrogen prices, and technology.  Average-wage 
variation between 1991 and 2008 are small, and in working hours are large.  The 
simulation results reveal that the Oregon minimum wage rate plays an important role in 
the nursery labor market.  Table 2.9 shows that, between 1991 and 2008, the Oregon 
minimum wage rate contributed $0.24 to the average wage rate and reduced quarterly 
work time by 137 hours per nursery.  Its impact on wage rates and working-hours-
employed is much larger than is the impact of border apprehension rate, construction 
wage rates, or Mexican minimum wage.  For example, border apprehension rate 
contributed only $0.10 to average wage and reduced quarterly work time by 93 hours.  
Table 2.10 further demonstrates these points.    
 
Conclusions 
 
The purpose of this chapter has been to answer three questions:  (1) What are the 
major factors in agricultural labor supply?  (2) What are the major drivers of agricultural 
labor demand?  (3) What are these factors’ relative contributions to labor supply and 
demand?  I have developed a framework to identify and estimate labor supply and 
demand in a simultaneous setting, and have used it to analyze policy and socioeconomic 
effects on the Oregon nursery labor market.  A theoretically consistent empirical model is 
specified and estimated to answer these questions. 
Empirical results show that border control, the construction wage, the Oregon 
minimum wage, and the Mexican minimum wage affect immigrant location decisions and 31 
 
 
therefore agricultural labor supply.  Total labor supply elasticity is at least 5.15, much 
higher than the domestic unskilled labor supply elasticities quoted in the literature.  The 
implication is that the illegal labor force is sensitive to wage and can respond promptly to 
changes in it.  I find that border apprehensions, a proxy for border control effort, do not 
have an influential role in labor supply, while the Oregon and Mexican minimum wage 
do have significant effects.  The explanation for this phenomenon is the substantial gap 
between the U.S. and Mexican economies, reflected for an example in the minimum 
wage gap, which attracts a continual flow of immigrants.  The risk of border 
apprehension is not great enough to prevent the flow.  Another important driver on the 
supply side is the wage rate in the construction industry.  With higher wage rates and 
greater overall labor demand, the construction industry serves as a strong competitor to 
the nursery industry in the low-skilled labor market.  A one percent increase in 
construction wage rates would push nursery wage rates up by 0.22 percent. 
The model also suggests that nursery product price and technology change play 
important roles in growers’ labor demand decisions.  Consistent with previous estimates, 
a one percent rise in wage rate would reduce working-hours-employed by 0.64 percent.  
Nursery labor demand is greatest in the fall, followed by the summer and spring, and 
lowest in the winter. 
Simulation analysis implies the model accounts for 72.7% and 31.8% of the 
predicted variation between 1991 and 2008 in average wage and working hours.  Except 
for technology change, the Oregon minimum wage serves as the largest contributor to 
market wage variation, accounting for 15.5% of it, followed by the construction wage 
(14.3%) and border apprehension rate (6.6%).  And except for technology change, 
nitrogen price is the largest contributor to the variation in working hours, accounting for -
18.1% of it, followed by housing starts (-5.9%) and the Oregon minimum wage rate (-
4.0%).  These results have implications for the design of policies to limit illegal 
immigration flows.  Although much of the secular change in the agricultural labor market 
can be attributed to technology improvement, growers and farm workers do respond to 
the Oregon minimum wage and to border control efforts.  Overall, the Oregon minimum 32 
 
 
wage is more effective than are border apprehension policies in boosting the average 
wage and in reducing the number of hours that illegal immigrants work in the nursery 
sector. 
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Endnotes
                                                           
1 http://www.doleta.gov/agworker/report9/chapter1.cfm. 
2 “No-match” rule requires employers to penalize or fire workers whose numbers don’t 
match up with the Social Security Administration database. 
3 http://aesop.rutgers.edu/~farmmgmt/ne-budgets/methodology.html. 34 
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Appendix A 
 
Recall equations (4) and (8), where utility and profit are equated to reservation 
utility and profit respectively:  
(4)              ( , ; , , ) V w p y V    
(8)          ( , , ; ) w r p t    
Differentiate (4) and (8) with respect to   and w respectively to obtain 
0 wp
dw dp
V V V
dd
 
    
0 wp
dw dp
dd


  
Solving for  / dw d  and  / dp d : 
p
w p p w
V dw
d V V

  


 
w
w p p w
V dp
d V V

  


 
Using a similar method, differentiate (4) and (8) with respect to and w 
respectively to obtain 
0 wp
dw dp
V V V
dd
 
    
                                   0 wp
dw dp
dd


  
Solving for  / dw d  and  / dp d : 
p
w p p w
V dw
d V V

  


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w
w p p w
V dp
d V V

  


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Appendix B 
 
Consider the predicted average wages for all the nurseries in 1991 and 2008, 
    ̂   ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅ and     ̂   ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅, respectively.  The wage rate reduced-form function can be written as 
    ̂   ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅  
 
 
∑     ̂ 
    
 
 
 
∑(
 
 
∑    ̂  
 
)
    
 
 
 
∑(            ̅̅̅̅̅̅              ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅             
   ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅             
    ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅          ̅̅̅̅̅̅
    
          ̅̅̅̅̅      ̅  
 
 
∑   
 
   
    ) 
where τ = 91 or 08 indicates the respective year for which the value is predicted.  G
  is 
the set of nurseries and N is the number of nurseries in year .  The  ’s are the 
coefficients of the reduced-form equation as reported in table 2.6.  Wage rate variation is
 
    ̂   ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅       ̂   ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅
    (      ̿̿̿̿̿̿̿         ̿̿̿̿̿̿̿)     (          ̿̿̿̿̿̿̿̿̿̿̿̿             ̿̿̿̿̿̿̿̿̿̿̿̿)     (         
   ̿̿̿̿̿̿̿̿̿̿̿̿
           
   ̿̿̿̿̿̿̿̿̿̿̿̿)     (         
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    (      ̿̿̿̿̿̿         ̿̿̿̿̿̿)     (    ̿̿̿̿       ̿̿̿̿) 
where the variables with a double overline are the averages of the corresponding variable 
in G
 .  Quarter and nursery dummy variables are suppressed.  Dividing both sides by 
(    ̂   ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅       ̂   ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅) gives 
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The right-hand side of the above equation represents the share of the predicted 
1991 vs 2008 difference in the average wage.  Similarly, the shares of the predicted 1991 
vs 2008 difference in working hours can be expressed as
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Figure 2.1. Border apprehensions and U.S. GDP growth rate, 1991-2008. 
 
Note: Border apprehensions are shown in the left axis and U.S. GDP growth rates are 
shown in the right axis. 
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Figure 2.2. Southwest linewatch hours and seasonally adjusted border apprehensions 
January 1991 to September 2004 
 
Note: Linewatch hours are shown in the left axis and border apprehensions are shown in 
the right axis. 
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Figure 2.3.  Real minimum wage rates in Oregon and Mexico, 1991-2008. 
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Figure 2.4.  Oregon nursery labor mobility over four seasons 
Note: In Oregon, quarter 1, 2, 3, and 4 are winter, spring, summer, and fall, respectively.   45 
 
 
Table 2.1. Descriptive Statistics of Explanatory Variables 
 
Symbol  Variable  Unit  Mean  Std. Dev. 
w  Real nursery wage  US $2009 per hour  12.58  3.47 
h  Hours employed  Hours  27073  51203 
B  Border apprehensions  People per quarter  294804  103356 
con w   Construction wage  US $2009 per hour  21.52  1.54 
min
OR w   Real min wage, Oregon  US $2009 per hour  7.63  0.53 
min
MEX w   Real min wage, Mexico  US $2009 per hour  0.58  0.10 
r  PPI: nitrogen  Index  180.96  54.33 
H  Housing starts  Unit  1518.44  313.12 
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Table 2.2. Hausman Test Results 
 
Supply (equation c) 
Dependent Variable: nursery wage rate 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-value 
Constant  -0.410**  0.495  -0.83 
Hours employed  0.186***  0.052  3.58 
Apprehension  -0.026***  0.009  -2.73 
Wage in Construction  0.199***  0.057  3.49 
Min wage, Oregon  0.400***  0.044  9.00 
Min wage, Mexico  0.056***  0.019  2.86 
Quarter 1  0.011  0.016  0.69 
Quarter 2  -0.068***  0.010  -7.08 
Quarter 3  -0.050***  0.008  -6.46 
Wage rate residual from equation (a)  -0.261***  0.052  -5.00 
       
Demand (equation d)     
Dependent Variable: hours of nursery labor employed per quarter   
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-value 
Constant  9.765***  1.384  7.05 
Wage rate  -0.490  0.392  -1.25 
Nitrogen  -0.027  0.068  -0.40 
Housing starts  0.182***  0.040  4.57 
Time  0.003**  0.001  2.54 
Quarter 1  -0.272***  0.024  -11.45 
Quarter 2  -0.033  0.029  -1.15 
Quarter 3  -0.075**  0.033  -2.28 
Working hours residual from equation 
(b) 
-0.139  0.394  -0.35 
 
Asterisks ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
Coefficients of nursery dummies are omitted. 
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Table 2.3. Autocorrelation Test Results, 3SLS 
 
Supply side 
dependent variable: 
s e  
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-value 
Constant  0.002  0.025  0.09 
1
s e   0.255*** (
s  )  0.012  20.82 
       
Demand side 
dependent variable: 
d e  
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-value 
Constant  0.022  0.056  0.40 
1
d e   0.337*** (
d  )  0.012  28.05 
 
Asterisks ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
Coefficients of nursery dummies are omitted. 
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Table 2.4. Parameter Estimates of Structural Model after Correcting Autocorrelation or 
Heteroscedasticity: Labor Supply 
 
Dependent Variable: nursery wage rate 
Variables  Transform model 
(equation 15) 
Dynamic model 
(equation 17) 
HCCME 
 
  3SLS  3SLS  2SLS 
Intercept  0.266 
(0.43) 
0.368* 
(1.19) 
-0.010 
(-0.04) 
Hours employed  0.092 
(1.01) 
0.077*** 
(5.64) 
0.140*** 
(6.59) 
Apprehensions  -0.020 
(-1.40) 
-0.030** 
(-3.25) 
-0.026 
(-2.52) 
Construction wage  0.246*** 
(2.90) 
0.187*** 
(3.37) 
0.200*** 
(3.04) 
Min wage, OR  0.387*** 
(5.69) 
0.348*** 
(9.40) 
0.423*** 
(9.16) 
Min wage, MEX  0.042 
(1.48) 
0.020 
(1.36) 
0.044** 
(2.23) 
Lagged wage    0.198*** 
(18.28) 
 
Quarter 1  -0.040 
(-1.62) 
-0.033*** 
(-3.11) 
-0.000 
(-0.01) 
Quarter 2  -0.073*** 
(-4.91) 
-0.075*** 
(-7.75) 
-0.068*** 
(-6.05) 
Quarter 3  -0.077*** 
(-7.21) 
-0.058*** 
(-7.42) 
-0.051*** 
(-5.73) 
Dnursery  Y  Y  Y 
R       0.45 
 
Asterisks ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
t-values are in parentheses.  Coefficients of nursery dummies are omitted. 
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Table 2.5. Parameter Estimates of Structural Model after Correcting Autocorrelation or 
Heteroscedasticity: Labor Demand 
 
Dependent Variable: hours of nursery labor employed per quarter 
Variables  Transform model 
(equation 16) 
Dynamic model 
(equation 18) 
HCCME 
 
  3SLS  3SLS  2SLS 
Intercept  6.189**** 
(6.16) 
5.556*** 
(9.32) 
-0.297 
(-0.17) 
Wage rate  -0.267 
(-0.63) 
0.004 
(0.03) 
2.613*** 
(5.41) 
PPI: nitrogen  -0.035 
(-0.48) 
-0.002 
(-0.04) 
0.413*** 
(4.87) 
Housing starts  0.181*** 
(3.72) 
0.147*** 
(4.35) 
0.288*** 
(4.80) 
Time  0.002*** 
(1.98) 
0.001* 
(1.77) 
-0.006*** 
(-3.75) 
Lagged Hours    0.326*** 
(27.36) 
 
Quarter 1  -0.267*** 
(-6.52) 
-0.259*** 
(-14.41) 
-0.142*** 
(-4.11) 
Quarter 2  0.070** 
(2.02) 
0.070 
(3.74) 
0.156* 
(3.81) 
Quarter 3  -0.068 
(-1.44) 
-0.053** 
(-2.73) 
0.150*** 
(3.38) 
Dnursery  Y  Y  Y 
R
2  0.69  0.84  0.66 
 
Asterisks ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
t-values are in parentheses.  Coefficients of nursery dummies are omitted. 
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Table 2.6. Parameter Estimates of the Structural Model: Labor Supply 
 
Dependent Variable: nursery wage rate   
Variables  2SLS 
(1991-2008) 
3SLS 
(1991-2008) 
FIML 
(1991-2008) 
FIML 
(1991-2003) 
Intercept  -0.410 
(-0.66) 
-0.161 
(-0.27) 
-0.518 
(-0.94) 
-1.145 
(-1.36) 
Hours employed  0.186*** 
(2.83) 
0.155** 
(2.43) 
0.194*** 
(3.48) 
0.294*** 
(3.09) 
Apprehensions  -0.026** 
(-2.16) 
-0.029*** 
(-2.65) 
-0.028** 
(-2.51) 
-0.035** 
(-2.05) 
Construction wage  0.199*** 
(2.76) 
0.222*** 
(3.42) 
0.219*** 
(3.30) 
0.131 
(1.38) 
Min wage, OR  0.400*** 
(7.12) 
0.408*** 
(7.82) 
0.391*** 
(7.61) 
0.426*** 
(6.77) 
Min wage, MEX  0.056** 
(2.26) 
0.033 
(1.50) 
0.043** 
(2.24) 
0.063** 
(2.47) 
Quarter 1  0.011 
(0.55) 
0.006 
(0.36) 
0.016 
(0.87) 
0.028 
(1.12) 
Quarter 2  -0.068*** 
(-5.61) 
-0.066*** 
(-5.82) 
-0.066*** 
(-5.72) 
-0.071*** 
(-4.38) 
Quarter 3  -0.050*** 
(-5.11) 
-0.048*** 
(-5.14) 
-0.047*** 
(-4.94) 
-0.044*** 
(-3.41) 
Dnursery  Y  Y  Y  Y 
R
2  0.488  0.830     
P-value  of  over- 
identification test  0.015  0.009  0.017  0.082 
 
Asterisks ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
t-values are in parentheses.  Coefficients of nursery dummies are omitted. 
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Table 2.7. Parameter Estimates of the Structural Model: Labor Demand 
 
Dependent Variable: hours of nursery labor employed per quarter 
Variables  2SLS 
(1991-2008) 
3SLS 
(1991-2008) 
FIML 
(1991-2008) 
FIML 
(1991-2003) 
Intercept  9.765*** 
(7.05) 
10.289*** 
(8.16) 
10.507*** 
(9.26) 
10.417*** 
(7.23) 
Wage rate  -0.490 
(-1.25) 
-0.591 
(-1.61) 
-0.640* 
(-1.83) 
-0.856** 
(-2.47) 
PPI: nitrogen  -0.027 
(-0.40) 
-0.077 
(-1.27) 
-0.084 
(-1.62) 
-0.051 
(-0.85) 
Housing starts  0.182*** 
(4.57) 
0.178*** 
(4.73) 
0.169*** 
(4.65) 
0.183** 
(1.71) 
Time  0.003** 
(2.53) 
0.003*** 
(3.21) 
0.004*** 
(3.57) 
0.005*** 
(2.92) 
Quarter 1  -0.272*** 
(-11.44) 
-0.275*** 
(-11.86) 
-0.277*** 
(-12.14) 
-0.300*** 
(-11.74) 
Quarter 2  -0.033 
(-1.14) 
-0.039 
(-1.38) 
-0.041 
(-1.52) 
-0.062** 
(-2.23) 
Quarter 3  -0.075*** 
(-2.27) 
-0.082*** 
(-2.64) 
-0.086*** 
(-2.86) 
-0.102*** 
(-3.30) 
Dnursery  Y  Y  Y  Y 
R   0.855       
P-value  of  over- 
identification test  0.077  0.075  0.072  0.151 
 
Asterisks ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
t-values are in parentheses.  Coefficients of nursery dummies are omitted. 
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Table 2.8. Parameter Estimates of the Reduced-Form Equations, FIML 
 
Independent Variable  Wage rate  Hours employed 
Intercept  1.36  9.64 
Apprehensions  -0.02  0.02 
Construction wage  0.19  -0.12 
Min wage, OR  0.35  -0.22 
Min wage, MEX  0.04  -0.02 
PPI: nitrogen  -0.01  -0.07 
Housing starts  0.03  0.15 
Time  0.001  0.003 
Quarter 1  -0.03  -0.26 
Quarter 2  -0.07  -0.001 
Quarter 3  -0.06  -0.05 
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Table 2.9. Relative Contributions of Labor Supply and Demand Factors 
 
  Supply: wage rates  Demand: working hours 
  %  $  %  Hours/quarter 
Explained variation         
Apprehensions  6.6  0.10  -2.7  -93.0 
Construction wage  14.3  0.22  -3.7  -127.0 
Min wage, OR  15.5  0.24  -4.0  -136.7 
Min wage, MEX  -7.4  -0.11  1.5  51.7 
PPI: nitrogen  -2.9  -0.10  -18.1  -621.5 
Housing starts  -6.3  -0.05  -5.9  -203.8 
Time  52.8  0.82  64.7  2222.1 
         
Total variation         
Explained  72.7  1.13  31.8  1091.8 
Unexplained  27.3  0.42  68.2  2341.5 
Total  100  1.55  100  3433.3 
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Table 2.10. Simulated Changes in Average Wage Rates and Working Hours, 1991-2008 
 
  Wage ($)  Working hours (hours/quarter) 
Factual  12.87  28624 
No change in     
Apprehensions  12.73  10423 
Construction wage  12.61  10457 
Min wage, OR  12.59  10467 
Min wage, MEX  12.95  10278 
PPI: nitrogen  12.93  10951 
Housing starts  12.88  10534 
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Introduction 
 
Vertical contracts between producers and retailers are becoming increasingly 
popular in agricultural industries.  The issue therefore attracts more and more attention 
from agricultural economists, for example in the broiler (Knoeber and Thurman, 1995), 
pork (Martin, 1997), winegrape (Goodhue, Heien, Lee, and Summer, 2003), and nursery 
industries (Batt and Miller, 2004).  The nursery industry consists of wholesale nurseries – 
which I will call the producers – and their customers, namely retail nurseries, landscapers, 
garden centers, and big-box stores.  When purchasing from a producer-nursery, a retailer 
makes a decision about how far ahead of delivery to place the order (pre-order interval).  
The producer-nursery then lists the plant price on the basis of the plant type, quality, and 
any pre-order terms.  Compared with a spot market transaction, pre-order contracts 
reduce the producer’s inventory and market risk, while providing retailers with purchase 
discounts.  The most recent U.S. nursery and greenhouse survey was led by Hodges, A., 
M. Palma, and C. Hall in 2009 in all 50 states, reflecting 2008 data.  They find that 
forward contracting is an important marketing practice that many producers use as a risk 
management tool.  Mortimer (2008) finds that vertical coordination between producers 
and retailers increases the profits of both the upstream and downstream firm.  In the 
present chapter, I investigate producer and retailer nurseries’ choices of contract terms.  
In terms of payment types, a pre-order contract can be divided into two groups: 
pay-by-order and pay-by-scan.  Pay-by-order is a contract in which the producer is paid 
once the retailer receives the shipment.  Pay-by-scan is a contract in which the buyer and 
seller agree that payment will not be made until the good is sold to customer.  In terms of 
order frequency, pre-order contracts can be divided into two types: single-order contracts 
and annual contracts.  Single-order contracts refer to purchase orders in which retailers 
may negotiate with the producer over the plant prices in a given shipment.  They are 
common in sales to independent nursery retailers.  Annual contracts, which refer to 
purchase orders in which the producer contracts to sell a product to a given retailer at 
given price during the selling season, are commonly used in sales to big-box stores.  In 57 
 
 
annual contracts, the retailer may reorder at the same price agreed upon in the original 
contract, and the producer’s responsibility is to satisfy the retailer’s demand at any time 
at that price.  Because producers ordinarily keep reserve inventories to meet retailers’ 
unexpected demands, the producers’ stocking fee in an annual contract is larger than it is 
in a variable-price contract.  Therefore, pre-order contracts in Oregon nurseries can be 
divided into four types: (I) pay-by-order and single-order contract; (II) pay-by-scan and 
single-order contract; (III) pay-by-order and annual contract; (IV) and pay-by-scan and 
annual contract. 
The goal is to analyze producers’ and retailers’ choices of, and reactions to, 
various contract types in the Oregon nursery industry.  To this end, I successively employ 
two alternative behavioral scenarios.  In the first step or scenario, retailers choose 
whether to sign a pre-order contract given a particular pre-order interval.  In the second 
scenario, producers determine the price discount on the basis of that pre-order interval 
selected.  Nursery producers usually offer two alternative discount methods:  (i) a direct 
plant price discount and (ii) a payment grace period, which is an indirect discount.  In my 
modeling of the two-step contracting process, I predict in the first step, with logistic 
regression and a Tobit model, the retailer’s decision regarding the pre-order interval.  For 
the second step, I estimate with a Tobit model the producer’s decision regarding any 
direct price discount, and with a multinomial logit model the producer’s decision 
regarding any indirect discount via a grace period before payment is demanded.  
Different from a one-step model, the two-step model in the present paper allows 
transaction and retailer characteristics to affect decisions about the pre-order interval 
differently from how they affect decisions about a direct price discount and payment 
grace period discount.  In what is the first systematic empirical analysis of Oregon 
nursery contracts, I use daily 2005-2010 transaction data from a nationwide-selling 
nursery company in Oregon.  The detailed information on transaction price and quantity 
in this dataset allows exploration of the producer’s marketing strategy, risk attitude, and 
bargaining power in dealings with various retailers. 
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Literature Review 
 
Vertical contracts have been widely studied in industrial organization, production 
economics, and supply chain management.  Researchers examine the effects of contract 
arrangement on pricing, risk allocation, marketing channels, transaction types, and profits 
allocation between producers and retailers.  
The classical “newsvendor” problem, which determines optimal inventory levels 
given fixed prices and random demand, is one of them.  A newsvendor who sells a 
particular type of newspaper can order as many copies as he likes and sells them at a 
given price.  Because the demand is uncertain, he will waste expenditure when ordering 
too much, and forego sales when ordering too few.  The newsvendor should choose the 
order amount that will maximize profit.  Chen and Chuang (2000) extend the newsvendor 
model to seasonal agricultural products with the assumptions that:  (i) if a retailer orders 
in advance, the vendor will offer him a discount; and (ii) the later the retailer makes the 
commitment to purchase, the more information he will have about the market eventual 
demand.  In their model, the retailer decides on the optimal purchase timing and quantity 
simultaneously.  Chen and Chuang provide evidence that optimal purchase timing is 
earlier and optimal pre-order quantity is larger when market demand is predictable than 
when market demand is unpredictable.  
Some studies focus on contract efficiency.  Cachon (2004) investigates the 
impacts of push contracts, pull contracts, and pre-order discount contracts.  In push 
contracts, all products are ordered before the selling season and the retailer bears all the 
inventory risk.  In pull contracts, the retailer purchases as needed during the season and 
the producer holds all the inventory risk.  In pre-order discount contracts, the retailer 
bears the inventory risk and the producer is responsible for the production risk, namely 
the risk that product volume may exceed the ordered amount.  Mathematical models and 
simulations show that pre-order discount contracts Pareto-dominate pull and push 
contracts.   Mö ller and Watanabe (2010) establish a monopolistic seller model to explore 
why it is sometimes early buyers, and other times late buyers, who receive price 59 
 
 
discounts in the airline industry.  Their conclusion is that a pre-order discount is more 
likely to be observed in a market where:  (i) temporal capacity limits are easy to 
implement; (ii) marginal costs of capacity are relatively high; (iii) the producer can adjust 
price according to demand; and (iv) resale is not feasible. 
Other literature explains how to set the wholesale price and pre-order discount so 
as to allocate profit between producers and retailers.  Gale (1993) examines the impacts 
of transaction timing on price discrimination by comparing monopoly and duopoly 
models.  He takes the U.S. airline industry as an example to show that, considering 
aggregate demand uncertainty, capacity constraints, and ex ante product differentiation, 
price discrimination is larger under duopoly than under monopoly.  Chen (2011) finds 
that in a buy-back policy, the producer can find a discounted wholesale price in a returns-
discount contract which raises the profit of both producer and retailer.  The reason is that 
producer profit is insensitive to wholesale price change when producer price approaches 
its optimum.  When a producer offers a wholesale price discount, the buyer is likely to 
order more products.  As a result, such contracts can significantly lift the profit of both 
producer and retailer. 
Although such theoretical work has been well-established, empirical work on 
these issues lags behind.  Due to the scarcity of the relevant intra-firm data, most 
theoretical results are supported by simulation rather than real business information.  The 
complicated pricing systems observed in the presence of highly differentiated product 
lines make such data collection even more difficult.  An exception is Goodhue, Heien, 
Lee, and Sumner (2003), who collect contract data via a survey of California winegrape 
producers and examine the relationship between product quality and contracting choices.  
Logistic regression models are used to estimate the effects of producer characteristics, 
contract provisions, and price incentives.  By comparing producers’ choices of contract 
type and provisions, they conclude that producers who grow high-quality grapes are 
likely to use formal written contracts, including provisions restricting the production 
process.  Similarly, Fraser (2005) collects data via a mail survey of grape producers and, 
using multinomial logit and ordered logit models, examines Australian winegrape supply 60 
 
 
contracts.  Fraser’s empirical analysis reveals that contract clauses such as bonus/penalty 
payments, contract duration, and risk-shifting, influence grape quality, while bottle price 
of wine determines the risk distribution between winery and producer.   
Katchova and Miranda (2004) are another example of the literature employing 
business data to examine market contracts.  Maximizing a farmer’s expected utility yields 
not only the adoption probability, but the producer’s choice of quantity, frequency, and 
contract type.  They prefer a double-hurdle model because farm characteristics affecting 
decisions to adopt market contracts differ from those affecting decisions on contract 
terms.  First, a Probit model is specified to examine whether a farm will adopt a 
marketing contract.  Second, the farmer’s choices about product quantity, contracting 
frequency, and contract type are investigated with Tobit and truncated regression, 
Poisson and truncated Poisson, and multinomial and binomial logit models.  Mortimer 
(2008) employs a two-stage model to analyze movie distributors’ and video stores’ 
choices of, and reactions to, two contract types in the video rental industry: revenue-
sharing contracts and linear pricing contracts.  In her paper, a monopolistic upstream firm 
is assumed to produce one product that is sold in the downstream market.  The upstream 
firm chooses rental quantity and inventory to maximize distributor profit.  The 
downstream firms observe the contracts, and select the optimal contract and inventory to 
maximize retailer profit.  The model shows that both upstream and downstream profits 
rise by 10% under the revenue-sharing contract for popular titles.   
In Mortimer’s paper, utility theory is the foundation for establishing discrete 
choice models in which contract type is a binary or multinomial dependent variable, and 
personal and product attributes are independent variables.  In the present paper, I use a 
successive model to examine how a retailer selects the transaction timing to minimize 
retailer transaction cost, and how a producer chooses discount rates to maximize producer 
profit given the retailer’s decision.   
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Producer and Retailer Price Contract Model 
Following Mortimer’s (2008) market assumptions, I assume first that there is no 
coordination across retailers, an assumption supported by the diversity of retailer type 
and location.  Second, the producer can adjust plant price according to market demand.  
Third, plants can either be grown or purchased at market.  The difference between the 
nursery’s and video rental industry’s technology is that the nursery industry follows a 
seasonal pattern on account of a plant’s life-cycle.  It is critical for nursery producers and 
retailers to find the optimal transaction timing, order quantity, and order discounts over a 
selling season.   
Retailer Problem 
 
In the nursery industry, the retailer is a bridge between nursery producers and 
consumers.  The retail nursery’s problem is to maximize retailer profit by choosing the 
optimal number of days ahead of delivery on which to order the plant, an interval I will 
call the pre-order interval.  Retail nurseries can satisfy consumer demands via three 
alternative channels: (a) purchase from wholesale nurseries in advance; (b) purchase from 
other retail nurseries at the spot market; or (c) production of the plants oneself.  In other 
words, channel (b) means retailer can sell the plants either purchased from wholesaler or 
produced by itself to other retailers.  Retailers decide, considering these three channels, 
the optimal length of the pre-order interval. 
At market equilibrium, the profits generated from these three channels should be 
equated to each other.  Given the zero-profit condition in a competitive market, the profit 
from channel (b) – namely revenue at spot market   minus the retailer’s production cost 
   – is equal to zero:       .  Retailer production cost is influenced by production scale, 
scope, business experience, market trends, retailer location, and retailer type.  
For the same reason, profit from channel (b) above – namely revenue R at spot 
market minus the present-value of pre-order cost       – is equal to zero.  This is 
expressed as           , where    is pre-order cost – namely the pre-order price charged 62 
 
 
by the wholesale nursery – and       is pre-order cost’s present value at compound 
interest rate r.  Combining the two conditions above, the equilibrium condition is 
 
(1)                  
 
Solving for t gives the optimal pre-order interval    at which the order contract is 
signed: 
 
(2)      
 
  (            ) 
 
Optimal pre-order interval    is determined from the retailer’s production cost    and the 
cost    of pre-ordering.  Equation (2) implies the optimal pre-order interval has a positive 
relationship with retailer’s production cost ( 
   
   
   ), and a negative relationship with 
pre-order cost ( 
   
   
   ).  
Assume retailer production technology follows the Cobb-Douglas production 
function,            , where L, K, M, and q are the quantities of labor, capital, 
material, and product, and           is a measure of returns of scale.  Given the price of 
labor, capital, and materials, the Cobb-Douglas cost function is  (          )  
 
 
      (        ), implying that production cost is related to quantity, returns to scale, 
and input prices.  In my nursery retail model, plant quantity is represented collectively by 
total plant volume per order (scale) and number of plant species per order (scope).  Under 
decreasing returns to scale (scale diseconomy), production cost rises as scale does; under 
increasing returns to scale (scale economy), production cost falls as scale rises.  Similarly, 
under decreasing returns to scope or scope diseconomy, production cost rises as scale 
does; under increasing returns to scope or scope economy, production cost falls as scale 
rises.     
In the nursery industry, raw materials include pots, soil, water, chemicals, and 
fertilizers, whose prices are generally indexed in my model by nursery producer price 63 
 
 
index.  Due to the seasonal pattern of a life-cycle of a plant’s value in the nursery, I 
include season dummy Dquarter in the model.  Geographic dummies Dregion are used to 
capture the local market characteristics.  The retailer’s production cost can thus be written 
as  
 
(3)               (                                ) 
 
Like production cost, pre-order price    charged by the wholesale nursery in 
equation (4) is affected by total plant volume per order (Scale), number of plant species 
per order (Scope), nursery producer price index (PPI), housing starts (Housing), length of 
the history of the nursery-retailer trading relationship (Experience), and retailer type (Dbb).  
The larger are the plant volume and the number of varieties in an order, the larger 
retailer’s total expenditure would be.  Housing starts are a proxy for plant demand.  The 
trading relationship between producer and retailer (Experience) contributes to the trust 
between these two parties and thus reduces pre-order cost.  Retailer types     , such as 
independent retailer and big-box store, affect the discount rate because – with their 
substantial negotiating power – big-box stores may demand higher discount rates than do 
independent retailers.  Pre-order cost thus can be specified as 
 
(4)               (                                      ) 
 
where     equals 1 when the retailer is a big-box store; zero otherwise.  Combining these 
factors, equation (2) can be written as 
 
(5)              (                                                       ) 
         
Taking the derivative of    with respect to Scale and using equation (2), (3), and 
(4), we obtain  
(6)          
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The expected sign of this relationship between pre-order interval and scale depends upon 
whether a scale economy or diseconomy is present in production cost function 
   
       and 
pre-order cost function 
   
       in equation (6).  Empirical evidence on this topic is 
provided in the section below.  If scale economy rules, the greater a plant order’s size, the 
lower the marginal production cost and the shorter the buyer’s optimal pre-order interval.  
Otherwise, the larger the order, the larger the marginal production cost and the greater the 
optimal pre-order interval.  The same relationship applies to scale’s effect on pre-order 
cost.  Therefore, the expected sign of 
   
       and 
   
       are unknown a priori.  In addition, 
scale’s effect on pre-order interval depends upon whether the scale’s effect 
   
       on 
production cost dominates or is dominated by its effect 
   
       on pre-order cost in 
equation (6). 
The same argument applies to the impact of the per-ordered variety of plant 
species, in a given transaction, on that transaction’s optimal pre-order interval.  If a scope 
economy is present, the greater the number of plant species per order, the lower is the 
marginal cost and thus the shorter the pre-order interval.  Otherwise, the greater the 
number of plant species in an order, the larger marginal cost and the greater the optimal 
pre-order interval.  On the other hand, retailers must consider the balance between a 
species’ effect on production cost and its effect on pre-order cost because the two would 
offset each other. 
Nursery producer price index at nursery, garden, and farm supply stores is a proxy 
for raw material prices.  Taking the derivative of    with respect to PPI and using 
equation (2), (3), and (4), we obtain  
(7)          
   
      
 
   
   
      
 
   
   
     
Product cost    and pre-order cost    rises with the prices of such raw materials as 
chemicals and fertilizers, we know that 
   
         and 
   
        .  That is, nursery producer 
price index’s effect on pre-order interval depends upon whether the nursery PPI’s effect 65 
 
 
   
     on production cost dominates or is dominated by its effect 
   
     on pre-order cost in 
equation (7). 
Housing starts (Housing), defined as the number of privately owned new houses 
on which construction has been started in a given period, is a proxy for plant demand.  
Because inventory cost falls with the rises in plant demand due to the large turnover rate, 
we know that  
   
            
 
   
   
            .  That is, as housing starts rise, optimal 
forward-delivery interval    should increase as well.   
Transaction trust between a producer and retailer is difficult to model.  Increasing 
trust presumably reduces such transaction costs as information search, negotiation, 
transaction monitoring, and contract implementation.  For example, a transaction with an 
old customer saves a seller’s expenditure in searching for and negotiating with a new 
buyer and in monitoring the buyer’s default probability.  I use the number of years over 
which nursery and retailer have conducted business over a given period to proxy for 
transaction trust.  The longer the period over which two parties have conducted trade with 
one another, the greater the number of transactions that will be recorded and hence the 
greater amount and accuracy of company information shared between the parties.  
Because 
   
               , it follows that 
   
               
 
   
   
               .  The greater 
the length of the nursery-retailer trading relationship, the greater would be the trust 
between them, so the greater the optimal pre-order interval. 
 
Producer Problem 
 
Given the retailer’s decision on pre-order interval   , the producer’s problem is to 
maximize its profit by determining the rate at which the price to the retailer should be 
discounted below the spot price as a reward for the pre-order commitment.  If the spot 
market price is   and the pre-order price is    , the discount can be expressed as  
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In the nursery industry, it is difficult to calculate average invoice price because so many 
highly differentiated products, whose prices vary by plant species and size, are present in 
each invoice.  But the discount rate is an appropriate measure for comparing average 
prices across invoices.   
Nursery producers deal mainly with two types of retail nurseries: independent 
retailers and big-box stores such as Walmart, Lowe’s, and Home Depot.  Two payment 
types are commonly used in the nursery industry: pay-by-scan and pay-by-order.  In pay-
by-scan, the producing nursery is paid only for the plants that are purchased and kept by 
the retailer-customer, while in pay-by-order the producer is paid once the retailer receives 
the shipment.  “Contract frequency” is divided into single-order contracts and annual 
contracts.  In table 3.1, I segment nursery contracts into four groups, based on payment 
type and contract frequency.   
The producer’s problem is to maximize profit for each contract type.  Assume in 
figure 3.1 the producer’s unit cost is a step function of plant quantity.  Let    be the unit 
cost per plant when plant quantity is in the range between      and   , given (     )  
  
  , and j is an index of output range.  If         , then        .  Unit cost rises as output 
does.  Each rectangle in figure 3.1 is unit cost in the given output range.  Total contract 
cost is the sum of costs over the output range,     ∑ (       )(         )
 
    , where 
             .  Unit cost is zero if output is zero. Switching price and output domains as 
in figure 3.2, contract cost can be written as     ∑ (         )(      )
 
    , where   is 
total plant quantity   .  Furthermore, ci is a function of pre-order interval t
* and of 
contract characteristics X, where 
  
       .  That is, unit production costs fall with 
increases in the committed pre-order interval. 
Let P be the spot market price,   the discount rate, and   ̅ the shipment quantity in 
Contract I.  Following Cross, Buccola, and Thomann (2006), the producer’s profit 
function when using Contract Type I in table 3.1 then is 
 
 67 
 
 
(8)  Contract I:  pay-by-order and single-order contract 
                 (     )   ̅   ∑ (         )(  ̅     )   
     
 
where discount rate   is defined relative to spot market price  , and (  ̅     )   
     (  ̅       ).  Profit function (8) applies to the contract between a nursery producer 
and an independent retailer who have decided to adopt a pay-by-order and single-order 
contract.  If the independent retailer has booked pre-order interval t
*, so that it has 
ordered amount   ̅ today and will pay for them t* days later at discounted price(     ) , 
then the present value of payment received by the producer is      (     )   ̅.   
The difference between Contract I and Contract II is payment method.  Contract II 
with pay-by-scan allows buy-back, while Contract I with pay-by-order does not allow it.  
For example, with a pay-by-scan contract, if a plant dies before payment has been made, 
the retailer can return it without paying the producer.  If         ̅  is the number of plants 
returned to the producer, the profit function is 
 
(9)  Contract II:  pay-by-scan and single-order contract 
             (     )   ̅   ∑ (         )(  ̅     )
   
           (     )         ̅  
where (  ̅     )         (  ̅       ).         
 
The difference between Contract Type I and Contract Type III is contract 
frequency.  Contract III allows shipment quantity to remain unspecified in the contract, so 
that shipment amount is random at the time of contract-signing.  This form is common 
with big-box stores.  If   ̃ is the random shipment quantity in Contract III, shipment 
quantity expectation  (  ̃) is used instead of fixed   ̅ in the profit function: 
 
(10)  Contract III:  pay-by-order and annual contract 
                  (     )  (  ̃)   ∑ (         )( (  ̃)     )   
     
where ( (  ̃)     )         ( (  ̃)       ).                68 
 
 
Contract Type IV, which calls for pay-by-scan and open-ended (unspecified) 
shipment quantity, is common in sales to big-box stores.  If        (  ̃)  is the quantity of 
defective plants returned to the producer, the profit function is  
 
(11)  Contract IV:  pay-by-scan and annual contract 
            (     )  (  ̃)   ∑(         )( (  ̃)     )
 
 
   
       (     )    
   (  ̃)  
where ( (  ̃)     )         ( (  ̃)       ).                
 
The long-run condition for maximizing profit across contract types is that the 
contract types be designed such that profit at expected equilibrium satisfies  (  )  
 (   )    (    )    (   ).  Otherwise, the producer will engage increasingly in the 
contract type with the largest profit until profit with that contract type becomes the same 
as with the other contract types.  The first-order conditions of this problem with respect to 
the pre-order discount decision is a function of pre-order interval t
* and of contract 
characteristics X.  Based on the above first-order conditions, we now may derive 
hypotheses about contract characteristics’ impacts on the pre-order discount.  In the 
Empirical Results section below, I will then test these hypotheses.   
Consider contract I in equation (8) for example.  Solving for   gives the optimal 
pre-order discount  
 : 
       
   
   ̅        
(    )     (    )     
(12)                                                                   (    )
   
Holding plant price fixed at spot market P, the pre-order discount rises as contract cost 
falls: 
  
  (    )    .  Because contract cost is a function of contract characteristics, the 
factors that reduce contract costs raise the optimal pre-order discount.  Furthermore, 69 
 
 
assuming  
  
       , pre-order discount rises as pre-order interval rises:  
  
     
    
 
  (    )
   
    
 
  
  
  
       . 
In order to capture the characteristics of all four contract types, I include two 
dummies variables,       and    .        denotes payment type, which is unity if the 
contract requires the retailer to pay-by-order; zero if pay-by-scan.      denotes retailer 
types or contract frequency, represented by unity for annual contracts or big-box stores, 
and zero for single-order contracts or independent retailers.  Contract types thus are 
defined as: 
  Contract I:            and         
  Contract II:            and         
  Contract III:            and         
  Contract IV:            and         
 
Other important contract characteristics affecting the pre-order discount rate 
include – along with the symbols I will use for them:  plant quantity (Scale), plant 
diversity (Scope), length of nursery-retailer trading relationship (Experience), percentage 
of unpaid balance (Owe), nursery producer price index (PPI), housing starts (Housing), 
and transaction season (Dquarter).  Some of these factors, such as Scale, Scope, Experience, 
PPI, Housing, and Dquarter, are the same as those defined in the optimal pre-order interval 
function.  The other variable, unpaid amount (Owe), reflecting financial risk is new to 
this analysis.  Owe is the percentage of the retailer’s unpaid balance in the previous year.  
Equation (12) which is applicable to four contract types can be written as 
 
(13)           (    ) 
   (                                                            ) 
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Taking the derivative of discount   with respect to contract characteristics   gives 
  
    
  
  
  
  .  Provided  
  
       and  
  
      , we have  
  
    
  
  
  
      ; otherwise, if 
  
      , 
then 
  
    
  
  
  
      .  That is, retailer characteristics such as length of nursery-retailer 
trading relationship, which reduce the unit cost between buyer and seller, will raise the 
discount rate.  On the other hand, factors that boost unit cost will reduce the discount rate.  
An example is the retailer’s debt-to-credit limit.  As a proxy of a retailer’s payment 
history, retailer’s debt-to-credit limit reflects the retailer’s ability and willingness to pay 
for its balance.  The higher is the percentage of the retailer’s unpaid balance, the worse is 
the retailer’s financial situation, so the greater the producer’s cost in collecting payment 
and the lower the optimal discount rate.   
 
Model Specifications 
In the two-step model derived above, the factors affecting retailer’s and 
producer’s decision include transaction attribute, retailer attribute, region effect, and 
season effect.  In equation (5), the retailer determines the optimal pre-order interval.  
Then, in equation (13), the producer decides on the pre-order discount rate given the 
retailer’s pre-order interval choice and transaction characteristics.  The nursery producer 
is assumed to provide two alternative discount methods: plant price discount and payment 
grace period.  Payment grace period is a discount method because it allows retailers to 
pay for the obligations over a longer period without extra penalty.  I assume that these 
two discount methods are influenced by the same set of factors.  The present two-step 
model allows the parties to choose the pre-order interval and discount rate in separate 
stages.  Such a two-step method is in line with the contract processes in many real 
businesses.  
Pre-order Interval Models 
 
Equation (2) shows the linear relationship between the optimal pre-order interval 
and the difference between logged production cost and logged pre-order cost.  Assuming 71 
 
 
production cost and pre-order cost functions follow a logarithmic functional form, 
production cost and pre-order cost bear a linear relationship to transaction attribute, 
retailer attribute, region effect, and season effect.  Therefore, equation (5) can be written 
as 
(14)                                                      {
            
              
where 
                                                                      
                
and                 (    ) 
 
Here, t is pre-order interval, R is sale revenue per invoice, S is the number of plant 
species per invoice, Y is the length of the nursery-retailer trading relationship, PPI is the 
nursery producer price index, and H is the index of housing starts.      equals 1 when the 
retailer is a big-box store; 0 otherwise.          is a regional dummy denoting West, 
Midwest, Northeast, South, or other regions.           is a seasonal dummy for spring, 
summer, autumn, and winter.  Bold font denotes vectors.  Because the logged total sales 
and plant species may each have a non-linear relationship with pre-order interval, an 
alternative specification is to include square terms for logged sale and scope.  Equation 
(14) then can be written as 
 
(15)                                                      {
            
              
where                     (   )               (   )                           
                                    
and              (    ) 
 
Equation (15) is a corner-solution model because dependent variable t is 
continuous at positive values, but becomes discontinuous at zero points.  Green (2002) 
shows that conventional regression methods fail to account for the qualitative difference 72 
 
 
between limit (zero) observations and nonlimit (continuous) observations.  The 
dependent variable is a censored variable and the censoring point is zero.  OLS regression 
leads to inconsistent parameter estimates because the sample is not representative of the 
population.  A Tobit model (1958) can in this situation be used instead of OLS, and 
estimated with maximum likelihood methods (MLE).  As proved in Green (2002), MLE 
has the desirable properties of consistency, asymptotic normality, asymptotic efficiency, 
and invariance under regularity. 
To depict the Tobit approach, denote the exogenous factors X as     (    R 
(   )      (   )                                  ) 
 (   )    (  )
  
     
 
(     ) 
      (   )      (
   
 
)  (   ) 
where  (   ) is the function of pre-order interval given the exogenous factors  ,  (
   
  ) 
is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, and exponential indicator 
functions are 1(     ) and 1(     ).  The log-likelihood of the model is 
      ∑  
 
 
    
    (  )         
(       
  ) 
       ∑           (
  
  
 
) 
    
 
The expected value of t, namely pre-order interval, is then 
 (   )    (       )        (       ) (         ) 
                                                  (       ) (         ) 
where   (       )      (     )       (        )    (         )    (
  
  ). 
In addition,  (         )         (         )          
 (
  
  )
 (
  
  )
 , so that 
(16)          (   )   {      [
 (
  
  )
 (
  
  )
]} (
  
  )      (
  
  )     (
  
  ) 
Because  (       )    (
  
  ), 
  (     )
   
 
  
   (
  
  ), and 
  (   )
   
    (
  
  )  , 
taking the derivative of equation (15) with respect to    gives 
 
 (17)        
  (   )
   
 
  (     )
   
 (         )    (       )
  (       )
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Equation (17) implies that the contract characteristic’s effect  
  (   )
   
 on the pre-
order interval depends upon its effect 
  (     )
   
 on the probability that the retailer will pre-
order and on the pre-order interval (
  (       )
   
) itself.  To estimate the probability that the 
retailer will pre-order, I define a new binary variable, namely whether a pre-order 
contract has been signed or not, as the dependent variable in the logistic regression  
 
(18)     (
  
    
)                                                       
                             
 
where    is the probability of pre-order contract.  If a pre-order contract has been signed, 
a pre-order interval is specified in the contract.  If a pre-order contract has not been 
signed, the pre-order interval is set to be zero.  Coefficients   can be estimated by 
maximum likelihood methods.  To sum up, I use equation (18) to estimate the probability 
that the retailer pre-orders, then use equation (15) to estimate the pre-order interval given 
that the retailer has signed a pre-order contract. 
Price Discount Model 
 
Knowing the retailer’s decision regarding a pre-order interval, the producer will, 
as discussed at equations (12), (13), and elsewhere, determines the discount rate 
maximizing the producer’s profit.  To provide functional form, I rewrite equation (13) by 
assuming the log linear relationship between discount rate and independent variables: 
 
(19)                ̂                                                
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where   is discount rate,  ̂ is predicted pre-order interval,   is sales revenue per order,   
is the number of plant species per order, Y is the length of nursery-retailer trading 
relationship, PPI is the nursery producer price index, H is the index of housing starts, 
      is payment dummy,     is retailer type dummy, and          is season dummy.  
Bold font denotes vectors.  F is the retailer debt-to-credit limit in the previous year, used 
here to reflect the retailer’s financial condition.  Because, as discussed in equation (15), 
logged total sales and plant species may have a non-linear relationship with discount rate, 
an alternative specification is to include the squared forms of logged sales quantity and 
scope in equation (19).  Equation (19) then can be written as  
 
(20)                ̂              (   )               (   )                   
                                                
and estimated with OLS. 
Payment Grace Period Model 
 
As discussed above in the Model Specification section, the payment grace period 
is an alternative, indirect way for the producer to provide a price discount.  Because 
modeling the producer’s choice of indirect discount by way of a payment grace period 
requires specifying multiple categories in the dependent variable, I use a multinomial 
logistic model to investigate the producer’s choice of grace period.  The payment grace 
periods in the model are 
1.  m = 0:  pay within 15 days of delivery 
2.  m = 1:  pay within 30 days of delivery 
3.  m = 2:  pay within 60 days of delivery 
4.  m = 3:  pay within one year of delivery 
The probability that the producer will offer the indicated payment grace period is 
 (       )  
   (  
    )
    ∑    (  
    )  
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where     (   ̂   R                                 ), namely the same exogenous 
variables as in the direct price-discount model.  In particular, the probability the producer 
will demand payment within 15 days is 
 (       )  
 
    ∑    (  
    )  
   
    
Suppose the first category, m = 0, is the reference one.  Then for m=1, 2, 3: 
(21)             
 (    )
 (    )     
     
                                   ̂                                                         
                                        
Equation (21) is used to predict the probability of a given grace period, along with the 
effects of exogenous factors   on the producer’s choice of that grace period.  The 
dependent variable in equation (21) can be expressed as   
 (   )
 (   ). 
 
Data Description 
 
Data on contract and retailer characteristics were provided by one of the largest 
nurseries
1 in Oregon.  The dataset consisted of 691,192 records, beginning in 2005 and 
ending in 2010, at the plant level.  Each record includes all the plant information 
available regarding a given retailer’s order on a given date, including order number, order 
date, delivery date, company shipped to, address shipped to, invoice discount, plant name, 
plant variety, plant size, plant type, unit price, ordered quantity, shipped quantity, freight 
cost, amount paid, and amount due.  If several records share the same order number, they 
are based on the same order.  To clean the dataset, I removed any record corresponding to 
a gift or to a sample with a 100% discount, or if it reflects a refund or replenishment of a 
previous transaction.  To facilitate the analysis of a market contract, I organized the 
original dataset at the plant level into a new dataset at the order level by grouping 
together all records of the same order number.  In this way, I obtained 46,000 
observations, each of which represent an order, including total revenue, number of plant 76 
 
 
species, customer’s name and address, invoice discount, retailer’s requested delivery date, 
and ultimate delivery date.   
Table 3.3 shows the summary statistics of these variables, defined in table 3.2.  
Some variables are, for proprietary purposes, not reported.  According to nursery 
business practice, an independent retailer’s pre-order interval is the difference between 
order date and delivery date.  Because big-box stores usually use annual contracts in 
which big-box stores negotiate price structure with the producer at the beginning of a 
year and sign an annual contract at that time, I assume that, for big-box stores, pre-order 
intervals are the difference between the first day of each year and the delivery date.  If the 
minimum pre-order interval is larger than zero in table 3.3, the retailer has selected a pre-
order contract; otherwise, the retailer has chosen the spot market contract.  Spot-market 
contracts constituted 29.5%, and pre-order contracts 70.5%, of the sample transactions.  
The overall sample mean pre-order interval is 110, implying retailers typically establish a 
contract about three months ahead of delivery.  Independent retailers usually place a 
contract a week ahead of expected delivery.  Big-box stores, on the other hand, usually 
place a contract five months ahead. 
As discussed above, price discount and payment grace period are the producer’s 
two alternative promotion methods.  Characterizing the payment grace period is 
econometrically straightforward; but calculating a price discount differs from the normal 
method.  The normal method of calculating discount rate is 
   
                  
       
 
In the present paper, I use maximum price rather than market price to calculate 
discount rate. Because plant price depends on variety and size, I regarded – in order to 
capture the main discount drivers – plants in the same variety and size category to be of a 
single product type.  Because most invoices include multiple products, I use the weighted 
average discount across products as the aggregate discount on that invoice.  In particular, 
if an invoice includes n types of plants, the invoice discount rate equals the discount rate 
on each plant type weighted by its sale revenue.  77 
 
 
(22)                ∑
     
    
         
      
 
     
where Pmax is the highest price charged for a plant in a given variety and size category.  
Because a given plant type’s spot market price is unknown, the maximum observed plant 
price within a given product type is used as the reference point to calculate that product 
type’s plant discount.  In this way, “standardized” discounts can be compared among 
orders.   
In order to study the producer’s price-discount decision, I adjust plant prices to 
the price stated at producer location.  Two price categories are provided on the nursery’s 
receipt: (i) price stated at producer location, and (ii) price stated at buyer location.  In the 
nursery examined here, whether (i) the shipping fee is stated or (ii) the shipping fee is 
missing and the buyer has hired the driver, the buyer is assumed to pay the shipping fee 
and price on receipt is price at producer location.  If, on the other hand, the shipping fee 
is missing and the producer has hired the driver, the producer is assumed to pay the 
shipping fee and price on receipt is price at buyer location.  In this latter case, I converted 
price on receipt to price at producer location by removing the estimated shipping fee.  
Because the nursery providing the data for the present study sells its product throughout 
the country, shipping costs are non-negligible.  Especially among big-box stores, the 
producer typically offers a free shipping service as an indirect discount.  I estimated 
shipping fee in three steps.  The first step is to collect buyers’ zip codes.  With the SAS 
software macro, distance between producer and buyer is calculated by city-based zip 
codes.  The second step is to estimate the transportation fee as a function of distance and 
shipping unit in each transaction.  The third step is to use the estimated transportation fee 
equation to predict shipping fee in each transaction.   
Each product’s percentage of sales revenue in an invoice is the appropriate weight 
for computing the invoice discount rate in equation (22).  Using equation (22), I obtain 
the weighted average discount rate in each invoice.  Because the highest price charged for 
a plant in a given variety and size category is given as exogenous, discount rate   
captures the impacts of transaction and retailer characteristics on product price.  The 
histogram of the discount rates in the 46,000 observations, although not provided in the 78 
 
 
present paper, shows that the weighted discount follows an approximately normal 
distribution. 
I have noted that, considering its time value, payment grace period is equivalent 
to, or another way to measure, a price discount rate.  Payment grace period is defined as 
the number of days allowed before the buyer is required to pay without incurring 
penalties.  The grace period category the producer optimally offers, such as within 15 
days, within 30 days, ..., and within one year, depends on transaction and retailer 
characteristics.  The twelve categories of grace period provided in the data are grouped 
here into six segments in order to avoid cases of missing observations in a category.  
Most transactions are stipulated to be closed within two months (60 days).  Grace periods 
differ between big-box stores and independent retailers.  Most big-box stores are required 
to pay within 60 days (46%), while independent retailers are mostly required to pay 
within 30 days (53%). 
The number of invoices in our sample varies by region, year, season, and retailer 
type.  For example, 86% of transactions are with Western retailers, 5.9% with 
Midwestern, 2.2% with Northeastern, 3.9% with Southern, and 1.9% with Canada and 
Alaska.  The largest number of clients was 380 (in 2010); the lowest number of clients 
was 321 (in 2006).  The percentage of transactions in each year between 2005 to 2010 
were respectively 2.6%, 11.0%, 13.6%, 12.7%, 15.5%, and 44.6%, strongly suggesting 
that increasing proportions of the firm’s records became represented in the data as time 
passed.  Percentages of data drawn from the 1
st quarter to the 4
th quarter were 
respectively 24.4%, 48.3%, 22.4%, and 5.9%, illustrating the seasonal pattern in nursery 
sales.  In terms of retailer type, 71.1% of transactions were with big-box stores and 28.9% 
with independent retailers.   
Summary statistics in table 3.3 compare transactions with big-box stores and 
those with independent retailers.  Big-box stores recently are the fast-growing 
phenomenon in the industry.  Because these stores are rather new customers for our 
sample nursery, it is not surprising that the nursery’s business experience with them is 
much shorter than it is with independent retailers.  The producer’s average per-order sales 79 
 
 
revenue with big-box stores is smaller than with independent retailers, but big-box stores’ 
transactions tend to be of higher frequency.  Seventy-nine percent of contracts with big-
box stores are on a pay-by-order basis and 21% on a pay-by-scan basis.  Ninety-seven 
percent of contracts with independent retailers follow pay-by-order and only 3% follow 
pay-by-scan. 
Standard deviation (the 7
th column in table 3.3) is a widely used measure of 
variability or diversity from the average.  Coefficient of variation (CV) (last column in 
table 3.3), or relative standard deviation, is a normalized measure of dispersion, allowing 
a comparison of two variables’ dispersions with their central tendencies or means.  
Because contract attributes’ standard deviations and coefficients of variation among big-
box stores are smaller than among independent retailers, big-box stores’ contract 
behaviors are less volatile and more predictable than independent retailers’ are.  In 
particular, contract characteristics such as pre-order interval, sales revenue per order 
(transaction scale), annual sales revenue, plant species per order (transaction scope), and 
unpaid balance (retailer lagged debt) are less variable among big-box stores than among 
independent stores.  Similarity of contract attributes across big-box stores, and their large 
transaction scales, are what especially attract producer-nurseries to big-box stores. 
Empirical Results 
 
The two-step model employed here predicts pre-order interval, price discount, and 
grace-period discount on the basis of transaction attributes, retailer attributes, region 
effects, and season effects.  In the present section, I discuss estimation results of the 
logistic, Tobit, and multinomial logit models described in the Model Specification section.  
Tables 3.4 – 3.9 present the estimation results for pre-order interval t, price discount rate 
 , and payment grace period d. 
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Factors Affecting Pre-order Interval 
 
Estimation results for the pre-order probability (equation 18) are reported in the 
second column of table 3.4.  Parameter estimates and t-statistics are each shown.  Pseudo 
R
2 is 0.76 and coefficients are all statistically significant at the 5% level except for the 
Western Region dummy.  Tobit estimation results for the pre-order interval length 
(equation 15) are reported, with parameter estimates and t-statistics, in the last three 
columns of table 3.4.  The Tobit is estimated by retailer type because transaction and 
retailer characteristics vary on that basis.  The Pseudo R
2 in the pooled-data, big-box 
store data, and independent retailer data models are respectively 0.10, 0.07, and 0.01.  
Most coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level.  To help explain the 
economic implications of these results, I report in table 3.5 the factor elasticities derived 
from these Tobit models. 
Findings in Tables 3.4’s logistic regression are consistent with the Tobits.  Table 
3.4’s logistic results show that for every 1% rise in transaction scale, the relative 
probability that plants have been pre-ordered instead of spot-purchased rises by 1.27%.  
Corroboration of this is found in the corresponding Tobit models.  Coefficients of 
transaction scale’s linear and squared terms are, in the last three columns of table 3.4, 
significant, implying a non-linear relationship between logged transaction scale and pre-
order interval.  Among big-box stores, the negative linear term and positive squared term 
indicate that transaction scale’s impact on pre-order interval follows a “U” curve.  As the 
scale of an order first begins to rise, the demanded pre-order interval falls; but as scale 
rises further, demanded pre-order interval rises.  However, among independent retailers, 
the positive linear term and negative squared term indicate that transaction scale’s impact 
on pre-order interval follows an inverse “U” curve.  
If economies are achieved as transaction scale rises, increases in the size of a sale 
order would reduce cost per transaction and thus reduce the optimal pre-order interval.  If 
scale economies instead are negative, growth in transaction scale instead would increase 
the pre-order interval.  Thus, the turning point in the impact of transaction scale on pre-
order interval is an estimate of the threshold between scale diseconomy and scale 81 
 
 
economy.  One way of determining the sign of the overall effect is to compare the turning 
point with the sample mean and the two-standard-deviation range of the relevant 
transaction-scale variable.  Among big-box stores, for example, the turning point (1.49) is 
less than the sample mean (7.76), implying scale diseconomies are present overall in 
contracts with big-box stores.  Among independent retailers, the turning point (7.89) is 
less than the sample mean (8.49), implying instead that scale economies are present 
overall in contracts with independent retailers. 
Transaction scope’s impact on pre-order probability is weaker than transaction 
scale’s impact.  Table 3.4’s logistic results indicate that, for every 1% rise in transaction 
scope, the relative probability that plants have been pre-ordered instead of spot-purchased 
increases by 0.79%.  In the last two columns of table 3.4, the coefficients of scope’s 
squared terms are statistically significant, implying a non-linear relationship between 
logged transaction scope and pre-order interval.  The logic in employing these 
coefficients to examine scope’s per- transaction cost effects is the same as it is in 
examining scale’s effects.  In particular, among big-box stores, the positivity of the linear 
term and negativity of the squared term indicate that transaction scope’s impact on pre-
order interval follows an inverse “U” curve.  As order scope first starts to rise, the 
demanded pre-order interval also rises; but as scope rises further, demanded pre-order 
interval falls.  Among independent retailers, the negative linear term and positive squared 
term indicate that transaction scope’s impact on pre-order interval follow a “U” curve 
itself.  As order scope first begins to rise, demanded pre-order interval falls; but as scope 
rises further, the demanded interval rises. 
If economies are achieved as transaction scope rises, increases in transaction 
scope reduce cost per transaction and thus decrease the optimal pre-order interval.  If, in 
contrast, scope economies are negative, transaction scope growth instead boosts the 
optimal pre-order interval.  Thus, the turning point in the impact of transaction scope on 
pre-order interval is an estimate of the threshold between scope diseconomy and scope 
economy.  Among big-box stores, for example, the turning point (0.23) is less than the 
sample mean (2.63), implying scope economies largely dominate in contracts with big-82 
 
 
box stores.  Among independent retailers, the turning point (0.66) is less than the sample 
mean (2.47), implying scope diseconomy are largely present in contracts with 
independent retailers.  In order to achieve scope economies, independent retailers would 
reduce the number of plant species per order.  The elasticity of transaction scope in table 
3.5 shows that independent retailers are more sensitive to transaction scope than are big-
box stores.  For every 1% rise in transaction scope, big-box stores demand a 0.02% lower 
pre-order interval, but independent retailers a 0.21% greater one. 
Length of the nursery-retailer trading relationship significantly affects the chances 
that retailer will select a pre-order contract.  Table 3.4’s logistic regression indicates a 
one-year rise in the nursery-retailer trading relationship boosts by 1.08 the relative 
probability that the buyer will want to pre-order.  However, the relationship length’s 
impact on the pre-order interval itself is significant only among big-box stores; and even 
there, the magnitude is small.  As shown in table 3.5, a 1% rise among big-box stores in 
the length of the nursery-retailer trading relationship reduces a big-box store’s pre-order 
interval preference by only 0.01%.  Once a buyer chooses to pre-order, buyer-seller 
familiarity seems to have little material impact on the length of pre-order interval itself. 
A higher nursery PPI, a proxy for input price, enhances the relative probability the 
retailer will select a pre-order contract.  As shown in table 3.4, for every 1% increase in 
nursery PPI, the relative probability that plants have been pre-ordered rises by 11.50%.  
However, rises in nursery PPI reduce the retailer’s motivation to contract for a longer 
pre-order interval.  It has a negative impact on the pre-order interval in the corresponding 
Tobit model, and does not impact independent retailers’ pre-order decisions significantly.  
Table 3.5 shows, for every 1% increase in nursery PPI, big-box stores demand 1.20% 
lower pre-order interval.  The fact that nursery PPI has a negative impact on pre-order 
interval once the pre-order decision has been made is best explained by supposing that 
PPI’s effect on pre-order interval is dominated by its effect 
   
     on pre-order cost in 
equation (7).  
Housing starts, an indicator of market demand, has significant impact on relative 
pre-order probability in table 3.4.  For every 1% increase in housing starts, the relative 83 
 
 
probability that plants have been pre-ordered instead of spot-purchased decreases by 
0.24%.  The reason is that rising housing starts not only boost market demand and plant 
price but also reduce retailers’ market risks.  Retailers therefore become less likely to 
choose pre-order contracts as a risk management tool.  Housing starts also are significant 
in the corresponding Tobit model of the pre-order interval magnitude.  The elasticities in 
table 3.5 show that, for every 1% increase in housing starts, big-box stores demand 0.06% 
longer pre-order interval.  The greater the consumer demand (thus the greater the price 
consumers are willing to pay for plants), the greater is the seller’s opportunity loss if it 
does not have the plants available for sale when the consumer wants them.  Thus, the 
greater is the incentive for the retailer to pre-order and have it available on demand.  
Independent retailers’ behavior is different in this regard from big-box stores.  Among 
independent retailers, for every 1% increase in housing starts, independent retailers 
demand 0.56% lower pre-order interval.  Rises in housing starts reduce instead of 
enhance the motivation to contract ahead of time with the producer-nursery.  Perhaps this 
is because housing-start growth implies, for both retailer types, an imminent rise in plant 
price.  However, retailers’ ability to deal with plant price boost differs.  Big-box stores 
have enough cash flow to cover plant price rises.  In contrast, uncertain cash flows among 
independent stores discourage them from pre-ordering plants. 
Evidence of the variety of retailers’ pre-ordering preferences is seen in the 
significant positive effect of the retailer-type dummy variable in table 3.4’s logistic 
model.  The relative probability that big-box stores will pre-order plants is a rather large 
0.62 less than that independent retailers will do so.  However, once a pre-order contract is 
chosen, big-box store demand 148 day more pre-order interval than independent retailers 
do, holding constant all the other pre-ordering factors I discuss above, and which table 
3.3 shows differ substantially between these two retailer types. 
Coefficients of the regional dummy variables in table 3.4’s logistic regression 
reveal that the choice to pre-order is most common among Midwestern retailers and least 
common among Western retailers, holding the above factors constant.  The Tobit model 
of demanded pre-order magnitudes is consistent with this finding.  Midwestern and 84 
 
 
Northeastern retailers order about one month earlier than others do.  Because I already 
have netted transportation cost from plant price, the regional dummies reflect the impacts 
on contract preferences of market characteristics specific to the buyer’s locale.  Ninety 
percent of the sample nursery’s plants are sold to Midwestern and Western retailers.  
Comparatively early pre-ordering in the Midwest probably is at least partly explained by 
the amount of time required to ship to the Midwest. 
 
Linear Regression for Discount Model 
 
Contract and retailer characteristics affect not only the retailers’ choice of pre-
order interval, but the producer’s decisions on discount rate as well.  Results of our price 
discounting model (equation 20), estimated separately for the pooled data, big-box and 
independent retailers, are reported in table 3.6.  Because of the material differences 
between big-box and independent retailer behaviors, I report the discount-rate impacts of 
contract and retailer characteristics separately by these two retailer types.  Parameter 
estimates and t statistics are reported.  Adjusted R
2 of the pooled-data, big-box, and 
independent retailer models are respectively 0.11, 0.12, and 0.17.  Because of the large 
proportion of zeros in them, I avoided logging predicted pre-order interval, length of 
nursery-retailer trading relationship, or previous-year retailer debt-to-credit limit in the 
table 3.6 model.  Most coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level.  As a way 
of better explaining the table 3.6 coefficients, elasticities of contract and retailer 
characteristics are reported in table 3.7. 
The first factor shown in table 3.6 to affect the producer’s price-discount offer is 
the predicted (thus censored) pre-order interval t from the Tobit model in equation (15), 
table 3.4.  Table 3.7 shows that, in the pooled data, if the pre-order interval increases by 
1%, the discount rate rises on average by 0.35%.  Discount rates vary by retailer type.  If 
a big-box store’s pre-order interval rises by 1%, the producer offers a 0.62% greater 
discount rate.  This is consistent with the significant positive coefficient of nursery type 
dummy Dbb in table 3.6 which, as table 3.7 shows, indicates big-box stores are provided 85 
 
 
with discounts 19% larger than independent retailers are, holding other factors constant.  
Likely, chain stores have more price negotiating ability than independents do.  
Interestingly, a 1% rise in an independent retailer’s pre-order interval reduces its offered 
discount by 0.05%.  I surmise that when independents place orders in advance, the orders 
typically involve a large variety of plants, which boosts handling costs and thus reduces 
the discount rate.  This is consistent with the hypothesis I derived from equation (13) in 
the Producer Problem section.  Transactions with independent retailers involving a larger 
unit cost will be offered at lower discount rate. 
The relationship in table 3.6 between transaction scale and price discount is, on 
account of the statistical significance of the squared scale term, non-linear.  The logic in 
examining the linear and squared terms is the same in the discount model as in the pre-
order-interval model.  Among big-box stores, the positive linear term and negative 
squared term indicate that the impact of transaction scale on discount rate follows an 
inverse “U” curve.  That is, as the scale of an order first begins to rise, the discount rate 
also rises; but as scale rises further, discount rate falls.  Under increasing returns to scale 
(scale economy), cost per transaction falls as scale rises, so that the optimal discount rate 
rises also.  Under decreasing returns to scale (scale diseconomy), cost per transaction 
instead rises as scale does, so that the optimal discount rate falls.  Thus, the turning point 
in the impact of transaction scale on discount rate is the threshold between scale economy 
and diseconomy.  Among big-box stores, the turning point (9.60) is larger than the 
sample mean (7.76), implying scale economy is largely present in contracts with big-box 
stores.  Among independent retailers, the turning point (0.50) is less than the sample 
mean (8.49), implying scale economy is also present – overall – in contracts with 
independent retailers.  The OLS regression in table 3.7 indicates that, for every 1% rise in 
transaction scale, the discount rate big-box stores are offered rises by 0.04%, and the 
discount rate independent retailers are offered rises by 0.19%. 
Transaction scope’s impact on discount rate is different from transaction scale’s 
impact.  Table 3.7 shows that, for every 1% rise in transaction scope, the producer offers 
a 0.11% lower discount rate to big-box stores, and a 0.15% lower one to independent 86 
 
 
retailers.  Among big-box stores, the negative linear term and positive squared term 
indicates the impact of transaction scope on discount rate follows a “U” curve.  If 
economies are achieved as transaction scope rises, increases in the transaction scope 
reduce cost per transaction and thus enhance discount rate.  If scope economy is negative, 
the transaction scope growth instead decreases the discount rate.  The turning point is the 
threshold between scope diseconomy and scope economy.  Among big-box stores, the 
turning point (3.28) is larger than the sample mean (2.63), implying scope diseconomy 
largely dominate in contracts with big-box stores.  Among independent retailers, the fact 
that the coefficient of the linear term is negative and of the squared term is insignificant 
indicates that discount rates fall as transaction scope rises.  Scope diseconomy is 
therefore overall present in contracts with independent retailers. 
Besides contract characteristics, retailer characteristics and histories play an 
important role in the producer’s decisions about discount rates.  The length of the 
nursery-retailer trading relationship has a significantly positive effect on the price 
discount both to chain stores and independents (table 3.6).  As shown in table 3.7, if the 
length of trading relationship rises by 1%, the discount rate accorded to big-box stores 
and independent retailers increases by 0.11% and 0.13%.  This is consistent with the 
hypothesis I developed in the Model Specification section.  The reason is that the length 
of nursery-retailer trading relationship reduces contract costs and therefore increases the 
discount rate.  
Nursery PPI’s impact on price discount is negative.  Table 3.7 shows that if the 
nursery PPI rises by 1%, the producer accords a 0.48% lower discount rate to big-box 
stores, and a 0.31% lower one to independent retailers.  This is because as nursery PPI 
rises, raw material prices rises also, pushing production cost upward.  Thus, optimal 
discount rates fall. 
Housing starts, the indicator of market demand, has a significantly negative 
relationship with discount rate in table 3.6.  As shown in table 3.7, for a 1% improvement 
in quarterly housing starts, the producer accords a 0.28% lower discount rate to big-box 
stores, and a 0.13% lower one to independent retailers.  As housing starts are lifted, the 87 
 
 
demand for nursery products improves, and pushes plant prices upward.  Thus, the 
discount rates fall. 
Regression coefficients of the retailer debt-to-credit limit show the impact of the 
retailer’s financial situation on the discount rate accorded to that retailer.  All of those 
coefficients in table 3.6 are significant, although their signs differ.  In table 3.7, if the 
debt-to-credit-limit rises by 1%, the discount rate to big-box stores falls by 0.23%.  That 
presumably is because the higher the retailer’s unpaid balance, the greater is the 
probability the producer presumably assigns to the retailer’s default.  And the producer 
would be expected to offer lower discounts to retailers with higher default probabilities.  
Surprisingly, however, a1% rise in an independent retailer’s debt-to-credit-limit boosts 
rather than reduces the discount rate afforded to it by a moderate 0.01%.  In contrast, big-
box stores with larger unpaid balances attract lower discount rates.  This counter-intuitive 
result implies the producer is risk neutral when facing independent retailers and a risk 
avoider when facing big-box stores.  The counter-intuition might be explained as follows.  
Because big-box stores usually hold larger credit limits and debt than independent 
retailers do (table 3.3), severe financial problems arise if big-box stores fail to pay back 
on schedule.  Independent retailers’ debts tend to be much smaller than big-box stores’.  
A reasonable discount may help the retailer’s cash flow and motivate independent 
retailers to maintain a business relationship with the sample nursery. 
Multinomial Logit Model of Payment Grace Period 
 
I use a multinomial logistic model in equation (21) to examine the producer’s 
decisions among alternative payment grace periods, such as zero days (cash), within 30 
days, within 60 days, …, and within one year.  To avoid small grace-period segments, I 
group them into the following four:  within 15 days, within 30 days, within 60 days, and 
within one year.  Estimation results are reported in table 3.8 by retailer type.  Because the 
maximum grace period accorded to big-box stores is 60 days, a within-one-year grace 
period is not included in the multinomial logit model for big-box stores.  The within-15-
day grace period is the base group in the table 3.8 results.  Most coefficients in table 3.8 88 
 
 
are statistically significant at the 1% level and have the expected signs.  For explanation 
convenience, the coefficients in table 3.8 are converted to elasticities and reported in 
table 3.9. 
The first factor in tables 3.8 and 3.9 is the predicted (thus censored) pre-order 
interval t from the Tobit model in equation (15).  The multinomial logistic model in table 
3.8 shows, for both types of retailers, that the coefficient of predicted pre-order interval is 
positive.  Table 3.9 shows that a 1% rises in a big-box store’s choice of pre-order interval 
boosts by 20.79% the probability (relative to a within-15-day) that the producer will offer 
this store a within-30-day grace period, and by 1.40% a within-60-day grace.  A 1% rise 
in an independent retailer’s choice of pre-order interval boosts by 2.22% the probability 
(relative to a within-15-day) that the producer will offer this store a within-30-day grace 
period, by 3.70% a within-60-day grace, and by 4.41% a within-one-year grace.  The 
producer is more likely to provide a longer grace period to independent retailers who 
contract longer pre-order intervals. 
Transaction scale significantly affects the producer’s decision on the payment 
grace period to allow the retailer.  Greater transaction scale is, among big-box stores, 
associated with a longer grace period but, among independent retailers, with a shorter one.  
This is because, as transaction scale rises, the cost of transacting with big-box stores falls 
on account of returns to scale, while the cost of transacting with independent retailers 
rises because returns to scale are absent.  Table 3.9 shows that a 1% rise in a big-box 
store’s transaction scale increases by 0.25% the probability (relative to a within-15-day) 
that the producer will offer this store a within-30-day grace period, and by 1.12% a 
within-60-day grace.  A 1% rise in an independent retailer’s transaction scale reduces by 
0.41% the probability that the producer will offer this store a within-30-day grace period, 
by 0.04% a within-60-day, and by 0.10% a within-one-year grace.    
Transaction scope’s impact on the grace period probability is different from 
scale’s impact.  As the species scope of a given transaction rises, both retailer types are 
more likely to be accorded a within-30-day grace period.  Table 3.9 shows that a 1% rise 
in a big-box store’s transaction scope boosts by 2.59% the probability (relative to a 89 
 
 
within-15-day) that the producer will offer it a within-30-day grace period, and reduces 
by 0.02% a within-60-day grace.  A 1% rise in an independent retailer’s transaction 
scope boosts by 0.15% the probability that the producer will offer it a within-30-day 
grace period, and reduces by 0.41% a within-60-day grace and by 0.56% a within-one-
year grace.   
Length of the nursery-retailer trading relationship has positive impact on grace 
period length.  For both types of retailers, longer relationship with producer helps to be 
provided longer grace period.  Table 3.9 shows that a 1% rise in a big-box store’s length 
of the nursery-retailer trading relationship boosts by 1.59% the probability that the 
producer will offer it a within-30-day grace period, and by 9.80% a within-60-day grace.  
A 1% rise in an independent retailer’s length of the nursery-retailer trading relationship 
boosts by 0.07% the probability the producer will offer it a within-30-day grace period, 
but reduces by 1.05% a within-60-day grace, and by 1.54% a within-one-year grace.   
The impact of nursery PPI on grace period probability differs by retailer type.  
Table 3.9 shows that a 1% rise in nursery Price Produce Index reduces by 99.17% the 
probability the producer will offer a big-box store a within-30-day grace period, and by 
29.18% a within-60-day grace.  A 1% rise in nursery Price Produce Index boosts by 3.96% 
the probability an independent retailer will be offered a within-30-day grace period, by 
7.16% a within-60-day grace, and by 9.14% a within-one-year grace. 
The impact of housing starts on grace period probability is similar to nursery 
PPI’s impact.  Table 3.9 shows that a 1% rise in housing starts reduces by 11.39% the 
probability a big-box store will be offered a within-30-day grace period, and by 14.23% a 
within-60-day grace.  Because annual contracts – common in sales to big-box stores – 
that leave shipment date and quantity open lead to higher transaction costs than do single-
order contracts with a pre-determined shipment date and amount, the producer must 
reduce the grace period to offset transaction costs of being unable to forecast shipment 
date and quantity.  A 1% rise in housing starts boosts by 0.26% the probability an 
independent retailer will be offered a within-30-day grace period, by 0.58% a within-60-
day grace, and by 1.06% a within-one-year grace.  Because the probability an 90 
 
 
independent retailer will default during a market expansion is low, the producer is likely 
to offer a longer grace period in an economic expansion than in an economic recession to 
attract independent retailers. 
The retailer’s debt-to-credit limit, a proxy of retailer financial situation, has 
significant effect on grace period probability.  The higher the percentage of the retailer’s 
balance remaining unpaid, the worse is the retailer’s assumed financial situation, the 
greater the producer’s cost in collecting payment, and the shorter the grace period the 
producer will offer.  Table 3.9 shows that a 1% rise in a big-box store’s debt-to-credit 
limit reduces by 23.07% the probability it will be offered a within-30-day grace period, 
and by 12.27% a within-60-day grace.  A 1% rise in an independent retailer’s debt-to-
credit limit reduces by 0.13% the probability it will be offered a within-30-day grace 
period and by 0.11% a within-60-day grace, and boosts by 0.04% a within-one-year grace.  
The impact of payment type on grace period choice differs by retailer type.  Table 
3.9 shows that, among big-box stores, the maximum possible grace period afforded in a 
pay-by-order contract is within 30 days.  Among independent retailers, the maximum is 
within 15 days.  Because the time required to complete a pay-by-order contract generally 
is shorter than required to complete a pay-by-scan contract, a retailer with a pay-by-order 
contract is provided a shorter grace than one with a pay-by-scan contract. 
 
Conclusions 
 
I have established a two-step model to investigate the relationship between 
contract type and retailer characteristics in the Oregon nursery industry.  On the basis of 
order frequency and payment type, nursery contracts are divided into four groups:  single-
order contracts using pay-by-order, single-order contracts using pay-by-scan, annual 
contracts using pay-by-order, and annual contracts using pay-by-scan.  Effects of 
transaction and retailer characteristics on pre-order interval, price discount, and grace 
period differ by contract type.  The analysis suggests big-box stores with annual contracts 
are less likely than are independent retailers with single-order contracts to make pre-order 91 
 
 
contracts with the producer.  However, once a pre-order contract is chosen, big-box store 
demand a longer pre-order interval than independent retailers do.  Regarding payment 
type, pay-by-order contracts are more likely to provide a higher discount rate than are 
pay-by-scan contracts.   
As predicted in the conceptual model, transactions with independent retailers 
exhibit – on average over the sample range – scale economies and scope diseconomies. 
Yet the degree of scale or scope economy in transactions with big-box stores depends on 
pre-order interval and discount rate.  Boosting per- transaction revenue scale and number 
of species sold to big-box retailers enhances transaction efficiency.  Furthermore, greater 
trust between producers and retailers, reflected in the length of the nursery-retailer 
trading relationship, reduces pre-order cost and boosts discount rates in pre-order 
contracts. 
The way in which the producer-nursery reacts to a retailer’s financial condition, 
proxied by the retailer’s debt to the producer expressed as a proportion of the retailer’s 
credit limit, suggests the producer’s risk attitude varies by retailer type.  An increase in a 
debt-to-credit limit implies the retailer’s financial condition has worsened.  Because big-
box stores usually hold larger credit limits and unpaid balances than do independent 
retailers, a big-box store’s failure to pay the balance would lead the producer to 
especially severe financial problems.  When a big-box retailer’s financial condition 
deteriorates, the producer reacts as a risk avoider by providing a lower discount rate.  
When, on the other hand, an independent retailer’s financial condition deteriorates, the 
producer exhibits risk-neutral behavior by raising the discount rate only moderately.  
Because independent retailers’ unpaid balances are much smaller than are big-box stores’, 
a moderate discount may help an independent continue its business with the producer and 
thus eventually pay its unpaid balance. 
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Endnotes
                                                           
1 The name of the nursery is omitted for proprietary purposes. 93 
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Figure 3.1. Wholesale Nursery Cost Function (1) 
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Table 3.1. Contract Types in Nursery Industry 
 
  Pay-by-order 
(Dpaid =1) 
Pay-by-scan 
(Dpaid =0) 
Single-order 
(Dbb=0) 
Contract I 
e.g. Independent retailers 
Contract II 
e.g. Independent retailers 
selling to big-box stores 
Annual Contract 
(Dbb =1) 
Contract III 
e.g. Lowe’s 
Contract IV 
e.g. Home Depot 98 
 
 
Table 3.2. Definitions of Variables 
Variable  Definition  Unit  Mark 
Pre-order Interval  Number of days between order date and delivery 
date 
 
days  t 
Weighted Discount 
Rate 
Difference between benchmark and pre-order 
price, expressed as weighted ratio of benchmark 
price 
 
%  D 
Transaction Scale  Sales revenue per order  dollars  Scale 
       
Transaction Scope  Number of plant species in given order 
 
  Scope 
Length of Nursery-
Retailer Trading 
Relationship 
 
Number of years over which nursery and retailer 
have conducted business 
 
years  Experience 
Nursery PPI  Producer price index in nursery, garden, and farm 
supply stores 
 
--  PPI 
Housing Starts  Number of privately owned new houses on which 
construction began in a given quarter 
 
units  Housing 
Retailer Lagged Debt   Retailer’s unpaid payment in previous year 
 
dollars  Owe 
       
Credit Limit  Maximum credit seller will extend to retailer for 
given credit line 
 
dollars  Credit 
Payment Grace 
Period 
Number of days allowed before retailer must pay 
without penalty 
days  m 
  1. within 15 days;    m = 0 
  2. within 30 days;    m = 1 
  3. within 60 days;    m = 2 
  4. within one year.    m = 3 
       
Nursery Type  Independent retailer    Dbb=0 
  Big-box store 
 
  Dbb=1 
Payment Type  Types of payment in nursery contract    Dpaid 
  1. Pay-by-scan: nursery producer payable only for 
the plants customers purchases; 
  Dpaid=0 
  2. Pay-by-order: nursery producer payable when 
retailer receives shipment. 
 
  Dpaid=1 
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Region  Retail nurseries are divided into the following five 
regions: 
  Dregion 
1. West: AZ, CA, CO, ID, MT, NM, NV, OR, UT, 
WA, and WY 
  West 
2. Midwest: IA, IL, II, IN, KS, MI, MN, MO, ND, 
NE, OH, SD, and WI 
  Midwest 
3. Northeast: CT, MA, ME, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, 
and VT 
  Northeast 
4. South: AL, AR, DC, DE, FL, GA, KY, MD, 
MS, NC, OK, SC, TN, VA, and WV 
  South 
5. Others: AK and Canada    Others  100 
 
 
Table 3.3. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  Group  N  Min  Max  Mean  Std Dev  CV 
Pre-order Interval  all  46000  0  494  110.48  92.53  0.84 
 
big-box  32683  2  494  151.97  76.47  0.50 
 
independent  13317  0  348  8.67  25.14  2.90 
Weighted 
Discount Rate 
all  45997  0  99.82  25.39  13.59  0.54 
big-box  32682  0  95.79  24.78  13.41  0.54 
independent  13315  0  99.82  26.89  13.9  0.52 
Transaction Scale  all  46000  0.5  143637  3080  4449  1.44 
 
big-box  32683  1.44  31114  2343  2343  1.00 
 
independent  13317  0.5  143637  4889  6721  1.37 
Annual Scale  all   45999  16.2  10504364  3984148  3708225  0.93 
 
big-box  32683  23069  10504364  5554034  3289823  0.59 
 
independent  13316  16.2  1064410  130993  203517  1.55 
Transaction Scope  all  45999  1  224  13.25  13.54  1.02 
 
big-box  32683  1  92  13.84  12.17  0.88 
 
independent  13316  1  224  11.81  16.34  1.38 
Length of 
Nursery-Retailer 
Trading 
Relationship 
all   46000  1  30  8.05  6.75  0.84 
big-box  32683  1  12  6.35  4.71  0.74 
independent  13317  1  30  12.24  8.86  0.72 
Nursery PPI  all  46000  114.33  131.22  120.19  5.69  0.05 
 
big-box  32683  114.33  131.22  119.17  5.41  0.05 
 
independent  13317  114.33  131.22  122.7  5.59  0.05 
Housing Starts  all  46000  525.7  2120.3  924.42  488.17  0.53 
 
big-box  32683  525.7  2120.3  835.9  431.02  0.52 
 
independent  13317  525.7  2120.3  1141.67  548.47  0.48 
Retailer Lagged 
Debt 
all   46000  -12046  2267590  473035  733283  1.55 
big-box  32683  0  2267590  659722  797017  1.21 
independent  13317  -12046  621228  14861  53717  3.61 
Retailer Debt-to-
Credit Limit in 
Previous Year 
all  45337  -0.76  5.66  0.14  0.18  1.29 
big-box  32683  0  0.23  0.15  0.09  0.60 
independent  12654  -0.76  5.66  0.14  0.31  2.21 
Notes: some variables are not reported for proprietary purposes.101 
 
 
Table 3.4.  Factors Affecting Pre-order Interval, by Retailer Type 
  Logistic Model      Tobit Model   
  Pooled data    Pooled data  Big-box stores  Independent 
retailers 
Variables 
    (
 
     
) 
  t  t  t 
Transaction Scale
   1.269
***    -5.770
***  -0.771  12.616
*** 
  (58.44)    (-7.13)  (-0.70)  (10.58) 
Transaction Scale
2      0.546
***  0.259
**  -0.799
*** 
      (-8.27)  (2.54)  (-9.90) 
Transaction Scope  0.793
***    3.497
***  0.337  -0.664 
  (23.82)    (-3.96)  (0.27)  (-1.12) 
Transaction Scope
2      -0.749
***  -0.731
**  0.502
*** 
      (-3.48)  (-2.36)  (3.31) 
Length of Nursery-
Retailer Trading 
Relationship 
 
0.074
*** 
(16.93)    -0.152
***  
(-3.13) 
-0.274
** 
(-2.50) 
0.003 
(-0.13) 
Nursery PPI  11.500
*** 
(15.12)    -129.475
*** 
(-18.04) 
-182.333
*** 
(-21.69) 
-8.359 
(-1.44) 
Housing Starts  -0.272
***    4.700
***  8.817
***  -4.817
*** 
  (-3.54)    (6.87)  (10.14)  (-9.37) 
Nursery Type 
 (Big-box store = 1)  -0.975
***    148.274
***     
  (-14.16)    (205.54)     
West  -0.173    -2.693  -3.129  -2.727
*** 
  (-1.00)    (-1.55)  (-0.84)  (-2.88) 
Midwest  3.503
***    36.601
***  44.546
***  8.911
*** 
  (12.19)    (18.7)  (11.67)  (6.89) 
Northeast 
d  1.396
***    32.806
***    13.339
*** 
  (3.65)    (14.02)    (11.21) 
South  0.879
***    3.589
***  -8.548
***  5.878
*** 
  (3.57)    (1.73)  (-2.02)  (5.11) 
Spring  -0.697
***    -96.570
***  -219.242
***  0.687 
  (-6.61)    (-77.95)  (-116.43)  (0.87) 
Summer  -0.429
***    -59.987
***  -162.051
***  0.699 
  (-4.42)    (-51.09)  (-89.91)  (0.94) 
Autumn  -0.0275    -5.298
***  -76.041
***  -0.336 
  (-0.27)    (-4.35)  (-41.51)  (0.41) 
Constant  -60.68
***    651.941
**  1113.105
***  30.722 
  (-17.45)    (19.83)  (28.54)  (1.14) 
Pseudo R
2  0.76    0.10  0.07  0.01 
Log likelihood  -6745    -243163  -174362  -57541 
N  45999    45999  32683  13316 
a. Logistic regression is from equation (18).  Dependent variable is the relative probability     (
 
   ) 
that plants have been pre-ordered instead of spot-purchased. 
b. Tobit model is from equation (15).  Dependent variable is pre-order interval t. 102 
 
 
c. Italic denotes the logged term; 
d. Northeast is not included in big-box stores model because there is no big- box store in the Northeast 
doing business with the sample nursery; 
e. z statistics are in parentheses of logistic regression and t statistics are in parentheses of Tobit model. 
 
*** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level103 
 
 
Table 3.5.  Elasticities of Factors Affecting Pre-order Interval, by Retailer Type 
Variables  Pooled data  Big- box stores  Independent 
retailers 
Transaction Scale
 
0.03  0.02  -0.11 
Transaction Scope  0.00  -0.02  0.21 
Length of Nursery-Retailer 
Trading Relationship 
-0.01  -0.01  0.00 
Nursery PPI  -1.17  -1.20  -0.96 
Housing Starts  0.02  0.06  -0.56 
 
Italic denotes logged term. 
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Table 3.6.  Factors Affecting Price Discount, by Retailer Type 
 
  Pooled data  Big-box stores  Independent retailers 
Variables                
Predicted Pre-order 
Interval
 
0.003
*** 
(13.80) 
0.004
*** 
(11.67) 
-0.004
** 
(-2.33) 
Transaction  Scale
  0.060
***  0.211
***  -0.012 
  (6.95)  (17.71)  (-0.41) 
Transaction  Scale
2  0.004
***  -0.011
***  0.012
*** 
  (6.18)  (-9.76)  (6.08) 
Transaction  Scope  -0.314
***  -0.531
***  -0.169
*** 
  (-33.34)  (-38.66)  (-12.12) 
Transaction  Scope
2  0.031
***  0.081
***  0.003 
  (13.43)  (24.09)  (0.92) 
Length of Nursery-
Retailer Trading 
Relationship 
 
0.006
*** 
(12.08) 
0.018
*** 
(12.69) 
0.011
*** 
(17.09) 
Nursery PPI  -0.138
*** 
(-1.67) 
-0.478
*** 
(-4.23) 
-0.310
*** 
(-2.22)     
Housing Starts  -0.130
***  -0.278
***  -0.125
*** 
  (-17.27)  (-22.26)  (-9.67) 
Retailer Debt-to-Credit 
Limit in Previous Year 
 
-0.036
** 
(-2.20) 
-1.557
*** 
(-22.26)
 
0.079
*** 
(4.42)
 
Payment Type  0.174
***  0.143
***  -0.016 
(Pay-by-order = 1)  (20.90)  (15.87)  (-0.49) 
Nursery Type  -0.233
***     
(Big-box store = 1)  (-7.95)     
Spring  0.269
***  0.725
***  0.101
*** 
  (12.54)  (10.1)  (5.45) 
Summer  0.114
***  0.425
***  0.109
*** 
  (7.16)  (7.89)  (6.28) 
Autumn  -0.019  0.205
***  0.015 
  (1.40)  (6.55)  (0.77) 
Constant  -0.661
*  1.408
**  0.419 
  (-1.72)  (2.38)  (0.65) 
Adjusted R
2  0.11  0.12  0.17 
F value  403  356  194 
N  45084  32669  12415 
 
a. Estimates are from equation (20).  Dependent variable is logged discount rate; 
b. Predicted pre-order interval is predicted censored value derived from Tobit model, equation 
(15); 
c. Italic denotes the logged term; d. t statistics are in parentheses. 
*** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level 105 
 
 
Table 3.7.  Elasticities of Factors Affecting Price Discount, by Retailer Type 
Variables  Pooled data  Big-box stores  Independent retailers 
Predicted Pre-order Interval
  0.35  0.62  -0.05 
Transaction Scale
  0.70  0.04  0.19 
Transaction Scope  -0.15  -0.11  -0.15 
Length of Nursery-Retailer 
Trading Relationship 
0.05  0.11  0.13 
Nursery PPI  -0.14  -0.48  -0.31 
Housing Starts  -0.13  -0.28  -0.13 
Retailer Debt-to-Credit Limit 
in Previous Year 
 
-0.01  -0.23  0.01 
Payment Type 
(Pay-by-order = 1;  
Pay-by-scan=0) 
19%  15%  -2% 
Nursery Type 
 (Big-box store = 1) 
-21%     
 
a. Predicted pre-order interval is predicted censored value derived from Tobit model, equation 
(14); 
b. Italic denotes logged term. 
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Table 3.8. Factors Affecting the Relative Probability of the Indicated Grace Period, 
by Retailer Type 
 
  Annual Contacts 
among Big-Box Store 
  Single-order Contracts 
among Independent Retailer 
Variable 
  
 (     )
 (     )
    
 (     )
 (     )
 
 
  
 (     )
 (     )
    
 (     )
 (     )
    
 (     )
 (     )
 
Predicted Pre-
order Interval
 
 
0.134
***  
(9.92) 
0.009 (0.70)    0.171
***  
(6.40) 
0.285
*** 
(10.62) 
0.340
*** 
(12.46) 
Transaction Scale
  0.249
**  1.116
***    -0.413
***  -0.039  -0.102
** 
  (2.09)  (20.17)    (-10.45)  (-0.95)  (-2.33) 
Transaction Scope  2.594
***  -0.021    0.146
***  -0.405
***  -0.557
*** 
  (15.24)  (-0.24)    (2.75)  (-7.47)  (-9.71) 
Length of 
Nursery-Retailer 
Trading 
Relationship 
 
0.251
**  
(2.16) 
1.543
*** 
(15.73) 
  0.006 
(0.85) 
0.086
*** 
(11.79) 
0.126
*** 
(16.57) 
Nursery PPI  -99.169
***  -29.176
***    3.960
***  7.159
***  9.135
*** 
  (-10.92)  (-3.66)    (2.74)  (4.81)  (5.77) 
Housing Starts  -11.390
***  -14.231
***    0.255
*  0.582
***  1.064
*** 
  (-6.89)  (-8.75)    (1.67)  (3.73)  (6.50) 
Retailer Debt-to-
Credit Limit in 
Previous Year 
 
-153.778
***  
(-18.29) 
-81.826
***  
(-10.29) 
  -0.908
*** 
(-7.84) 
-0.776
*** 
(-6.26) 
0.295
***  
(2.87) 
Payment Type  1.204
***  -1.305
***    -0.234  -0.851
**  -1.929
*** 
(Pay-by-order = 1; 
Pay-by-scan=0) 
(3.08)  (-10.39)    (-0.62)  (-2.21)  (-4.95) 
Spring  47.401
***  13.093
***    0.397
**  0.263  0.027 
  (11.10)  (4.45)    (2.11)  (1.36)  (0.14) 
Summer  30.052
***  7.805
***    0.047  0.088  -0.412
** 
  (8.20)  (3.48)    (0.29)  (0.53)  (-2.34) 
Autumn  10.033
***  1.700    -0.141  -0.203  -0.390
** 
  (3.30)  (1.35)    (-0.83)  (-1.15)  (-2.11) 
Constant  511.385
***  226.799
***    -17.121
***  -39.329
***  -52.571
*** 
  (11.62)  (5.74)    (-2.57)  (-5.72)  (-7.20) 
N  32673      12654     
Pseudo R
2  0.91      0.15     
Log Likelihood  -3045      -11704     
LR chi2(18)  61510      LR chi2(33)  4006   
Significance level  (0)        (0)   
 
a. Estimates are from multinomial logit model, equation (21).   107 
 
 
b.   
 (   )
 (   ):  Log-odds that the producer offer a within-30-day grace period relative to a within-
15-day grace period; 
  
 (   )
 (   ):  Log-odds that the producer offer a within-60-day grace period relative to a within-15-
day grace period; 
  
 (   )
 (   ):  Log-odds that the producer offer a within-one-year grace period relative to a within-
15-day grace period. 
c. Predicted pre-order interval is predicted censored value derived from Tobit model, equation 
(14); 
d. Italic denotes logged term; 
e. z statistics in parentheses. 
 
*** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level 
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Table 3.9.  Elasticities of Factors Affecting Grace Period, by Retailer Type 
  Big-Box Store    Independent Retailer 
Variable   (     )
 (     )
 
 (     )
 (     )
 
   (     )
 (     )
 
 (     )
 (     )
 
 (     )
 (     )
 
Predicted Pre-order 
Interval
 
20.79  1.40 
 
2.22  3.70  4.41 
Transaction Scale
  0.25  1.12 
 
-0.41  -0.04  -0.10 
Transaction Scope  2.59  -0.02 
 
0.15  -0.41  -0.56 
Length of Nursery-
Retailer Trading 
Relationship 
 
1.59  9.80 
 
0.07  1.05  1.54 
Nursery PPI  -99.17  -29.18 
 
3.96  7.16  9.14 
Housing Starts  -11.39  -14.23 
 
0.26  0.58  1.06 
Retailer Debt-to-Credit 
Limit in Previous Year 
-23.07  -12.27 
 
-0.13  -0.11  0.04 
Payment Type 
(Pay-by-order = 1; 
Pay-by-scan=0) 
233%  -73% 
 
-21%  -57%  -85% 
 
a. 
 (   )
 (   ):  Probability that the producer offer a within-30-day grace period relative to a within-15-
day grace period; 
 (   )
 (   ):  Probability that the producer offer a within-60-day grace period relative to a within-15-
day grace period; 
 (   )
 (   ):  Probability that the producer offer a within-one-year grace period relative to a within-15-
day grace period. 
b. Predicted pre-order interval is predicted censored value derived from Tobit model, equation 
(14); 
c. Italic denotes logged term. 
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Introduction 
 
The nursery and greenhouse production sector is comprised of growers of nursery 
stock, shrubbery, bulbs, fruit stock, and sod, under cover or in open fields.  Because 77 
percent of nursery product sales were through wholesale outlets, 
1  vertical relationships 
between wholesale nurseries – which I will call the producers – and retailers are 
important in the nursery industry.  Another critical characteristic distinguishing nursery 
products from many other agricultural crops is the high degree of product differentiation.  
A representative nursery wholesaler produces about 500 varieties of broadleaf evergreens, 
deciduous flowering shrubs, conifers, Japanese Maples, and ornamental plants.  Plant 
forms include Bare root, Ball & Burlap, and Container, ranging in size from 3.5” bio-
degradable to 20 gallon pots.  Enormous product diversity arises from combinations of 
variety, plant material, and plant size.  Each nursery producer tries to create a different 
plant by altering the plant variety, size, and plant form, the services it offers, and other 
variables such as brand name, advertising, and customer relationship.  High product 
differentiation, along with climate requirements, plant knowledge, and customer and 
plant supplier relationships, build barriers to entry and move the nursery industry toward 
monopolistic competition.  In such market structures, the wholesaler has a degree of 
control over prices, presumably setting them to maximize profit in light of production and 
transaction costs. 
The Oregon nursery provides an interesting background from which to study the 
effects of product differentiation on supply and demand elasticities.  The “Oregon Mix” 
is unique for its plant health, variety mix, early market readiness, and special growing 
climate.  Nursery producers compete on price, service level, product quality, and the 
breadth and uniqueness of products offered.  The Oregon nursery industry presently is 
recovering after reaching the bottom of a down-cycle in 2011. 
2  Supply excesses and 
demand shortages from 2007 to 2011 have led to a number of perplexities for the Oregon 
nursery industry, such as inventory buildup, tight cash flow, limited new plantings, and 
quality concerns.  When disaggregated to the product level, the problem can best be 111 
 
 
analyzed in terms of a range of attribute-specific disequilibria.  Price strategy in particular 
is critical for most profitably meeting market demand. 
The present study is the first to systematically examine the interaction between 
supply and demand in Oregon nursery products.  Data were collected from a variety of 
sources, including the Oregon Association of Nurseries, the invoices of a representative 
nursery company, and the Oregon Employment Department.  Based on a theoretical 
model, a simultaneous equation system is here estimated to evaluate supply and demand 
elasticities by variety, size, and presence of intellectual property.  Results are employed 
to make recommendations for improved price strategy and profitability.  
 
Literature Review 
 
Perfect competition and pure monopoly are two commonly used assumptions for 
studying the market structure.  Recently, agricultural economists have begun to focus on 
the middle ground between these two polar extremes.  The homogeneous-commodity 
assumption is one of the constraints removed in the process.  Because a given product is 
defined by such as quality, size, vintage, services provided, and brand, no single product 
is completely homogeneous with another.  Degree of product differentiation is subjective.  
Chamberlin (1933) argues it is useful to group similar products and refer to them as a 
product group.  But constructing a category according to how close one pair of goods can 
substitute for another is arbitrary, especially in an industry without broadly accepted 
product standards.   
Economists have introduced a variety of theories to study the characteristics of 
differentiated products of a supply-and-demand framework.  Berry (1994) conducts a 
supply-and-demand analysis of a cross section of oligopoloid markets with differentiated 
products.  His primary method was to assume that demand can be described by a discrete-
choice model and that prices are endogenously determined by price-setting firms.  On the 
demand side, he employed a discrete-choice model such as the logit or probit to study 
product characteristics, price, and consumer preferences.  On the supply side, firms are 112 
 
 
assumed to be price setters by maximizing profits.  Demand and supply elasticities are 
determined jointly by way of the demand and supply function. 
Deng and Ma (2010) apply Berry’s (1994) discrete-choice method to China’s 
automobile market.  They conducted a market analysis of the Chinese automobile 
industry using market-level data.  Vehicles were grouped by size in order to deal with 
product differentiation.  On the demand side, they used a nested multinomial logit model 
to ascertain demand features, including market share by vehicle type and such automobile 
characteristics as size, horsepower, speed, and model.  On the supply side, they assumed 
Bertrand behavior to reveal the markups set by automobile manufacturers.  By jointly 
estimating a demand and supply function, they found that price elasticities are lower for 
the luxury segment, and that greater competition within a group leads to more elastic 
demand. 
Davis, Ahmadi-Esfahani, and Iranzo (2008) employ Berry’s (1994) theory to the 
U.S. wine market.  Wine is a highly differentiated product on account of the mix of brand, 
quality, size, vintage, grape type, producer location, and reputation.  They grouped wines 
by brand, quality, and producer to investigate wine characteristics.  The Australian wine 
industry was found to be in oversupply at the aggregate level; but at a disaggregated, 
attribute-specific level, the nature of the disequilibrium was different.  A discrete choice 
model of product differentiation is used to estimate, at wine brand level, the demand for 
Australian wine in Australia’s second largest export market, the United States.  Price is 
determined endogenously by a quality nesting model at the first stage.  They find that 
price elasticities provide insight into how pricing policies may be used to effectively 
boost sales and reduce excess supply.  In particular, sales of brands with relatively elastic 
demands may be lifted discounting their prices.  However, high inelasticity indicates the 
price discount may be ineffective and that US consumers dislike the brand. 
Other empirical analyses of differentiated agricultural products have employed 
hedonic models.  Its focus on product attributes is suitable for products with some degree 
of differentiation, and log-linear estimation and semi-parametric methods are used to 
achieve results more accurate than in linear regression.  Price can be expressed as a 113 
 
 
function of product characteristics.  For example, automobile price may depend on brand 
name, car model, engine capacity, fuel consumption, and horsepower (Baltas and 
Saridakis, 2010).  Wine price may be affected by age, production region, grape variety, 
vineyard, and vintage (Costanigro, McCluskey, and Mittelhammer, 2007).  A wine 
market may be segmented by price level including commercial, semi-premium, premium, 
and ultra-premium.  From the production perspective, Buccola and Iizuka (1997) use a 
hedonic econometric framework to study the U.S. dairy industry.  A hedonic cost model 
was estimated in which the output aggregator is a function of total output and the 
percentage concentrations of its components, including protein, butterfat, and fluid carrier.  
This method is helpful for studying the contribution of each product characteristic and 
captures the equilibrium points of demand and supply. 
The study of demand or supply elasticity at the product level reveals consumer 
preferences, which are hidden at the aggregate level.  Bresnahan and Reiss (1985) and 
Tyagi (1999) show that in equilibrium, the market power of an automobile manufacturer 
and dealer is proportionate to the slopes of the demand curves they face.  Buccola and 
VanderZanden (1997) study own and cross-price demand elasticities in Oregon red and 
white wines using scanner data.  Red wine demands are much less sensitive to price 
changes than are white wine demands, suggesting Oregon red wine consumers have more 
discriminating tastes than do white wine consumers.  This conclusion has implications for 
state wine tax rates, price strategy, and consumer utility.  Kotakou (2011) studies supply 
and input demand elasticities, including for fertilizer, energy, and other intermediate 
inputs, in the Greek cotton industry.  A particular interest was the relationship between 
farm size and cotton supply elasticity.  She applied pooled, random-effects, and fixed-
effects estimation and found estimation method affected parameter estimates and 
significance.  The best specification appeared, with unbalanced panel data, to be fixed-
effects estimation.  Cotton supply elasticity generally varies by farm size.  
Due to data limitations, empirical study of demand and supply elasticities in the 
nursery industry is rare.  Thanks to the National Nursery Survey, provided at five-year 
intervals since 1988, an increasing amount of data on nursery production and marketing 114 
 
 
practices is being collected for empirical analysis.  Gineo and Omamo (1990) find that 
household expenditure on nursery products depends on household income, the number of 
single-family home construction starts, and the education and age composition of the 
population.  Campbell and Hall (2010) show that a nursery’s marketing strategies (for 
example trade shows, appeals to repeat customers, discounting and other negotiated terms, 
export volumes, and advertising) play a large role in plant sales.  But demand 
characteristics (population level and growth, household income, and urbanicity) and 
business characteristics (business age, location, and use of permanent versus temporary 
employees) play a limited role.  Velá stegui Andrade and Hinson (2009) indicate the 
factors affecting a grower’s market channel choice include location, market strategy 
diversification, and trade show attendance.  These studies provided theoretical support for 
considering such product, market, and business characteristics in the present study of the 
Oregon nursery industry. 
Oregon Nursery Industry 
 
The nursery or horticulture industry is comprised of a variety of businesses 
involved in the production, distribution, and services associated with ornamental plants, 
landscape, and garden supplies and equipment (Hodges, Hall, and Palma, 2011).  
Industry products include nursery crops and floricultural plants (Industry Perspective: 
Nursery/Greenhouse, 2012).  Nursery crops refer to plants grown for environmental as 
well as ornamental purposes, and generally live many years.  Examples are outdoor 
landscaping plants – including trees, shrubs, and ground covers – and unfinished plant 
materials, bulbs, and sod.  Floriculture plants are grown primary for ornamental and 
decorative purposes and typically live only one season.  The floricultural sector consists 
primarily of cut flowers, cut cultivated greens, potted flowering plants, potted foliage 
plants, and bedding and garden plants.  The National Nursery Survey (2008) shows that 
the top plant types by sales are deciduous shade and flowering trees, followed by 
flowering annual bedding plants, flowering potted plants, evergreen trees, and broad-115 
 
 
leaved evergreen shrubs.  These top-five plant types comprise 42 sales percent of total 
sales.  
The Oregon nursery industry began before Oregon was a state (O’Connor, 2008).  
Because of the unique mix of rich oil, moderate weather, and plentiful rainfall, Oregon is 
one of the top three nursery stock producing states in the U.S.  The majority of nursery 
sales from the Pacific Northwest come from Oregon. 
3 The Oregon nursery industry is 
concentrated in the northern Willamette Valley.  The top five producing counties – 
Marion, Clackamas, Washington, Yamhill, and Multnomah/Lane – account for 86 
percent of the industry’s total production. 
4  As shown in figure 4.1, these counties are 
mainly located in the northwest of Oregon. 
The Oregon Nursery and Greenhouse Survey (2006-2010) shows total sales grew 
rapidly, from the $315 million in 1990 to the peak $988 million in 2007, with an average 
annual growth rate of 7% (figure 4.2).  Since 2008, sales have fallen on account of 
economic recession.  Between 2007 and 2010, sales dropped to $676 million and the 
number of nursery operations declined by 14%.  In 2010 the Oregon nursery industry 
consisted of 1800 operations, one-half of them with less than $20,000 in sales.  These 
small nurseries generated only 0.6 percent of industry sales.  In contrast, 70 nursery 
growers, each with sales of more than $2 million, comprised 69% of industry sales.  The 
suggestion is that the Oregon nursery industry might approximate monopolistic 
competition.  The recession appears to have had a most depressing effect on firms with 
more than $2 million in sales.  By 2010 the number of firms with greater than $2 million 
in sales had fallen by 30%, after four straight years of declining sales. 
5  In the Oregon 
Nursery and Greenhouse Survey 2010, nursery economists predicted that 2011 could be 
the bottom of the down-cycle and 2012 the year of recovery.  
The nursery industry can be segmented into four groups by production method:  
bare root, container, ball & burlap, and greenhouse.  The container method is the largest 
segment, with 41% of total sales in 2010.  Sales in the other three categories are near one 
another, frequently exchanging rank.  With the general sales declines, sales per segment 116 
 
 
fell by 17%, 14%, 8%, and 2% respectively in bare root, container, ball & burlap, and 
greenhouse between 2009 and 2010.    
The two principal market levels in the nursery industry are wholesale and retail.  
In Oregon, 98.9 percent of sales were at wholesale and only 1.1 percent at retail. 
6  
Wholesale market outlets include mass merchandisers, home centers, single location 
garden centers, multiple location garden centers, landscape, and re-wholesalers.  In 
Oregon, the most popular outlet as a share of total wholesale sales was the single-location 
garden center, with 46.1 percent of sales in 2008, followed by re-wholesalers (23.6%), 
multiple-location garden centers (12.5%), landscapers (10.3%), home centers (7.3%), and 
mass merchandisers (0.2%).   
Marketing practices of nursery growers include sales to repeat customers, 
negotiated sales, brokerage sales, contract sales, and export sales.  More than 90 percent 
of Oregon nursery sales were to repeat customers, which indicates the importance of 
customer relationship.  Forward contracting is another important marketing practice as a 
risk management tool.  With regard to sale destination, out-of-state buyers dominate 
Oregon nursery sales.  Oregon Nursery and Greenhouse Survey (2010) found that 74 
percent of Oregon’s nursery total sales are outside of Oregon.  Besides Oregon, the top 
four areas are upper Midwest, 
7  northeast states, 
8  Atlantic states, 
9  and Washington.   
As a labor intensive industry, one of the largest production costs in nursery 
industry is wage.  In Oregon’s nursery, greenhouse, and floricultural production, the 
share of labor expenses of all production expenses was 49.2% in 2007 (Britsch, 2010).  
Employment shows a seasonal pattern, the lowest in winter and highest in autumn.  The 
2010 survey found the Oregon nursery industry employed 9,500 full time workers and 
11,100 seasonal workers.  Average annual worker income was $14,016.  A large portion 
of nursery workers in Oregon are immigrants from Mexico. 
The nursery surveys further analyzed the drivers impacting nursery supply and 
demand.  They include GDP growth rate, unemployment, input costs (including diesel 
and gasoline price), consumer confidence, personal saving rate, local government 117 
 
 
demand, market outlets, home building, and home improvement.  All these factors will be 
guide the present supply and demand framework. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
 
My framework draws heavily from Bresnahan and Reiss (1985) and Tyagi (1999), 
who focus on the vertical relationship between wholesalers and retailers and on product 
differentiation.  In my application of their methods, I examine a nursery that produces 
differentiated products and sells to retail nurseries, landscapers, garden centers, and big-
box stores.  Plant prices are distinguished by product characteristic, for example by plant 
genus, plant size, popularity, and patent status.   
I model a representative wholesaler operating in a monopolistically competitive 
environment, in which the wholesaler can set price to maximize profit in a particular 
product niche.  Although this is a strong assumption, wholesalers in the nursery market 
usually grow differentiated plants to avoid competition from other wholesalers.  Because 
most nursery growers in Oregon produce more than one plant, I consider multi-product 
firms in the framework.  A one-unit rise in plant price may lead to an impact on plant 
supply and demand that depends on plant genus, size, popularity, and patent status.  The 
assumption of a single product would assume the impacts are the same for all plants.  I 
also assume a special temporal structure, in particular that the wholesaler and retailers act 
sequentially.  The wholesaler set its wholesale prices first, then retailers set retailer prices 
given the wholesale prices.   This leader-follower market relationship can be solved by 
backward induction, namely by considering the retailer’s problem first.   
Downstream Market 
 
I begin by assuming consumer demand function  ( ), where P is retailer price 
set by the retail nursery.  For retailers, the demand function is written in its inverse form:  
(1)       ( )   ( (  )  (  ) …  (  )),  
where     (      …   )       ( )    . 118 
 
 
The retailer is assumed to have marginal selling cost    for each product j.  In the 
model, the retailer follows wholesale price     because it is an important input cost in the 
retail profit function.  The retailer’s decision problem is then given by: 
(2)                  ∑   (   ( )           )    
The retailer’s profit function is nondecreasing in P, nonincreasing in W, homogenous of 
degree one in P and w, and convex in P and W.  The first order condition is: 
(3)     
   
   
    ( )             ∑    
   ( )
   
      
i.e.   ( )   ∑    
   ( )
   
            
Equation (3) provides a solution to the retailer’s problem.  At downstream market 
equilibrium, the retailer’s marginal revenue (  ( )   ∑    
   ( )
   
  ) is equal to its 
marginal cost (       ).  Equation (3) also contains the retailer’s demand function for the 
wholesaler product, namely 
(4)                 ( )   ∑    
   ( )
   
       
Equation (4) implies the retailer’s plant demand price  i W  depends on plant quantity Q, on 
retail price    – which in turn depends on consumer market demand and confidence, on 
marginal selling cost    – including labor, gasoline, and other input prices, and on 
consumer demand elasticity 
   ( )
   
 by plant type.  According to Hotelling’s lemma, 
optimal plant demand quantity is obtained as the marginal profit with respect to plant 
input price: 
(5)          
      (   )    
  (   )
   
 
  Because the retailer profit function is nonincreasing, convex, and continuous in w, 
the demand curve is downward sloping: 
   
   
 
 ( 
  (   )
   
)
   
   
   
   
    or, written in 
inverse form,  
   
   
   . 119 
 
 
Upstream Market 
 
  Next, I consider the wholesaler’s problem.  I assume the wholesaler sets its 
wholesale output price     and has unit costs of production   .  The wholesaler’s profit-
maximization problem is written as: 
(6)                       ∑   (   ( )     )    
The wholesaler’s profit function is nondecreasing in W, homogenous of degree one in W, 
and convex in W.  The first-order condition is: 
(7)       
   
   
    ( )        ∑    
   ( )
   
      
i.e.   ( )   ∑    
   ( )
   
       
Equation (7) provides a solution to the wholesaler’s problem.  At upstream market 
equilibrium, the wholesaler’s marginal revenue (  ( )   ∑    
   ( )
   
  ) is equal to its 
marginal cost (  ).  Equation (7) also implies the wholesaler’s supply to the retailer is 
specified as 
(8)                    ∑    
   ( )
   
   
Equation (8) implies the wholesaler’s plant supply price depends on plant quantity Q, on 
marginal production cost    – including labor, material, and other input prices – and on 
plant supply elasticity 
   ( )
   
 by plant type.  According to Hotelling’s lemma, optimal 
plant supply is obtained as the marginal profit with respect to plant output price: 
(9)            
      (   )  
  (   )
   
 
Because the wholesaler profit function is nondecreasing, convex, and continuous in W, 
the supply curve is upward sloping: 
   
   
 
 (
  (   )
   
)
   
 
   
   
    or, written in inverse 
form,  
   
   
   . 
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Equilibrium 
 
The wholesale nursery sets wholesale price to maximize its profit considering 
production cost and plant quantity demand.  Retail nursery behavior affects wholesale 
price by way of the quantity of plants demanded and by selling costs.  The equilibrium in 
both downstream and upstream market can be obtained by combining equations (4) and 
(8).   
(10)             ( )   ∑    
   ( )
   
              ∑    
   ( )
   
   
i.e.         
  ( ) (     )
     
 
∑    
   ( )
   
 
∑    
   ( )
   
 
 
In a single-product case, equation (10) can be written in a simple form.  Equation 
(11) shows that, in equilibrium, both wholesaler and retailer margins are in proportion to 
the slopes of the demand curves they face. 
(11)        
  (   )
     
 [
  ( )
   ]
 [
  ( )
   ]
 
 
                                   
                                     
 
  Lerner index    
    
   describes a firm’s market power.  A higher number 
implies greater market power.  For a perfectly competitive firm, L = 0 or P = MC implies 
that the firm has no market power.  Equation (11) can be further written in the form of 
Lerner index: 
(12)         
  
    
  (   )
 
   
 
 
 
  
  ( )
  
 
  
  ( )
  
 
 
                            
                              
 
Equation (12) indicates that the ratio of wholesaler to retailer market power is 
proportional to retailer and wholesaler demand elasticities.  According to our model 
assumption, the wholesaler operates in a monopolistically competitive environment and 
the retailer in a more competitive environment.  Thus the wholesaler has more price 121 
 
 
negotiation ability than the retailer does, i.e. 
  
      . Thus, the wholesaler’s demand 
elasticity is much larger than the retailer’s. 
 
Data 
 
Equations (4) and (8) simultaneously determine plant wholesale price and plant 
quantity, and equations (10) – (16) show the interaction between plant supply and 
demand.  In the present paper, I employ these simultaneous equations to study the Oregon 
nursery industry from 2005 to 2010.  Sample data on wholesaler, retailer, and plant 
characteristics were provided by one of the largest nurseries 
10 in Oregon.  Records were 
provided for each invoice.  The dataset consisted of 691,192 records, beginning in 2005 
and ending in 2010, at the invoice level.  Each record includes order number, order date, 
delivery date, company shipped to, address shipped to, invoice discount, plant name, 
plant variety, plant size, plant type, unit price, ordered quantity, shipped quantity, freight 
cost, amount paid, and amount due.  If a single order is specified multiple genera or sizes, 
that order generates ten econometric observations with the same order number.  To clean 
the dataset, I removed any record corresponding to samples with a 100% discount, or if it 
reflects a refund of a previous transaction.   
Because the present study is designed at the firm level, I further converted the 
data from a transaction basis to a quarterly basis.  Aggregating the transaction-level data 
to the whole-firm level is also consistent with most supply and demand studies, and 
makes it easier to link order data with quarterly released macroeconomic data.  To do so, 
I calculated the quarterly-average plant sales revenue and quantities for each retail 
nursery to which it is sold by genus and plant size.  Plant variety is the first indicator 
provided in the wholesale nursery’s plant description.  With this aggregation, I obtained 
71,483 observations, each of which represents total sales revenue and quantity of a given 
genus sold to a particular retail nursery in a particular quarter.  Real average plant price 
of a given genus is generated by dividing total sales revenue by total quantity and 
deflating to 2012 dollars. 122 
 
 
As mentioned above, nursery plants are highly differentiated.  Even after the 
above aggregation, the representative nursery wholesaler produced 277 plant genera.  In 
order to avoid too many dummies in the model, I concentrated on the top plant genera by 
sales.  Among the 277 genera, the top 50 comprised 90% of total sales, the top 20 
comprised 72% of sales, and the top ten comprised 55% of sales.  In the present demand 
and supply analysis, I use only the top ten sale plant genera, comprising 21,873 
observations.  Ninety-four percent of these observations are non-patented plants and six 
percent are patented plants.  As shown in the description below, the top ten genera 
include coniferous trees, deciduous trees, and evergreen shrubs.  Real plant price varies 
from below $1 to the hundreds of dollars, depending on plant genus and size.  The 
highest average price is for Acer, followed by Picea.  The lowest average price is for 
Heather, followed by Euonymus.  In a given genus, the larger the plant size, the higher 
the plant price. 
Following are the genera in the three major categories examined here: 
1. Coniferous plants 
  Thuja: a genus of coniferous trees in the family Cupressaceae 
  Picea: a genus of coniferous evergreen trees 
  Juniper: coniferous plants of the cypress family Cupressaceae 
  Pinus: a genus of Pines in the family Pinaceae 
 
2. Deciduous plants and evergreen shrubs 
  Acer: maple in the family Sapindaceae, mostly deciduous trees 
  Berberis: a genus of deciduous and evergreen shrubs 
  Buxus: slow-growing evergreen shrubs and small trees in the family Buxaceae 
 
3. Flowering plants 
  Euonymus: a genus of flowering plants in the staff vine family Celastraceae, 
deciduous and evergreen shrubs and small trees 123 
 
 
  Rhododendron: evergreen or deciduous, most with showy flowers 
  Heather: a group of flowering plants found most commonly in acid and 
infertile growing conditions 
 
Supply and Demand Factors 
 
The wholesale nursery provides a longer payment grace period to customers with 
the better payment reputations, and more generally to those involving lower transaction 
costs.  Payment grace period is defined as the number of days allowed before the buyer is 
required to pay without incurring penalties.  Considering the time value of money, the 
retailer’s payment grace period is indeed equivalent to, or another way to measure, the 
wholesaler’s financial costs themselves.  I consider six segments of grace period in order 
to avoid cases of missing observations in a category.  Most transactions are stipulated to 
be closed within two months.  Grace periods differ between big-box stores and 
independent retailers.  Most big-box stores are required to pay within 60 days (46%), 
while independent retailers are mostly required to pay within 30 days (53%). 
The other supply and demand variables are collected from various sources.  Table 
4.2 shows the summary statistics of these variables, defined in table 4.1.  Producer price 
index measures the purchase prices of materials and supplies typically purchased by the 
production sector.  In the present paper, the PPI is a proxy for the prices of intermediate 
materials in nursery production, for example pots and fertilizers.  The PPI at nursery, 
garden, and farm supply stores is from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  It is deflated to 
2012 dollars.   
The U.S. farm wage is from the National Agricultural Statistics Service of USDA.  
It has been reported quarterly since 1990.  Because farm wage rate is missing in the 1
st 
quarter of 2007, I generated it with a regression of the quarterly wage rate growth rate on 
quarterly dummies from 2000 to 2010.  The missing wage rate is then calculated as the 
predicted growth rate in the 1
st quarter of 2007.  Nominal U.S. farm wage rates are 124 
 
 
deflated to 2012 dollars with the CPI.  After considering its seasonal adjustment, the real 
U.S. farm wage has from 2005 to 2010 been held at $11 per hour (in 2012 dollars).   
Housing Starts are seasonally adjusted new privately owned housing units started 
(U.S. Census Bureau).  The real estate market experienced a significant housing start 
decline from a monthly 2,120,000 units in the 1
st quarter of 2006 to a monthly 526,000 
units in the 1
st quarter of 2009.  Until the end of 2010, national new privately owned 
housing units started remained near 539,000 units per month, below historical norms.  
Market demand in the nursery sector is highly correlated with healthy housing starts. 
Standard deviation (6
th column of table 4.2) is a commonly used measure of 
variability or diversity from the average.  Coefficient of variation (CV) (last column of 
table 4.2), or relative standard deviation, is a normalized measure of dispersion, allowing 
a comparison of two variables’ dispersions with their central tendencies or means.  These 
two statistics indicate that transaction quantity has a larger dispersion than transaction 
price has.  Relative volatility in the market factors – nursery PPI, U.S. farm wage, and 
housing starts – is less than in such transaction variables as transaction quantity, 
transaction price, and payment grace period.   
 
Empirical Specification 
 
In the model derived above, plant wholesale price and plant quantity are 
determined simultaneously in equations (4) and (8).  I employ log-linear equations in 
both structural and reduced form.  The structural-form equations can be used to determine 
the relationship between plant wholesale price and plant quantity on both the supply and 
demand side.  The reduced-form equations identify how equilibrium plant wholesale 
price and plant quantity are affected by payment grace period, input prices, and market 
demand. 
Consider first plant demand facing the wholesale nursery industry.  Plant demand 
can be expressed by the number of plants retailers are willing to purchase.  A retailer is 
willing to purchase plants from the Oregon nursery if and only if  (       )     ̅, 125 
 
 
which is the maximum profit he can achieve in Oregon when facing wholesale price w, 
average U.S. farmer wage rate r, gas price  , and housing starts h.  Total plant demand in 
the Oregon nursery can be written as 
 
(17)  Demand    
    ∭    (       )  (       )   ̅   (       )       
 
where    (       ) is the joint probability density function corresponding to (       ) 
for retail nursery I, and   (       ) the plant quantity demanded in equation (4).  Thus 
   (       )  (       ) reflects, in the limit, the portion of the mean quantity of plant 
genus I demanded under conditions (       ).  I use a log-linear form to estimate non-
linear function (17).  Total plant demand from retailer I is estimated as 
 
(18)  Demand                                                                  
   
I suppose in (18) that average U.S. farmer wage rate r is a proxy for retailers’ 
labor input costs.  Gas PPI   is a proxy for the material input costs, considering that 
transportation expenses constitute a large portion of material input costs.  Housing starts 
h are a proxy for the nursery market demand because rising housing starts expand the 
demand of nursery products and therefore drive up nursery product prices.  Retailer type 
dummy    allows a distinction between bigbox stores and independent retailers because 
their marketing costs tend to differ from each other.  Patent dummy    distinguishes 
between patent-protected and –unprotected plants.  One might equally have written plant 
price on the right side of the demand function in equation (19); that is 
 
(19)  Demand                                                                  
 
Next consider the supply side of the wholesale nursery market.  Plant supply can 
be expressed either by the number of plants a wholesaler is willing to provide or by the 126 
 
 
wholesale price he demands under certain cost conditions.  Generally speaking, nursery 
production includes the costs of labor, land, machinery, and management; the expenses of 
materials such as seeds and plants, fertilizers, chemicals, and fuel; and irrigation and 
marketing costs. 
11  In the present model, I use nursery PPI to proxy for total production 
expenses.  Growers choose the best combination of input costs p and payment grace 
period t to maximize profit.  A wholesale nursery is willing to sell plants if the profit 
obtained satisfies  (     )     ̅.  Total plant supply for producing plant genus I is 
 
(20)  Supply             
    ∬   (     )  (     )   ̅   (     )     
 
where   (     ) is the joint distribution function under conditions (     ) in plant genus 
I, and   (     ) is plant supply function in equation (8).  Expression   (     )  (     ) 
thus measures the portion of the mean wholesale price under conditions (     ).  Total 
plant supply of plant genus I is estimated in log-linear form. 
 
(21)  Supply                                                 
 
Given data availability, I use nursery PPI p to proxy for the prices of labor, land, 
capital, fertilizer materials, packaging prices, and pottery prices.  Nursery PPI, denoted p, 
is lagged here because a wholesale producer spends average 2.5 years to grow plants. 
The last step is to include dummy variables in the supply and demand models.  
Our theory indicates plant genus characteristics affect pricing and purchase decisions.  
Given that characteristics information is not included in our regressions, I use a fixed-
effects model and interaction terms to capture the omitted data.  Because demand and 
supply elasticity may vary across plant genus, I introduce the interaction terms between 
plant quantity and plant genus dummies in both the demand and supply functions.  For 
the same reason, I introduce an interaction term between plant quantity and plant patent 
dummy in the demand function to allow a test of whether plant patent status affects plant 
demand.  Here, vector    and    capture plant size and plant genus effects.  Because 127 
 
 
nursery production shows a strong seasonal pattern and all data are quarterly, I include a 
dummy variable ( q D ) for each season.  Letting I index plant genus, I thus represent my 
final fixed-effects model in structural form as 
 
(22)  Demand 
                    ∑             
  
   
                                           
         ∑    
 
   
     ∑   
 
   
     ∑   
  
   
          
(23)  Supply 
                    ∑             
  
   
                    ∑    
 
   
     ∑   
 
   
  
  ∑   
  
   
          
Plant quantity and wholesale price in these structural equations are the critical 
endogenous variables.  As distinct from the case in which either wholesale price or plant 
quantity is exogenous, endogeneity induces a correlation between plant quantity and error 
term in (22) as well as between wholesale price and error term in (23), leading to a bias in 
the elasticity estimates of OLS regressions.   
For example, assume X is a vector of all explainable variables, including wage 
rates, in demand equation (22).  The expectation of the OLS-estimated supply flexibility 
is then expressed as 
 (   ̂)         ((   )      ) 
The expectation of estimated demand elasticity is unbiased if and only if 
 ((   )      )    , that is when there is no correlation between wholesale price and 
error term.  However,  ((   )      )     for  (    )    .  An unobserved positive 
demand shift, moving the demand curve to the right, would tend to raise plant quantity 
transacted, given all other variables fixed.  Hence it creates a positive correlation between 128 
 
 
the unobserved shock and plant quantity transacted ( (    )     or  ((   )      )  
 ).  Thus  (   ̂)         ((   )      )     .  The estimated demand elasticity would 
be biased positively.  Because demand elasticity is approximately equal to the reciprocal 
of demand flexibility, demand elasticity would be biased negatively.   
In a similar way, I prove that without the adjustment of endogeneity of wholesale 
price in equation (23), supply flexibility would be biased positively because unobserved 
positive supply shifts, moving the supply curve to the right, would tend to reduce plant 
quantity given all other variables constant.  This creates a negative correlation between 
unobserved shock and plant quantity transacted ( (    )    ).  Because supply 
elasticity is approximately equal to the reciprocal of supply flexibility, supply elasticity 
would be biased positively.   
Except for wholesale price and plant quantity, all variables in equations (22) and 
(23) are used as instrumental variables in the 3SLS estimation.  Plant size and plant genus 
dummies capture the plant characteristics information that is not included in the model.  
Seasonal dummies capture the nursery industry’s seasonal pattern.  On the demand side, a 
retailer’s order decisions do not affect nursery production input prices.  On the supply 
side, a wholesaler’s pricing decisions do not affect labor wage rate, material input prices, 
or market demand.  Thus, equations (22) and (23) comprise the simultaneous equation 
system estimated in this chapter. 
 
Econometric Issues 
 
Simultaneous equations (22) and (23) illustrate the interactions between 
wholesale price w and plant quantity q as well as the effects of important exogenous 
supply and demand factors.  Three-stage least squares (3SLS) estimation is used to solve 
the simultaneous system.  Because the simultaneous equations include interaction terms 
between quantity and genus dummy and between quantity and patent dummy, I also 
endogenize the interaction terms in the estimation of wholesale price w and plant quantity 
q. 129 
 
 
Before discussing the estimation results, it is necessary to conduct Hausman 
specification test of whether simultaneity is present in the system.  If the test shows that 
wholesale price and plant quantity are determined by each other simultaneously, 
instrumental variables are needed; otherwise, OLS is preferred.  Consider two estimators, 
     obtained with OLS and     obtained with instrumental variables.  The null 
hypothesis in a Hausman test is that both      and     are consistent.  The alternative 
hypothesis is that only     is consistent.  First, endogenous variables w and q are each 
regressed on all exogenous factors, as shown in equation (24) and (25), and estimated 
residuals  ̂  and  ̂  derived.  I employ the variables’ logs in all these equations.  Variable  
r denotes average U.S. farmer wage rate, g gasoline price, h housing starts, t payment 
grace period, D the patent dummy,    the retailer-type dummy,    the season dummy, 
   the plant size dummy, and    the plant genus dummy. 
 
(24)  Demand           (                              ) 
(25)   Supply            (                              )
 
 
Then, as shown in equation (26) below, w is regressed on residuals  ̂  along with 
endogenous variable q and the exogenous factors in equation (23).  Similarly, as shown in 
equation (27) below, w is regressed on residual  ̂  along with endogenous variable q and 
exogenous factors in equation (22).  The estimation equations are as 
 
(26)  Supply               (                             ̂ ) 
(27)     Demand                     (                                         ̂ ) 
 
I then perform a t-test on residuals  ̂  and  ̂ .  As shown in table 4.3,  ̂  is 
significant in equation (26) and  ̂  is significant in equation (27).  The implication is that 
w in the supply function is correlated with error term   ̂  derived from the demand 
function, while q in the demand function is correlated with error term  ̂  derived from the 130 
 
 
supply function.  Simultaneity thus exists between plant supply and demand.  OLS is not 
applicable when the dependent variable is correlated with the error term.  The Hausman 
test shows instrumental variables are required for estimating our structural model.   
In 3SLS, all exogenous variables are used as instrumental variables to correct the 
endogeneity problem.  That is, in the first stage, the predicted values of wholesale price 
and plant quantity are estimated by regressing wholesale price and plant quantity on all 
exogenous variables.  In the second stage, equations (22) and (23) are estimated by 
substituting the predicted values of wholesale price and plant quantity in place of 
observed ones.  In the third stage, I use the residuals from the second stage to obtain a 
variance-covariance matrix and apply generalized least squares (GLS) to obtain the final 
estimators. 
The next step is to perform relevance and exogeneity tests and to determine the 
validity of instruments.  First, instrument relevance is examined by way of two 
regressions.  In the first-stage regression of wholesale price on all exogenous variables, 
R-square is 0.79.  In the first-stage regression of plant quantity on all exogenous variables, 
R-square is 0.32.  As shown by the F-test of joint significance, exogenous variables are 
overall statistically significant and most are individually significant as well.  All 
exogenous variables thus should be used as instruments for wholesale price and plant 
quantity. 
An exogeneity test is necessary for determining whether the instruments are 
uncorrelated with the structural error, that is are truly exogenous.  The Basmann test 
(1960) is one of the methods for conducting an exogeneity test.  As reported in the first 
column of tables 4.4 and 4.5, the p-values of the Basmann test on the 3SLS model are 
0.003 and 0.001 in the supply and demand functions respectively, indicating both are 
significant at the 1% level.  That is, the instruments pass the Basmann test in both 
equations of this model.  The test shows the instruments used in the first stage are valid 
and I keep all the exogenous variables as instruments. 
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Estimation Results 
 
In this section I provide the empirical results beginning with the supply 
estimations.  Following the estimation of supply parameters are the calculations of supply 
elasticity by genus, using 3SLS regression.  I then discuss the demand parameters and 
demand elasticities. 
Although price-dependent demand and supply functions constitute the final model 
in tables 4.4 – 4.6, I present the system of price-dependent supply function and quantity-
dependent demand function as a reference in table 4.7.  The latter model is not employed 
because the R-square of quantity-dependent demand function is only 0.14, much lower 
than the former one. 
Supply Parameters 
 
Table 4.4 gives the supply parameter results of estimating equation (23), using the 
2005 – 2010 sample.  To calculate the supply parameters in a simultaneous system, I 
regress the log of wholesale price on the log of plant quantity, interaction terms between 
logged plant quantity and genus, the log of two-year lagged nursery producer price index, 
the log of payment grace period, and the season, size, and genus dummies, using both 
OLS and 3SLS estimation.  In the season dummies, the base season is “fall.”  In size 
dummies, the base size is “small.”  In genus dummies, the base genus is “Thuja.”  All 
dummy coefficients are interpreted relative to these base attributes. 
In most genera, supply elasticities are significantly positive in the 3SLS estimates 
in columns (1) and (2), but negative in the OLS estimates in columns (3) and (4).  Had we 
not considered the endogeneity between wholesale price and plant quantity, OLS 
estimation would have led us to negatively sloped supply functions.  
On the supply side, the two-year-lagged nursery PPI – used to approximate for 
time-wise variation in such nursery production costs as labor, materials, and water – 
shows a significantly positive relationship with wholesale price.  For every 1% increase 132 
 
 
in nursery PPI, the wholesale price rises by 0.35%.  Wholesale prices are moderately 
pushed up by production costs.  Because few inputs are expended once the plant is 
already shipped, current nursery PPI shows a nonsignificant relationship with wholesale 
price.  Overall, the nursery industry appears unable to respond strongly or quickly to cost 
changes, and therefore vulnerable to unexpected input price changes. 
Another supply factor, payment grace period, shows a significantly negative 
relationship with wholesale price.  One percent rise in payment grace period reduces the 
wholesale price by 0.13%.  A long payment grace period is provided to customers with 
good payment reputation and low default probability.  Because transaction costs with 
qualified customers are relatively low, the price the wholesale nursery provides to its 
qualified customers is lower than with less qualified customers.  The size dummy 
coefficients show a robust positive correlation between plant size and price.  Larger 
plants require more materials and other inputs and so are charged higher prices. 
Supply Elasticities 
 
The magnitude of the supply elasticities varies by genera, and all are larger than 
unity.  Price elasticities of supply in column (1) of table 4.6 are calculated from the 
supply flexibilities in table 4.4.  Except for Picea and Pinus, all genera’s supply 
elasticities are positive.  In the top-ten-in-sales genera, average supply elasticity is 10.18.  
A large supply elasticity implies the marginal cost function is rather flat, that is price does 
not rise much as production volume rises.  Several factors contribute to the large supply 
elasticity.  First, a large elasticity is expected in the nursery industry because production 
processes tend to employ, except perhaps for suitable land, widely available inputs.   
Research and development costs are comparatively low.  Labor largely are unskilled and 
material inputs are generally accessible.  Second, the supply elasticity of a representative 
wholesaler is expected to be larger than that of the nursery market as a whole.  This is 
because a single nursery can change factor usage without driving up factor prices.  Third, 
after four straight years of declining sales in the Oregon nursery industry, many 133 
 
 
wholesale nurseries have accumulated unused capacity or previously produced plants, 
along with an ageing inventory that needed to be liquidated. 
The most supply-elastic genus is Buxus, mainly evergreen shrubs, followed by 
Thuja, mainly coniferous trees, with average elasticities of 35.53 and 23.94, respectively.  
Heather (8.29) is the genus least responsive to price change.  The low supply elasticities 
of the flowering plants probably is explained by the scarcity of the wholesale nursery’s 
supply of these items.  The next two genera with relatively low supply elasticities are also 
flowering plants, Rhodo (10.10) and Euonymus (10.71).  Supply elasticities of the 
remaining genera are between 11 and 20.  For example Acer, a family of deciduous trees, 
has a supply elasticity of 11.29.  Berberis, a genus of deciduous and evergreen shrubs, 
has 13.04.  Juniper, a genus of coniferous plants, has 15.23.  In sum, the supply 
elasticities of coniferous plants are larger than those of deciduous plants, which in turn 
are higher than those of flowering plants. 
Demand Parameters 
 
Table 4.5 gives the demand parameter results of estimating equation (22) with the 
2005 – 2010 sample.  To calculate the demand parameters in a simultaneous system, I 
regress the log of wholesale price on the log of plant quantity, interaction terms between 
log of plant quantity and genus, the log of real U.S. average farmer wage, the log of real 
gasoline price, the log of housing starts, interaction term between logged plant quantity 
and patent dummy, and the season, size, genus, and patent dummies, under both OLS and 
3SLS.  Base dummies in the demand function are the same as in the supply function. 
Demand flexibilities of non-patented Thuja, given by the quantity variable, are 
about -0.08 and -0.09 in the 3SLS and OLS models, respectively.  In other words, Thuja 
demand elasticities are -11.97 and -11.09 in the 3SLS and OLS models.  OLS estimates 
of the demand elasticities were lower than the 3SLS estimates, both in the patented and 
non-patented categories and in the other genera as well, further suggesting the 
endogeneity problem between wholesale price and plant quantity.  The OLS estimates 
likely are biased, as discussed above. 134 
 
 
I assume retail nurseries purchase not only plants from the wholesale nursery, but 
various other retailer inputs such as retailer labor and transportation.  Our concern is with 
the retail buyer’s demand for the plant or material input.  Because retail nurseries are 
located all over the country, I use U.S. average farm wage to proxy for the retailer’s labor 
wage.  However, U.S. farm wage does not show significant correlation with wholesale 
plant price. 
Transportation is another important expenditure item at retail nurseries.  The 
wholesale nursery may help retail nurseries arrange for trucks and drivers, but the 
shipping fee is eventually paid by the retailer.  Real gasoline price is one direct measure 
of shipping cost.  Table 4.5 shows that, for every 1% rise in real gasoline price, wholesale 
price falls by 0.04%.  Gasoline price increases push the transportation input demand 
function to the left, reducing the wholesale price that retailers are willing to pay. 
A one percent rise in housing starts, proxying for consumer demand for nursery 
products, would increase the wholesale plant price by 0.05%.  Housing starts as well as 
other construction involving housing beautification, scenic program, and landscaping, 
significantly lift the demand for nursery stock and hence the wholesale price.  However, 
the effect is rather low, perhaps because I have left out of the model other factors that are 
correlated with housing starts but with an effect on demand opposite to that of housing 
starts. 
The coefficient of the buyer-type dummy indicates that big-box stores are charged 
with wholesale prices 43% higher than independent retailers are, holding other selling 
factors constant.  This interesting result is explained by the fact that transactions with big-
box stores are usually on a pay-by-scan basis.  In pay-by-scan, the wholesale nursery is 
paid only for the plants that are purchased and kept by the chain store’s customer.  In 
other words, the wholesale nursery may have to buy back the unsold plants.  Because of 
the high transaction cost this restriction imposes on the wholesaler, the latter will charge 
a higher price to the big-box store than it will to the independent retailers.  The 
coefficients of the size dummies are consistent with those in the supply function:  buyers 
are willing to pay more for larger plants than for smaller ones.   135 
 
 
Demand Elasticities 
 
Demand elasticities for patented and non-patented plants are summarized in 
columns (2) and (3) of table 4.6.  All price elasticities of demand are negative.  Average 
demand elasticity in the top-ten non-patented plants is -35.72, indicating that the shape of 
the demand curve is rather flat and that plant demand is very sensitive to price.  The 
reason can be explained in terms of the homogeneity condition of demand:  own-price 
elasticity (which is negative) plus cross-price elasticity (which normally is positive) plus 
income elasticity (which normally is positive) equals zero.  Hence, a good’s own-price 
elasticity is a high negative number if its cross-price elasticity is high (implying the good 
has strong substitutes) and/or if its income elasticity is high (implying the consumer’s 
marginal utility for the good doesn’t decline much as his consumption quantity grows).  
In the present study, the high demand elasticities suggest either strong substitutability 
with other goods in the wholesale nursery or high plant-consumer income elasticities, 
especially among flowering plants. 
At the genus level, Heather has the largest demand elasticity (-200.44), followed 
by Rhodo (-37.41) and Euonymus (-28.58).  All of these are flowering plants.  Pinus has 
the lowest demand elasticity (-4.94), followed by Picea (-4.98) and Buxus (-10.25).  All 
of three of these are evergreen coniferous trees.  Demand elasticities of the remaining 
genera are Thuja (-11.97), Juniper (-16.07), Berberis (-18.46), and Acer (-24.13).  Thuja 
and Juniper are genera of coniferous trees, and Berberis and Acer of deciduous trees.  In 
contrast to the supply elasticities, demand elasticities of flowering plants are the highest 
of all, followed by deciduous plants, and finally by coniferous trees.  
Putting the above together with our analysis on the supply side, coniferous trees 
have the highest supply elasticity but lowest demand elasticity of all plant groups I have 
examined.  One therefore would expect these trees to exhibit relatively high quantity-
transacted variation and relatively low price variation.  In contrast, flowering plants have 
the lowest supply elasticity but highest demand elasticity.  Flowering plants thus would, 
in the presence of demand fluctuations, exhibit lower quantity-transacted variation and 
higher price variation than coniferous trees would.  The demand for flowering plants will, 136 
 
 
more than for coniferous trees, depend on marketing and sales strategy.  More generally, 
price discounts on flowering plants will boost sales more than will discounts on conifers. 
As mentioned earlier, in order to study the demand impact of intellectual property, 
I have included both a patent dummy and patent slope dummy (patent dummy x quantity) 
in the demand model.  Effects of patenting a Picea and Heather genera cannot be 
estimated because no patents in these genera are present in the dataset.  As shown in table 
4.6, the coefficient of the patent dummy is negative, implying a patented plant’s price 
tends to be lower than a non-patented plant’s.  Furthermore, the average demand 
elasticity among the eight patented genera is -55.44, indicating that the demand for 
patented plants is more rather than less elastic than it is for non-patented ones.  These 
results suggest the wholesale nursery’s plant patenting activity is not directly successful 
in the sense of reducing demand elasticity and driving price upward.  However, 
customers still may be generally attracted by the plant uniqueness that patenting brings. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The objectives of this chapter are to:  (a) study the interaction among the major 
drivers of nursery supply and demand in an industry of high product differentiation; and 
(b) draw management implications on the basis of the estimated supply and demand 
elasticities.  To do so, I have developed a framework for identifying and estimating plant 
supply and demand at a single firm in a simultaneous setting, assuming the firm operates 
as a monopolistic competitor, and to assess the effects of macroeconomic factors in that 
setting.  A theoretically consistent empirical model is specified and estimated to solve 
these problems.  Because of the high degree of product differentiation in the Oregon 
nursery industry, I examine only the genera falling into the top-ten-in-sales in the 2005 – 
2010 sample. 
Empirical results show that nursery production costs two years ago, and 
transaction costs, affect wholesale nursery decisions regarding the minimum prices it is 
willing to accept and therefore on the plants it supplies to retailers and other buyers.  On 137 
 
 
the other side, transportation costs and consumer demand for nursery products play 
important roles in retail nurseries’ plant demand decisions.   
Overall, average supply elasticity in the top-ten-in-sales genera is relatively high, 
implying supply quantities are sensitive to nursery per-unit production and transaction 
cost.  Put differently, the supply functions of the nursery’s principal inputs – land, labor, 
and production materials – appear to be rather flat, even with quarterly data, although I 
have not estimated these supply functions themselves.  Average demand elasticity in the 
top-ten-in-sales genera is also high, with however large variation across genera.  The high 
demand elasticities imply either strong demand substitutability with other goods or high 
plant-consumer income elasticities.  At the genus level, supply and demand elasticities 
are similar within the coniferous plant, deciduous plant, and flowering plant groups but 
different across these groups.  The supply elasticities of coniferous plants are larger than 
those of deciduous plants, which in turn are higher than those of flowering plants.  The 
demand elasticities are the lowest in coniferous trees followed by deciduous plants, then 
flowering plants. 
This conclusion has implications for the understanding of nursery production 
structure, management, and marketing strategy.  The rather flat wholesale nursery supply 
functions I have estimated imply the oversupply during the economic recession.  Many 
wholesale nurseries have accumulated unused capacity or previously produced plants, 
along with an ageing inventory that needed to be liquidated. 
Second, differing demand elasticities among the plant genera imply differing 
marketing strategies.  Generally, price discounts on plants with relatively high demand 
elasticities would significantly boost sales and enlarge the market, while those on plants 
with low demand elasticities would have less sales impact.  Therefore, the demand for 
flowering plants will, more than for coniferous trees, depend on marketing and sales 
strategy.  Price discounts on flowering plants will boost sales more than will discounts on 
conifers. 
Third, retailer type influences wholesale nursery decisions on plant prices.  Big-
box stores are charged wholesale prices higher than independent retailers are, holding 138 
 
 
other selling factors constant.  However, big-box stores’ pay-by-scan compensation 
method imposes relatively high transaction costs on the wholesaler. 
A final implication of this study relates to plant patenting.  Empirically, patenting 
seems to bring no direct signs of greater profitability, such as through a lower demand 
elasticity that would generate higher prices.  The wholesale nursery may wish to 
reconsider the pricing and marketing policies of its patented plants to differentiate them 
more effectively from its non-patented plants. 
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1 Hodges, A. W., C. R. Hall, and M. Palma. 2010. “Trade Flows and Marketing Practices 
within the U.S. Nursery Industry, 2008. ” Southern Cooperative Series Bulletin #411. 
Available at http://www.greenindustryresearch.org 
2 Northwest FCS Nursery/Greenhouse Knowledge Team. 2012. “Industry Perspective 
Nursery/Greenhouse 2012.” Northwest Farm Credit Services, Advancing Rural 
America’s Success. 
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4 USDA-NASS Oregon Field Office. 2011. “Oregon Nursery and Greenhouse Survey 
2010”. September. 
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Figure 4.1. Oregon County Map 
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Figure 4.2. Total Sales and number of operations in the Oregon nursery industry 
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Table 4.1. Definitions of Variables 
Variable  Definition  Unit  Mark 
Transaction Quantity  Total number of plants for each genus sold to a 
retailer in a quarter 
  Q 
Transaction Price  Average price for each genus sold to a retailer in a 
quarter 
dollar  P 
Payment Grace Period  Number of days allowed before retailer must pay 
without penalty 
days  d 
Nursery PPI  Producer price index for nursery, garden, and farm 
supply stores 
  PPI 
U.S. Average Farmer 
Wage 
U.S. all hired farm wage rate, quarterly data   dollars  Wage 
Housing Starts  Number of new privately owned housing units 
started, not seasonally adjusted 
thousand  H 
       
Nursery Type  Independent retailer    Dbb=0 
  Big-box store 
 
  Dbb=1 
Patented Plant  A distinct and new variety of plant with a patent    Dpatent 
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Table 4.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  N  Min  Max  Mean  Std Dev  CV 
Nursery PPI  21873  150  186  172  3.9  0.02 
U.S. Average Farmer Wage  21873  10.78  11.75  11.33  0.3  0.03 
Housing Starts  21873  526  2120  1137  542  0.48 
 
Notes: some variables are not reported for proprietary purposes.148 
 
 
Table 4.3. Hausman Test Results 
Plant Supply (equation 26) 
Dependent Variable: wholesale price 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-value 
Intercept  -4.827***  0.291  -16.57 
Quantity  0.049***  0.009  5.77 
Quantity * Picea  -0.113***  0.010  -10.87 
Quantity * Juniper  0.002  0.011  0.19 
Quantity * Acer  0.012  0.012  1.03 
Quantity * Buxus  -0.010  0.012  -0.81 
Quantity * Euonymus  0.038***  0.012  3.28 
Quantity * Berberis  0.004  0.012  0.34 
Quantity * Rhodo  0.032***  0.012  2.61 
Quantity * Heather  0.071***  0.015  4.77 
Quantity * Pinus  -0.119***  0.011  -10.39 
Nursery PPI_2-year Lag  1.240***  0.059  20.93 
Payment Grace Period  -0.110***  0.008  -14.2 
Winter  -0.001  0.010  -0.14 
Spring  0.006  0.009  0.65 
Summer  -0.038***  0.011  -3.62 
Medium Size  0.881***  0.008  104.89 
Medium-large Size  1.153***  0.010  111.1 
Large Size  1.654***  0.009  177.26 
wholesale price residual from equation (24)  -0.137***  0.009  -15.66 
       
Plant Demand (equation 27)     
Dependent Variable: plant quantity   
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-value 
Intercept  23.813***  4.055  5.87 
Quantity  -6.581***  0.224  -29.38 
Quantity * Picea  0.334***  0.071  4.74 
Quantity * Juniper  0.041  0.072  0.57 
Quantity * Acer  1.104***  0.108  10.24 
Quantity * Buxus  -0.240***  0.079  -3.03 
Quantity * Euonymus  -0.253***  0.085  -2.99 
Quantity * Berberis  0.035  0.083  0.42 
Quantity * Rhodo  0.521***  0.082  6.35 
Quantity * Heather  -0.465***  0.116  -4.01 
Quantity * Pinus  0.130*  0.076  1.72 
U.S. Average Farmer Wage  -7.074***  1.591  -4.45 
Gasoline Price  -0.780***  0.115  -6.77 
Housing Starts  0.721***  0.039  18.55 149 
 
 
Quantity * Patent  -0.088*  0.053  -1.65 
Patent Dummy  -0.844***  0.120  -7.03 
Bigbox Dummy  3.511***  0.047  75.08 
Winter  0.784***  0.057  13.82 
Spring  0.476***  0.039  12.07 
Summer  -0.388***  0.060  -6.50 
Medium Size  4.737***  0.188  25.21 
Medium-large Size  6.465***  0.249  25.95 
Large Size  9.001***  0.356  25.30 
Plant quantity residual from equation (25)  5.140***  0.226  22.79 
 
a. The asterisks ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
b. The coefficients of genus dummies are omitted. 
c. Italic denotes logged term. 
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Table 4.4. Parameter Estimates of the Structural Model: Plant Supply 
Dependent Variable: Wholesale price 
  3SLS  OLS 
Variable  Coefficients  t value  Coefficients  t value 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Intercept  -0.390**  -1.98  -4.590***  -15.53 
Quantity  0.042***  4.32  -0.068***  -15.40 
Quantity * Picea  -0.117***  -9.92  -0.045***  -8.11 
Quantity * Juniper  0.024*  1.90  -0.016***  -2.77 
Quantity * Acer  0.047***  3.48  0.026***  3.69 
Quantity * Buxus  -0.014  -0.97  -0.007  -1.10 
Quantity * Euonymus  0.052***  3.90  0.028***  4.42 
Quantity * Berberis  0.035***  2.62  0.022***  3.30 
Quantity * Rhodo  0.057***  4.17  0.040***  5.90 
Quantity * Heather  0.079***  4.72  0.041***  5.63 
Quantity * Pinus  -0.119***  -9.18  -0.056***  -9.02 
Nursery PPI_2-year Lag  0.348***  8.71  1.215***  20.14 
Payment Grace Period  -0.125***  -14.32  0.013**  2.03 
Winter  0.006  0.59  0.035***  3.62 
Spring  -0.002  -0.20  0.033***  3.55 
Summer  -0.061***  -5.18  -0.025**  -2.30 
Medium Size  0.887***  93.56  0.786***  99.98 
Medium-large Size  1.154***  98.43  1.060***  105.35 
Large Size  1.663***  158.15  1.500***  186.94 
Picea  0.903***  18.41  0.567***  22.19 
Juniper  -0.017  -0.30  0.106***  3.89 
Acer  0.881***  17.22  0.850***  30.08 
Buxus  0.264***  4.15  0.222***  7.20 
Euonymus  -0.106*  -1.85  -0.084***  -2.85 
Berberis  0.020  0.34  0.036  1.17 
Rhodo  -0.125**  -2.20  -0.103***  -3.36 
Heather  -0.272***  -3.55  -0.142***  -3.98 
Pinus  0.760***  14.73  0.446***  16.39 
         
R
2  0.7916    0.812   
P-value of over- 
identification test 
0.0001       
 
a. The asterisks ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
b. Italic denotes logged term. 
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Table 4.5. Parameter Estimates of the Structural Model: Plant Demand 
Dependent Variable: Wholesale price 
  3SLS  OLS 
Variable  Coefficients  t value  Coefficients  t value 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Intercept  1.723***  3.79  3.179***  3.18 
Quantity  -0.084***  -8.22  -0.090***  -20.53 
Quantity * Picea  -0.117***  -11.20  -0.042***  -7.73 
Quantity * Juniper  0.021*  1.90  -0.005  -0.89 
Quantity * Acer  0.042***  3.51  0.025***  3.54 
Quantity * Buxus  -0.014  -1.13  0.001  0.08 
Quantity * Euonymus  0.049***  4.12  0.030***  4.86 
Quantity * Berberis  0.029*  2.47  0.027***  4.02 
Quantity * Rhodo  0.057***  4.66  0.041***  6.14 
Quantity * Heather  0.079***  5.30  0.050***  7.01 
Quantity * Pinus  -0.119***  -10.36  -0.052***  -8.55 
U.S. Average Farmer Wage  -0.277  -1.55  -0.981**  -2.49 
Gasoline Price  -0.040***  -2.98  -0.085***  -2.96 
Housing Starts  0.054***  11.57  0.097***  10.88 
Quantity * Patent  0.022***  4.73  0.002  0.25 
Patent Dummy  -0.161***  -8.90  -0.110***  -3.94 
Bigbox Dummy  0.358***  15.96  0.336***  27.22 
Winter  0.078***  7.32  0.094***  6.79 
Spring  0.049***  5.16  0.055***  5.64 
Summer  -0.053***  -4.63  -0.062***  -4.38 
Medium Size  0.776***  81.46  0.770***  99.15 
Medium-large Size  1.047***  91.95  1.041***  104.91 
Large Size  1.477***  121.19  1.470***  184.32 
Picea  0.828***  18.93  0.557***  22.15 
Juniper  -0.022  -0.44  0.087***  3.20 
Acer  0.818***  17.88  0.863***  30.81 
Buxus  0.277***  4.91  0.209***  6.90 
Euonymus  -0.148***  -2.90  -0.077***  -2.62 
Berberis  0.027  0.52  0.042  1.35 
Rhodo  -0.155***  -3.05  -0.099***  -3.29 
Heather  -0.291***  -4.27  -0.165***  -4.71 
Pinus  0.655***  14.23  0.427***  15.91 
         
R
2      0.817   
P-value of over- 
identification test 
0.0001       
 
a. The asterisks ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
b. Italic denotes logged term. 
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Table 4.6.  Supply and Demand Elasticities at a Production Nursery 
  Supply Elasticity  Demand Elasticity 
    Non-Patented  Patented 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Coniferous Plants       
Pinus  -13.02  -4.94  -5.55 
Picea  -13.29  -4.98  N.A. 
Thuja  23.94  -11.97  -16.32 
Juniper  15.23  -16.07  -24.99 
       
Deciduous Plants and 
Evergreen Shrubs       
Buxus  35.53  -10.25  -13.27 
Berberis  13.04  -18.46  -31.31 
Acer  11.29  -24.13  -52.02 
       
Flowering Plants       
Euonymus  10.71  -28.58  -78.30 
Rhodo  10.10  -37.41  -221.73 
Heather  8.29  -200.44  N.A. 
 
a. Patent flag means a particular genus contains one or more patented varieties. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 153 
 
 
Table 4.7. Parameter Estimates of the Structural Model 
Plant Supply      Plant Supply     
Dependent variable: Wholesale Price  Dependent variable: Plant Quantity 
Variable  Coefficients  t value  Variable  Coefficients  t value 
  (1)  (2)    (3)  (4) 
Intercept  -2.501***  -8.27  Intercept  12.368**  2.51 
Quantity  0.027***  3.47  Price  -5.206***  -14.64 
Quantity * Picea  -0.068***  -7.78  Price * Picea  -1.334***  -14.67 
Quantity * Juniper  0.066***  7.01  Price * Juniper  -0.306***  -3.25 
Quantity * Acer  0.090***  9.16  Price * Acer  -0.681***  -5.02 
Quantity * Buxus  -0.011  -1.08  Price * Buxus  -0.043  -0.41 
Quantity * Euonymus  0.038***  3.92  Price * Euonymus  1.024***  9.43 
Quantity * Berberis  0.016  1.62  Price * Berberis  1.134***  10.45 
Quantity * Rhodo  0.027**  2.57  Price * Rhodo  1.593***  14.77 
Quantity * Heather  0.043***  3.48  Price * Heather  1.754***  11.85 
Quantity * Pinus  -0.055***  -5.63  Price * Pinus  -1.541***  -15.62 
Nursery PPI_2-year Lag  0.842***  13.41 
U.S. Average Farmer 
Wage  -2.519  -1.30 
Payment Grace Period  -0.188***  -24.69  Gasoline Price  -0.463***  -3.28 
Winter  -0.007  -0.67  Housing Starts  0.550***  11.30 
Spring  -0.008  -0.78  Price* Patent  1.724***  27.15 
Summer  -0.053***  -4.46  Patent Dummy  -4.292***  -29.46 
Medium Size  0.880***  93.36  Bigbox Dummy  3.430***  42.47 
Medium-large Size  1.156***  99.03  Winter  0.614***  7.32 
Large Size  1.663***  158.58  Spring  0.400***  6.01 
Picea  0.719***  19.02  Summer  -0.264***  -2.92 
Juniper  -0.196***  -4.62  Medium Size  3.274***  10.85 
Acer  0.732***  18.73  Medium-large Size  4.939***  12.36 
Buxus  0.258***  5.30  Large Size  7.053***  12.36 
Euonymus  -0.057  -1.30  Picea  5.239***  19.26 
Berberis  0.100**  2.22  Juniper  0.944***  4.64 
Rhodo  -0.016  -0.35  Acer  6.501***  11.79 
Heather  -0.104*  -1.82  Buxus  1.370***  5.89 
Pinus  0.532***  13.29  Euonymus  -1.421***  -6.37 
      Berberis  -1.165***  -4.92 
      Rhodo  -3.151***  -12.80 
      Heather  -2.047***  -8.10 
      Pinus  4.560***  17.42 
 
a. The asterisks ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
b. Italic denotes logged term. 154 
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This present dissertation systematically analyze the nursery production and 
marketing structure, including the nursery labor supply and demand, the nursery products 
supply and demand, and the sales contract between wholesaler and retailers.  The results 
have implications for the understanding of nursery production structure, management, 
and marketing strategy. 
In chapter 2, I have developed a framework to identify and estimate labor supply 
and demand in a simultaneous setting, and have used it to analyze policy and 
socioeconomic effects on the Oregon nursery labor market.  The results show that border 
control, the construction wage, the Oregon minimum wage, and the Mexican minimum 
wage affect immigrant location decisions and therefore agricultural labor supply.  Except 
for technology change, the Oregon minimum wage serves as the largest contributor to 
market wage variation, followed by the construction wage and border apprehension rate.  
On the other side, nitrogen prices, nursery product price, and technology change play 
important roles in growers’ labor demand decisions.  Except for technology change, 
nitrogen price is the largest contributor to the variation in working hours, followed by 
housing starts and the Oregon minimum wage rate.  Although much of the secular change 
in the agricultural labor market can be attributed to technology improvement, growers 
and farm workers do respond to the Oregon minimum wage and to border control efforts.  
Overall, the Oregon minimum wage is more effective than are border apprehension 
policies in boosting the average wage and in reducing the number of hours that illegal 
immigrants work in the nursery sector. 
In chapter 3, I have established a two-step model to investigate the relationship 
between contract type and retailer characteristics in the Oregon nursery industry.  The 
analysis suggests that big-box stores with annual contracts are less likely than are 
independent retailers with single-order contracts to make pre-order contracts with the 
producer.  However, once a pre-order contract is chosen, big-box stores demand a longer 
pre-order interval than independent retailers do.  Regarding payment type, pay-by-order 
contracts are more likely to provide a higher discount rate than are pay-by-scan contracts.  
Second, greater trust between producers and retailers reduces pre-order cost and boosts 156 
 
 
discount rates in pre-order contracts.  Third, the way in which the producer-nursery reacts 
to a retailer’s financial condition, proxied by the retailer’s debt-to-credit limit ratio, 
suggests the producer’s risk attitude varies by retailer type.  When a big-box retailer’s 
financial condition deteriorates, the producer-nursery reacts as a risk avoider toward a 
big-box stores.  Because independent retailers’ unpaid balances are much smaller than 
big-box stores’, a moderate discount may motivate independents to continue their 
business with the producer and hence eventually pay their unpaid balances.  The producer 
exhibits risk-neutral behavior toward an independent retailer.   
In chapter 4, I have developed a framework for identifying and estimating plant 
supply and demand at a single firm in a simultaneous setting, assuming the firm operates 
as a monopolistic competitor, and to assess the effects of macroeconomic factors in that 
setting.  Overall, average supply elasticity in the top-ten-in-sales genera is relatively high.  
The rather flat supply function reflects accumulated unused capacity and previously 
produced plants in many wholesale nurseries during the economic recession.  Average 
demand elasticity in the top-ten-in-sales genera is also high, implying either strong 
demand substitutability with other goods or high plant-consumer income elasticities.  At 
the genus level, supply and demand elasticities are similar within the coniferous plant, 
deciduous plant, and flowering plant groups but different across these groups.  Another 
interesting finding is that empirically, patenting seems to bring no direct signs of greater 
profitability.  The wholesale nursery may wish to reconsider the pricing and marketing 
policies of its patented plants to differentiate them more effectively from its non-patented 
plants.  
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